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The  dramatic  phenomenon  which  appeared  soon  after  Stalin's  death'in  March 
1953  in  the  Communist  world  was  the  strengthening  of  friendship  and  co- 
operation  between  the  two  largest  socialist  countries--the  Soviet  Union  and 
the  People's  Republic  of  China.  The  most  important  reason  was  that  the 
Soviet  leaders  wanted  to  make  use  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  to 
maintain  their  leading  position  in  the  socialist  camp  and  the  world 
Communist  movement.  For  the«Chinese,  the  main  reason  was  economic  rather 
than  political.  They  wanted  to  obtain  as  much  aid  as  possible  from  the 
Soviet  side,  while  implementing  their  first  five-year-plan  (1953-1957). 
Only  two  and  a  half  months  after  the  death  of  Stalin,  an  important 
agreement  was-signed  in  Moscow  for  assistance  to  China  in  the  constructions 
and  reconstruction  of  141  industrial  sites.  By  the  end  of  1953,  China'  s 
share  of  'the  USSR's  total  external  trade  turnover  amounted  to  20  per  cent, 
while  the  Soviet  Union's  share  of  China's  trade  was  55.6  per  cent. 
From  mid-1958  the  Chinese  method  of  building  socialism  began  to  take 
shape:  the  grouping  of  agricultural  co-operatives  into  large  People's 
Communes  combining  small-scale  industry  with  agriculture,  the  Great  Leap 
Forward.  In  the  eyes  of  the  Soviet  leaders  this  was  a  great  challenge  not 
only  to  orthodox  Marxist-thinking,  but  also  to  the  leading  position  of  the 
CPSU. 
What  is  more,  it  was  in  1958  that  it  first  became  apparent  that  China  and 
the  Soviet  Union  shared  different  views  on  a  number  of  foreign  policy 
issues  which  brought  the  conflict  to  a  state  of  high  tension.  First  it  was 
the  bombing  of  Jinmen  (Quemoy)  and  Mazu  (Matsu).  Then  came  the  Sino-Indian 
border  clash.  On  9  September,  in  spite  of  a  Chinese  request,  the  Soviet 
Foreign  Ministry  issued  a  "neutral"  statement,  providing  the  first  public 
indication  that  relations  were  deteriorating  rapidly..  Khrushchev's  China 
policy  appeared  to  have  two  elements: 
1)  To  increase-the  scale  of  Soviet  economic  aid  to  China,  thus 
reassuring  it  of  friendship  while  increasing  Soviet  penetration  of  its 
economy. 
2)  To  oust  Mao  Zedong  and  anti-Soviet  elements  from  the  Chinese 
leadership. 
The  period  from  1960-to  1969  was  characterised  by  the  Sino-Soviet  "cold 
war",  beginning  with  polemics  in  ideology  and  expanding  to  economic, political,  and  military  confrontation. 
Until  the  end  of  1962  both  sides  refrained  from  attacking  each  other 
directly.  The  Chinese  directed  their  attacks  against  "revisionism"  in 
general  and  the  Yugoslavs  in  particular;  the-  Russians  directed  their 
attacks  against  "dogmatism"  in  general  and  the  Albanians  in  particular. 
The  first  major  ideological  confrontation  took  place  at  the  Third  Congress 
of  the  Romanian  Worker's  Party  in  Bucharest  from  20-25  June  1960.  Then  on 
16  July  the  Soviet  government  informed  the  Chinese  government  of  its 
decision  to  withdraw  all  Soviet  technicians  working  in  China.  This 
unilateral  decision,  which  aroused  greater  resentment  in  China  than  any 
other  action,  struck  a  crushing  blow  at  China's  economy  at  a  time  when  the 
country  was  suffering  from  the  failure  of  the  Great  Leap  and  a  series  of 
natural  disasters.  The  Chinese  government  replied  with  charges  of 
revisionism.  But  as  the  economic  links  between  the  two  countries 
deteriorated,  the  Chinese  leaders  eventually  published  their  well-known 
nine  comments,  from  15  August  1963  to  14  July  1964,  strongly  criticizing 
both  Soviet  internal  and  external  policies. 
Sino-Soviet  relations  deteriorated  after  Khrushchev's  fall  in  October 
1964.  There  were  at  least  two  events  contributing  to  this.  One  was  a 
quarrel  about  taking  "unity  of  action"  to  aid  North  Vietnem,  suggested  by 
the  Soviet  leaders.  The  other  was  a  dispute  about  holding  an 
international  conference  of  all  Communist  parties  in  1965.  Party  relations 
were  broken,  although  no-one  at  the  time  thought  that  this  break  could 
continue  for  the  next  23  years. 
1966-1969  witnessed  the  high-tide  of  the  "Great  Proletarian  Cultural 
Revolution"  in  China,  and  this  put  the  PRC  in  full  confrontation  with  the 
USSR  for  two  decades.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  struggle  against  "Soviet 
revisionism"  which  dominated  Mao's  mind  in  his  later  years  was  one  of  his 
main  motives  for  starting  the  Revolution.  Liu  Shaoqi  whom  he  regarded  as 
China's'Khrushchev  and  the  representative  of  the  revisionist  line  inside 
the  Chinese  Party,  had  to  be  denounced.  -Smashing  revisionists  at  home  meant 
samashing  them  abroad  and  therefore  the  necessity  of  ending  the  few 
remaining  contacts  between  the  Russians  and  their  last  Chinese  informants. 
Simultaneously,  the  first  frontier  confrontations  took  place.  The 
boundary  question  between  the  PRC  and  the  USSR  is  but  has  occupied  an 
important  position  in  the  evolution  of  Sino-Soviet  relations.  However,  it only  led  to  fighting  when  relations  between  the  two  countries  deteriorated 
for  other  reasons.  Armed  clashes  occurred  on  2  and"15  March  1969,  on  the 
Island  in  the  Wusulijiang  (River  Ussuri)  called  Zhen  Bao,  just  a  few  weeks 
before  the  Ninth  Congress  of  the  CCP.  Mao  concluded  that  the  USSR  was 
behaving  like  a  young  imperialist  power  on  the  offensive  and  found'ample 
evidence  in  the  behaviour  of  Brezhnev. 
The  Soviet  Union's  policy  towards  China  in  the  1970s  seemed  to  want  to 
knock  together  an  "Asian  collective  security  system",  aimed  at  isolating 
China;  to  build  up  its  armed  forces  in  the  Far  East  to  put  pressure  on 
China  and  Japan  in  order  to  compete  with  the  United  States  in  the  Pacific 
Ocean;  to  use  the  "Cuba  of  Asia",  Vietnam,  as  its  agent,  to  sieze  the  whole 
of  Indochina  and  dominate  Southeast  Asia,  edging  the  United  States  out  of 
the  continent.  The  USSR's  invasion  of  Afghanistan  seemed  to  be  bent  on 
controlling  that  country,  but  also  on  furthering  its  long-term  strategic 
objective  of  expanding  its  power  in  South  Asia  and  the  Middle  East. 
The  Chinese  response  was  inevitably  hostile,  to  try  to:  a)  reduce  or 
eliminate  the  threat  of  a  "two  front  war"  involving  China  with  more  than 
one  major  enemy;  b)  more  generally  deflect  any  political  and  military 
pressure  against  the  PRC  by  seeking  to  prevent  "encirclement"  by  the  PRC's 
enemies;  c)  form  the  broadest  possible  international  united  front  against 
hegemonism;  d)  gain  stable,  diversified  foreign  trade  partners  and  sources 
of  advanced  technology  for  the  PRC,  thereby  enabling  China  to  modernize  its 
economy.  Under  Mao's  guidance  the  theory  of  the  Three  Worlds  was  put  into 
practice.  China  established  diplomatic  relations  with  many  capitalist 
countries;  and  in  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  there  was  a  limited 
Chinese-American  alliance  against  the  Soviet  Union. 
Mao's  death  and  Deng  Xiaoping's  succession  led  to  a  fundamental  change  in 
China's  internal  economic  policy  and  its  accompanying  ideology,  and 
gradually  also  to  a  change  in  its  attitude  to  the  Soviet  Union.  With 
Gorbachev's  succession  in  the  Soviet  Union  in  1985  there  were  corresponding 
changes,  making  an  eventual  rapproachement  possible.  The  evolution  of 
Soviet  policy  toward  China  began  on  24  March  1982  when  Brezhnev  made  his 
speech  in  Tashkent,  developed  through  28  July  1986  when  Gorbachev  made  his 
speech  in  Vladivostok,  and  culminated  in  May  1989  when  Gorbachev  came  to 
Beijing  to  have  the  first  Sino-Soviet  summit.  The  process  of 
normalization  of  Sino-Soviet  relations  was  complex  and  full  of  difficuties. China  identified  the  three  major  obstacles  as  both  a  barrier  to  positive 
change  and  as  a  genuine  test. 
The  year  1988  saw  a  breakthrough  in  eliminating  the  three  obstacles  as 
the  Soviet  Union  promised  to  withdraw  its  troops  from  Afghanistan  and 
reduce  its  forces  along  the  Sino-Soviet  frontier  and  in  Mongolia.  The 
Chinese  Foreign  Minister,  Qian  Qichen,  visited  Moscow  in  early  December 
1988,  accelerating  the  process  by  narrowing  the  differences  on  the 
remaining  topic  --  the  Kampuchean  issue  --  and  reaching  agreement  in 
principle  to  a  Sino-Soviet  summit. 
The  moment  when  Deng  Xiaoping  shook  hands  with  Gorbachev  on  16  May 
marked  the  normalization  between  the  two  largest  socialist  countries  and 
the  two  biggest  Communist  parties.  Deng  summed  up  the  summit  in  simple 
words  --  end  the  past  and  open  up  the  future  --  but  the  momentous  occasion 
was  over-shadowed  by  mounting  turmoil  in  Beijing.  The  long  row  was  over, 
but  events  since  have  shown  that  ideological  differences  could  recur,  even 
if  in  a  different  form. X  RYCOa  -l 
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Introduction 
When  the  Chinese  Communists  came  to  power  in  1949,  after  a  long  bloody 
armed  struggle  with  Jiang  Jieshe  of  the  Guomingdang,  who  was  supported  by 
the  U.  S.  Adiministration,  and  simultaneously  ideological  clashes  with  the 
Komintern,  which  was  supported  by  the  Soviet  Communists,  Stalin  was 
suspicious  the  the  People's  Republic  of  China  would  become  another 
Yugoslavia,  and  that  Mao  Zedung  would  become  another  Tito,  a  result  the 
Americans  sincerely  hoped  for  at  the  time.  Since  then  developments  in 
Sino-Soviet  relations  have  become  one  of  the  hottest  topics  for 
specialists  in  international  relations  and  politics.  There  is  an  enormous 
literature  published  in  the  West.  But  due  to  the  long-standing  antagonism 
between  China  and  the  USSR  it  has  been  very  difficult  for  Chinese  scholars 
to  do  research  on  the  subject.  For  many  years  Soviet  studies  was  one  of 
the  most  sensitive  areas  and  was  not  one  about  which  it  was  possible  to 
speak  and  write  freely.  Therefore,  as  one  of  the  first  Chinese  scholars 
doing  research  on  this  subject,  I  am  obliged,  first  of  all,  to  say 
something  about  developments  of  in  China  since  1949  when  the  regime  was 
established. ýJ- 
1.1  The  Nature  of  Soviet  Studies  in  China 
Russian  and  Soviet  -studies  in  China  have  a  long  history  because  of 
geographical,  economic  and  political  factors.  As  early  as  the  17th  century 
in  the  Qing  Dynasty,  a  delegation-  was  sent  by  the  emperor  Qian  Long  to 
Russia  and  Siberia.  «Not  long  after,  a  book  was  written  by  one  of  A  he 
delegates,  describing  what  he  had  seen  in  Russia  and  Siberia.  '  That  was  the 
first  book  written  by-a  Chinese  on  Russia. 
The  October  Revolution  in  1917  brought  a  chance  to  give  to  Russian 
studies  in  China  a  first  high  tide.  The  period  saw  a  nationwide  discussion 
on  the  Russian  revolution.  -  Hundreds  of  books  on  Russian  politics,  foreign 
policy,  economics  and  literature  were  translated  into  Chinese.  Large 
numbers  of  research  papers  were  published  in  various  journals  -and 
newspapers.  What  is  more,  hundreds  and  hundreds  of  young  people  went  to 
Russia  in  order  to  find  the  means.  which  would  save  China  from  poverty  and 
backwardness.  In  my  article  "The  Russian  October  Revolution  and  the  Chinese 
4  May  Movement",  I  have  traced  the  historical  background  for  the  founding 
of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  and  the  great  influence  of  the  October 
Revolution  on  the  Chinese  revolution.  2 
After  the  founding  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  Soviet  studies 
developed  in  a  new  direction.  But,  as  with  other  social  sciences,  Soviet 
studies  in"China  have  developed  in  a  very  tortuous  way  since  the  beginning 
of  the  1950s. 
In  the  early  1950s,  the-Chinese  people  followed  the  call  issued  by  the 
Party  to  start  intensive  study  of  the  Soviet  experience  in  building 
socialism.  In  order  to  meet  the  demand,  the  complete  works  of  Lenin  and 
Stalin  were  translated  into  Chinese  and  published  in  a  very  short  time. 
Between  1949  and  1952  alone,  more  than  3.000  books  from  the  Soviet  Union 3 
were  translated  and  published,  which  amounted  to  12  million  copies.  Many 
translations  were  produced  having  the  purpose  of  introducing  Soviet  theory 
and  practice  in  various  fields.  At  the  same  time,  great  efforts  were  made 
throughout  the  whole  nation  to  set  up  specialized  schools  for  teaching 
Russian  and  other  East  European  languages.  But  Soviet  studies  in  China  in 
that  period,  from  an  academic  point  of  view,  were  not  profound  and 
systematic.  They  had  three  features:  ' 
1)  There  were  no  specialized  institutions  of  Soviet  studies  in  the 
country.  Some  research  was  done  within  executive  departments  of  the 
government,  mainly  aimed  at  teaching  practical  know-how:  for  the 
construction  of  the  new'China. 
2)  The  main  aim  of  Soviet  studies  was  to  introduce  Soviet  experience  to 
China  and  spread  general  knowledge  about  the  Soviet  Union  among  the  Chinese 
people.  This  approach  was  very  elementary  and  one-sided.  In  other  words,  it 
affirmed  everything  done  in  the  USSR.  There  were  both  internal  and  external 
reasons  for  this.  Internally,  many  people,  especially  leaders  of  the  CCP, 
regarded  the  Soviet  model  of  socialism  as'  an  ideal  one.  3  Externally,  the 
capitalist  world,  with  the  USA  at  its  head,  displayed  a  rather  hostile 
policy  towards  China.,  '  China  had  no  alternative  but  to  take  the  Soviet 
Union  as  its  instructor. 
3)  However,  the  Chinese  people  began  to  know  the  Soviet  Union  better  in 
these  circumstances.  Some  students  were  trained  to  be  serious  specialists 
on  Soviet  affairs.  All  that  helped  to  lay  down  the  basic  foundations  for 
the  further  development  of  Soviet  studies  in  China. 
The  period  from  the  mid  1960s  to  the  late  1970s  was  a  very  complex  period 
in  the  history  of  'Soviet  studies  in  China  with  its  own  characteristic 
features.  .  It  is  common  knowledge  that  there  were  great  changes  taking 4 
place  in  Sino-Soviet  relations  at  the  time.  In  face  of  the  'new  situation, 
the  first  Institute  specializing  in  Soviet:  studies  was  set  up  in  Beijing  in 
1963.  But  regretably  Soviet  studies,  like  other  academic  disciplines,  met  a 
serious  setback  during  the  Cultural  Revolution.  Three  points  ought  to  be 
borne  in  mind. 
1)  The  basis  for  Soviet  studies  during  this  period  in  China  was  not 
academic  but  dogmatic.  The  Soviet  Union  was  criticized  in  an  'unrealistic 
way.  The  reason  was  that  China-itself  was  then  dominated  by  'leftist' 
thinking. 
2)  Under  these  circumstances  many  researchers  still  tried  to  write  a 
few  good  papers,  which  promoted  Soviet  studies  in  China.  Nevertheless, 
these  articles  exposed  and  criticized  the  Soviet  policies  of  'hegemonism' 
and  'expansionism.  ' 
3)  During  the  period  a  research  force  was  developed  and  maintained 
which  was  a  combination  of  old,  middle-aged  and  young  scholars. 
This  was  the  foundation  on  which  from  1979  there  coule  be  arapid  and 
intensive  development  of  Soviet  studies  in  China.  For  the  past  10  years, 
Soviet  specialists  in  China  have  been  more  active  than  ever.  Their 
activities  can  be  seen  in  the  following  developments: 
1)  More  institutes-for  Soviet  studies-have  been  set  up.  Apart  from 
existing  institutions  in  executive  departments  of  the  government,  the 
Chinese  Academy  of  Social-  Sciences  and  some  universities  and  provincial 
academies  of  social  sciences  have  also  founded  specialized  institutions.  In 
all  there  are  now  about  100  in  China  with  more  than  2,000'scholars  engaged 
in  Soviet  and  East  European  studies.  In  September  1982,  -  China's  National 
Association  for  Soviet  and  East  European  Studies  (CNASEES)  was  founded  in 
Shanghai,  and  the  first  national  conference  was  held  at  the  same  time.  More 5 
than  300  scholars,  with  more  than  200  papers,  attended  the  conference. 
CNASEES  set  up  a  secretariat  in  charge  of  daily  activities  based  in  the 
Institute  in  Beijing.  In  October  1984,120  members  of  the  Council  of  the 
CNASEES  gathered  in  Chendu  to  discuss  how  to  promote  Soviet  studies  in 
China  further. 
2)  Periodicals  concerned  with  Soviet  and  East  European  affairs  have 
increased  to  more  than  30.  Quite  ,a  few  books,  pamphlets,  yearbooks  and 
books  translated  from  foreign  languages  have  been  published  in  recent 
years., 
3)  Great  efforts  have  been  made  to  improve  library  collections.  In  May 
1984,  on  the  initiative  of  CNASEES,  60-people  from  40  libraries  held  a 
meeting  in  Harbin  which  set  up  a  network  for  exchanging=  information  and 
books  among  libraries. 
4)  Academic  exchanges  between-scholars  of  China-and  of  foreign  countries 
have  been  increasing.  In`'the  past  few  years,  -  Chinese  scholars  and 
institutions  have  established  academic  links  with  the  United  States, 
Britain,  West  Germany,  Canada,  Australia,  Japan,  -  the  Soviet  Union  itself 
and  East  European  countries. 
5)  Research  projects  have  been  broadened  and  the  quality  of-research  has 
been  improved.  Many  new  institutions  have  shifted  from  doing  mainly 
translation  to  actual  research  activities. 
But  problems  remain.  These  can  be  summarized  as  follows: 
1)  There  are  budget  problems,  especially  for  local  institutions. 
2)  There  is  a  shortage  of  young  people  in  the  field  of  Soviet  studies. 
3)  Great  efforts  still  have  be  made  to  improve  library  facilities. 
4)  It  is  very  difficult  to  have  academic  books  published  in  time., 6 
5)  Certain  areas,  such  as  relations  with  the  USSR  remain  sensitive,  and 
objectivity  is  difficult. 
1.2  The  Chinese  Attitude  to  Russia  and  the  Soviet  Union 
Sino-Soviet  relations  can  be  looked  at  from  two  main  angles:  the  state; 
and  the  party.  As  far  as  Sino-Russian,  late  Sino-Soviet  relations-are 
concerned,  the  great  proportion  by  far  has  fallen  in  the  imperial  stage  of 
the  two  countries,  during  the  respective  rules  of  the  Qing  (1644-1912)  and 
Romanov  (1613-1917)  dynasties.  For  more  than  three  centuries,  despite 
quarrels  and  occasional  border  clashes,  there  was  no  full  scale  war  between 
the  two  countries.  Similarly,  they  have,,  not  warred  against  each  other 
during  more  than  half  a  century  of  Communist  rule  in  Soviet  Russia  and-of 
warlord,  Jiang,  and  then  Communist  rule  in  China. 
As  for  the  parties'  relations,  they  can  be  traced  to  the  early  and  the 
mid  1920s.  In  the  mid  1920s,  Soviet  policy  towards  China  was  dominated  by 
fear  of  a  possible  British-Japanese  alliance  which  would  strangle  the 
Chinese  revolution  then  in  progress  and,  worse  still,  threaten  the  security 
of-the  Soviet  Union.  Stalin's  purpose  therefore  was  not  to  foment  Communist 
revolution  in  China,  which  he  thought,  in  any  case,  had  little  chance  of 
success,  but  to  build  up  a  strong  "anti-imperialist"  eChina  which  would 
serve  as  a  Soviet  ally  against  a  British-Japanese  axis.  The  vehicle  chosen 
for  Stalin's  China  policy  was  the  Guomindang.  To  strengthen  the  Guomindang, 
Stalin,  -via  the  Comintern,  ordered  the  Chinese  Communists  to  merge  with  it 
and  to  subordinate  their  own  social  and  political  aspirations  temporarily 
to  those  of  the  Kuomindang. 
Then  came  the  1927  disaster.  Jiang  Jieshe  -(Chiang  Kai-shek)  annihilated 
the  Chinese  Communist  Party  in  Shanghai  on  12  April  1927,  and  thus  dealt  a 7 
disastrous  blow  to  Stalin's  China  policy  and  an  almost  fatal  blow  to  the 
Chinese  Communists.  Stalin,  as  Zagoria  observed,  refusing  to  believe  that 
the  Guomindang  could  not  be  utilized  as  a  vehicle  for  Soviet  policy  in 
spite  of  its  policies  toward  the  Chinese  Communists,  and  increasingly  bound 
up  in  his  struggle  against  Trotsky  in  which  he  could  ill  afford  to  concede 
his  mistakes,  pursued  his  policy  of  unity  with  the  Kuomindang.  The  Chinese 
Communists  went  underground.  Remnants  of  the  Party  were  rescued  by  Mao 
Zedong,  who  led  them  to  the  hills  where  they  remained  for  many  years  until, 
in  the  mid  1930s,  after  bloody  fighting  with  Jiang  they  made  the  Long 
March  to  the  north  to  lay  the  foundations  for  a  base  from  which  to  seize 
powers  From  1927  on,  as  George  Kennan  has  suggested,  Moscow  had,  in  the 
Chinese  Communists  "an  ally  but  not  a  satellite.  "-  Stalin  made  the  same 
mistake  again,  in  the  second  half  of  the  1940s,  after  victory  in  the 
Second  World  War,  when  the  Chinese  Communists  were  fighting  with  Jiang  for 
control  of  China.  He  underrated  the  potential  for  revolution;  he  did  not 
believe  that  the  Chinese  Communists  were  a  match  for  Jiang  Jieshi's 
excellently  equipped  army  of  many  million  men,  backed  by  the  US  while  the 
Soviet  Union  was  unable  to  offer  its  help.  That  was  why  Stalin  had 
originally  disagreed  with  any  policy  that  led  to  war.  He  later  admitted 
his  mistake  when  he  had  talks  with  Liu  Shaoqi,  the  head  of  the  CC  CCP 
delegation,  in  July  1949.  Shi  The  described  this  in  his  article  entitled  "I 
Accompanied  Chairman  Mao":  "During  the  second  talk.  Stalin  asked  Liu 
Shaoqi:  'Have  we  been  much  of  a  hindrance  to  you?  '  Liu  Shaogi  said  'no'. 
But  Stalin  observed  seriously:  'We  must  have  been,  for  we  are  not  too  well 
versed  in  Chinese  affairs.  "7 
Later  when  Mao  Zedong  came  to  Moscow  in  December  1949,  he  said  to  Stalin, 
"I  have  been  beaten  up  and  pushed  around  for  a  long  time,  and  had-no  one  to 8 
complain  to...  ".  Stalin  intervened  by  saying,  "Winners  are  not  judged  or 
censured.  that  is  a  universal  fact.  "e 
A  brief  review  of  this  early  experience  with  Russia  and  the  Soviet 
Unioncontributes  to  an  understading  of  the  later  Sino-Soviet  conflict  in 
several  respects.  First  of  all,  it  makes  plain  why  Mao  was  determined  to 
"maintain  much  greater  independence  from  Moscow.  "9  Second,  it  explains  why 
the  Chinese  Communists  believed  that  the  Russians  were  repeating  from  the 
late  1950s  "the  very  same  error  they-had  committed  in  China  in  the  late 
1920s  and  1930s--sacrificing  local  Communist  parties  to  Soviet 
interests.  "10  Third,  the  sorry  Russian  record  in  China  had  clearly  made  the 
Chinese  leaders,  especially  Mao,  much  more  reluctant  to  compromise  with  a 
partner  possessing  "little  comprehension  of  the  revolutionary  process  in 
underdeveloped  countries.  ""  Finally,  the  early  experience  planted  a  seed 
for  ideological  dispute  in  the  coming  years. 
1.3  Alliance,  Rivalry  and,  Ideology 
This  paper  is  primarily  a  review  of  relations,  between  the-two  largest 
socialist  countries  in  the  world,  the  Soviet'-Union  and  the  People's 
Republic  of  China,  from  the  early  1950s,  when-Khrushchev  came-to  power  and 
the  Soviet  and  the  Chinese  governments  concluded-  what,  appeared  to  an 
amicable  alliance,  through  the  remakable  changes,  up  to  the  May  1989,  when 
Gorbachev  went  to  Beijing  to  the  summit  meeting-with  Chinese  leaders  and 
established  normalization.,  - 
The  reason  for  choosing  the  period  from  1953-1989  is  because,  after 
Stalin's  death  on  5'  March  1953,  an  old  page  in  the  history  of  the 
international  communist  movement  was  turned  and  replaced  by  a  new  one, 9 
especially  as  regards  the  relations  between  the  CPSU  and  the  CCP. 
. 
The  evolution  of  Sino-Soviet  relations  since  the  early  1950s  can  be 
divided  into  four  stages.  From  early  the  1950s  to  1959  was  the  first  stage, 
in  which  China  entered  an  alliance  with  the  Soviet  Union  to  fight  against 
interference  and  encirclement  by  the  United  States;  the  period  from  1960 
to  1969  can  be  viewed  as  the  second  stage  when  the  Sino-Soviet  "cold  war" 
took  place;  the  third  stage  was  from  1970  to  1979,  when  China  was  "striking 
with  both  fists"  to  meet  the  threat  from  the  two  superpowers  but  taking  the 
Soviet  Union  as  the  more  dangerous  enemy;  from  1980  to  May  1989  came  the 
fourth  stage  in  which  the  two  countries  took  steps  towards  normalization 
of  their  relations. 
The  demise  of  a  united  -international  communist  movement  profoundly 
transformed  the  revolutionary  challenges  to  capitalism  in  both  the  Third 
World  and  the  capitalist  countries  themselves.  What  did  socialist 
revolution  mean  when  the  conflict  between  the  two  most  prominent  examples 
of  "existing  socialism"  loomed  larger  than  their  conflict  with  US 
imperialism?  The  split  even  had  profound  implications  for  the  political 
economy  of  all  the  socialist  countries.  The  radical  political  and  economic 
transformations  occurring  today  throughout  the  socialist  world  could  not 
have  been  launched  without  polycentric  communism.  It  is  difficult  to 
conceive  of  what  the  world  would  be  like  today  if  there  had  been  no  Sino- 
Soviet  split.  3 
How  did  such  a  complete  turn  of  events  in  the  socialist  world  come  about? 
What  had  changed  in  the  communist  relationship?  What  impact  did  it-have  on 
the  West?  What  were  the  roots  of  the  conflict?  Up  to  now,  there  have  been 
at  least  three  schools  of  thought  on  these  questions.  They  are,  roughly 
speaking,  Chinese,  Soviet  and  Western. 10 
The  Chinese  version  can  be  found  in  an  article  published  in  Renmin  Ribao 
on  6  September  1963.  '2  This  article  tried  to  answer  the  question  how  the 
differences  had  arisen  between  the  leaders  of  the  CPSU  and  of  the  CCP.  "A 
whole  series  of  differences  of  principle"  first  of  all  appeared  at  the 
20th  Congress  of  the  CPSU  in  1956  when"  Khrushchev  denounced  Stalin. 
Secondly,  Khrushchev  put  forward  the  theory  of  "peaceful  transition"  which 
was  incompatible  with  the  principles  of  the  October  Revolution.  He  did 
this  without  any  prior  consultation  with  the  fraternal  parties.  Thirdly, 
the  Soviet  leadership  developed  a  line  of  "Soviet-US  cooperation  for  the 
settlement  of  world  problems"13  and  distorted  Lenin's  correct  principle  of 
peaceful  co-existence  between  countries  with  different  social  systems. 
Fourthly,  Soviet  leaders  "put  forward  unreasonable  demands  designed  to 
bring  China  under  Soviet  military  control"'-'  and  "levelled  many  virulent 
attacks  against  the  domestic  and  foreign  policies  of  the  Chinese  Communist 
Party.  "16  They  took  economic  sanctions  and  colluded  with  Indian 
reactionaries  to  put  pressure  on  China.  Fifthly,  the  Soviet  leadership 
split  the  international  communist  movement  by  openly  attacking  fraternal 
parties.  The  Chinese  Communist  Party  could  not  keep  silent  about  all  these 
errors. 
As  for  the  Soviet  version,  its  most  typical  expression  'is  in  the  book 
written  by  O.  B.  Borisov  and  B.  T.  Kolosov.  16  They  trace  the  roots  of  the 
Sino-Soviet  dispute  to  the  following: 
-1)  The  personality  cult  of  Mao  enabled.  him  to  destroy  the  basically 
healthy  Chinese  Communist  Party  and  put  forward  an  extreme  ethnic-based 
policy  for  China  which  inevitably  resulted  in  the  policy  of  anti-Sovietism. 
2)  The  Mao  group  opposed  the  Soviet  Union  in  carrying  out  its  policy  of 
peaceful  co-existence  with  imperialist  countries,  especially  with  the ii 
United  States.  From  1957  Mao  tried  to  force  the  USSR  to  take  a  more 
bellicose  position  in  dealing  with  international  affairs,  which  almost 
resulted  in  nuclear  confrontation  with  the  United  States  during  the  Taiwan 
Straits  crisis  and  the  Sino-Indian  border  conflict.  This  was  the  basic 
reason  for  the  Soviet  Union's  adopting  a  hostile  attitude  towards  China. 
3)  The  Mao  group  was  ungrateful  for  Soviet  aid  and  Soviet  efforts  to 
promote  China's  interests  in  the  international  arena.  The  result  was  that 
the  CCP  decided  to  be  independent  from  the'Soviet  Union  and  other  socialist 
countries  in  building  socialism. 
4)  The  Chinese  leadership  violated  the  principle  that  should  govern 
relations  among  socialist  countries.  They  persisted  in  having  open 
polemics  and  leaking  confidential  materials  which  were  important  for  the 
party  and  the  country.  They  refused,  to  take  coordinated  steps  to  harmonize 
their  foreign  policy  with  the  Soviet  Union's. 
5)  The  anti-Soviet  attitude  cultivated  by  the  Mao  group  was  increasingly 
strengthened  and  reached  its  culmination  during  the  cultural  revolution  and 
the  Sino-Soviet  "border  clashes.  The  anti-Soviet  policy  of  the  CCP  was  to 
describe  the  USSR  as  a  reactionary  revisionist  country  which  colluded  with 
US  imperialism  opposing  the  revolutionary  national  liberation  movement. 
By  doing  so  the  CCP  tried  to  split  the  international  communist  movement. 
From  the  West's  point  of  view,  the  roots  of  the  Sino-Soviet  rift  were 
the  following:  '? 
1)  The  CCP  established  an  Asiatic''form  of  Marxism--Mao  Zedong  thought, 
which  troubled  Mao's  relations  with  the  Soviet  leadership.  From  1949  the 
Chinese  Communists  persisted  in  claiming  that  Mao  had  'discovered  a  model 
to  be  followed  in  other  colonial  and  semi-colonial  countries.  The  Chinese 
explicitly  claimed  that  Mao's  theories  on  revolution  were  independently 12 
arrived  at,  while  the  Russians  consistently  -endeavored,  to  show  his 
complete  dependence  on  Stalin. 
2)  There  was  a  great  difference  in  the  revolutionary  experience  of  the 
Soviet  and  Chinese  Communist  parties.  The  Russian  Bolsheviks  came  to  power 
almost  overnight  without  any  experience  in  guerrilla  warfare  and  believed 
that  revolutionary  opportunities  would  arise  during  a  -time  of  national 
crisis,  in  which  the  ruling  classes  would  have  become  so  weakened  that  they 
would  topple  almost  of  their  own  weight.  The  Chinese,  by  contrast,  came-to 
power  after  a  struggle  lasting  more  than  two  decades;  their  revolutionary 
experience  was  almost  entirely  based  on  protracted  guerrilla  warfare,  and 
they  believed  that  the  way  to  take  power  was  through  arduous  armed  struggle 
over  an  extended  period  of  time. 
3)  Differences  in  the  political  'environment  of  the  USSR  and  the  PRC 
gave  rise  to  further  divergence  of  outlook.  The  separation  of  the  island  of 
Taiwan,  for  instance,  threatened  the  very  legitimacy  of  the  Chinese 
Communist  revolution  and  stood  in  the  way  of  its  final  consolidation.  There 
was  no  Soviet  parallel  to  this  phenomenon.  As  regards  the  relations  with 
the  United  States,  the  Chinese  feared  that  their  Russian  allies  would 
strive  to  reach  a  bargain  with  the  US  that  would  sacrifice  Chinese 
interests,  because  only  the  Russians  could  negotiate  with  the  US  at  the 
time.  L 
4)  The  different  economic  situations  and  policies  of  the  two  countries 
contributed  to  the  origins  of  the  conflict. 
5)  There  were  different  military  policies  as  well.  - 
6)  There  were  also  separate  revolutionary  interests  between  the  two 
countries. 
Generally  speaking  this  is  a  reasonable  assessment.  But  one  should  not 13 
ignore  the  special  values  and  characteristics  in  the  relations  between 
countries  ruled  by  communist  parties.  Their  relationship  is  established  on 
a  basis  totally  different  from  that  of  the  capitalist  countries.  They  are 
expected  to  replace  national  interests  by  the  demands  of  unanimity  of 
ideology,  and  share  the  responsibility  of  proletarian  internationalism  -- 
that  is,  support  the  international  communist  movement,  national  liberation 
movements  and  the  fight  against  imperialism.  The  Sino-Soviet  dispute,  not 
only  in  the  eyes  of  some  other  socialist,  countries  but..  at  least 
theoretically  in  the  eyes  of  the  leaders  in  Beijing  and  Moscow,  was 
temporary.  The  root  of  the  conflict  was  regarded  not  as  the  conflict  of 
national  interests,  but  as  the  result  of  wrong  policies  -.  carried  out  by 
certain  leaders  at  the  time.  1e 
Given  the  priority  of  putting  ideology  first,  criticism  of  wrong 
policies  and  of  certain  leaders  became  a  critical  task  for,  Communists. 
This  criticism  in  China  was  gradually  developed  into  the  struggle  against 
"modern  revisionism"  which  became  the  core  of  the  theory  of"class  struggle 
and  resulted  in  fundamental-  changes  in  Sino-Soviet  relations.  This 
dissertation,  therefore,  -  puts  particular  emphasis  on  the  internal  and 
external  ideological  factors  affecting  the  changing  relations  between  China 
and  the  Soviet  Union. 
After  the  20th  Congress  of  the  CPSU  in  February-1956,  Mao  Zedong  viewed 
the  changes  in  the  international  communist  movement  positively.  The 
criticism  of  Stalin  and  the  re-thinking  of  the  Soviet  model  for  building 
socialism  gave  him  much  inspiration  for  his  own  "new  thinking"  which  can 
be  summed  up  as  follows: 
1)  Now  that  society'  had  been  transformed  from  an  old  stage  to  a  new 
one,  the  class  struggle  had  ended.  People  could  use  peaceful-methods  to 14 
protect  the  productive  forces  instead  of  using  the  method  of  class 
struggle. 
2)  Criticism  of  Stalin  had  helped  to  destroy  mysticism.  Everybody-could 
speak  openly.  This  was  real  liberation.  The  fight  now  was  for  freedom 
and  equality  which  had  been  regarded  as  the  slogan  only  for  the 
bourgeoisie.  19  I 
3)  Let  a  hundred  flowers  bloom  and  let  a  hundred  schools  of  thought 
contend.  Mao  also  agreed  with  the  analysis  made-by  the  8th  Congress  of  the 
CCP  about  the  main  contradiction  in  China,  that  is  the  contradiction 
between  advanced  productive  relations  and  backward  productive  forces. 
Unfortunately  this  "new  thinking"  was  short-lived.  The  Hungarian  incident 
and  the  anti-rightist  movement  inside  China  alarmed  Mao.  And  he  began  to 
reassess  the  internal  and  external  situation. 
Externally,  as  the  Sino-Soviet  dispute  developed,  Mao  began  to  believe 
that  "revisionism"  had  appeared  in  the  leadership  of  the  Soviet  Union.  He 
said  at  a  Party  meeting  that  "...  revisionism  came  and  put  pressure  on  us. 
Our  attention  was  diverted  to  opposing  Khrushchev.  From  the  second  half  of 
1958  he  wanted  to  blockade  the  Chinese  coastline.  "211  In  July  1959  at  the 
Lushan  conference,  Mao  suggested  printing  three  foreign  reports  in  which 
Khrushchev  criticized  the  People's  Commune. 
In  January  1960,  at  the  working  conference  of  the  Central  Committee  of 
the  CCP  held  in  Shanghai,  Mao  circulated  the  pamphlet  "How  the  Foreign 
Bourgeoisie  Look  at  the  Sino-Soviet  Dispute"  and  said  that  it  was 
necessary  for  China  to  express  its  viewpoint  openly.  In  April,  in  the  same 
spirit,  three  important  articles  including  the  one  entitled  "Long  Live 
Leninism"  were  published  throughout  China. 
Mao  still  placed  hope  in  a  change  of  Khrushchev's  attitude  before21 15 
his  conclusion  about  "Soviet  revisionism"  was  firmly  entrenched  in  October 
1961  when  22nd  Congress  of  the  CPSU  adopted  its  new  programme.  Things  took 
a  turn  for  the  worse  as  relations  -between  the  two  countries 
deteriorated.  In  September  1963  the  first  public  comment  on  the  open  letter 
of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  CPSU,  "The  Origin  and  Development  of.  the 
Differences  Between  the  Leadership  of  the  CPSU  and  Ourselves,  "  published  in 
Renmin  Ribao  said  that  22nd  Congress  of  the  CPSU  -  "marked  the 
systematisation  of  the  revisionism  which  the  leadership  of  the  CPSU-has 
developed  step  by  step  from  the  20th  Congress  onward.  "22-This  was  obviously 
the  conclusion  that  Mao  drew  from  the  22nd  Congress.  - 
In  January  1962,  Mao  officially  but  privately  stated  his  views  to  an 
Enlarged  Central  Work  Conference  (i.  e.,  a  7,000  person  conference).  He  said 
that  the  "Soviet  Union  was  the  first  socialist  country,  and  the  Soviet 
Communist  Party  was  the  Party  created  by  Lenin.  But  although  the  Party  and 
the  state  leadership  have  now  been  usurped  by  the  revisionists,  -I  advise 
our  comrades  to  believe  firmly  that  the  broad  masses,  the  numerous  Party 
members  and  cadres  of  the  Soviet  Union  are  good;  that  they  want  revolution, 
and  that  the  rule  of  the  revisionists  won't  last  long.  "23  From  then  on  the 
word  "revisionism"  had  a  special  meaning  in  the  CCP's  documents  and 
published  articles.  The  CCP  seized  the  initiative  in  safeguarding  Marxism- 
Leninism.  At  that  time,  nobody  including  Mao  himself  was  sceptical  about 
the  correctness  of  the  task. 
Internally,  Mao  was  not  at  all  satisfied  with  a  situation  in  which  he 
feelt  a  potential  danger  similar  to  that  of  the  Soviet  Union.  This 
potential  danger  was  later  regarded  as  the  three  winds:  Heianfeng  (the 
wind  of  blackening  the  situation);  Danganfeng  (the  wind  for  having  family 
contracting  system  in  agriculture);  -  Fananfeng  (the  wind  of  reversing 16 
correct  verdicts  for  rightists).  The  result  was  a  distorted  observation 
of  the  internal  development  of  the  class  struggle,  which  was,  to  a  large 
extent,  decided  by  subjectivism.  However,  this  observation  had  an 
unpredicted  effect  on  the  formulation  of  his  theory  of  class  struggle, 
especialy  when  he  connected  and  compared  the  potential  danger  in  China  with 
the  realistic  danger  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Mao  also  suggested  that  right- 
wing  opportunism  in  China  be  renamed  as  Chinese  revisionism.  24  ', 
After  some  deliberation,  -  Mao  at  last  decided  that  the  class  struggle 
should  be  waged  by  the  whole  Party  and  had  this  decided,  at  the  *10th 
Plenum  of  the  8th  Central  Committee  of  the  CCP  held  inSeptember  1962.  This 
decision  was  later  called  a  basic  line  for  the  Party  to  follow  through  the 
whole  historical  period  from  socialism  to  communism.  - 
It  should  be  pointed  out  that,  because  of  his  belief  that  "Soviet 
revisionists"  had  come  to  power,  Mao  reiterated  the  class  struggle  from  the 
strategic  point  of  view  specifically  for  opposing  and-  preventing 
revisionism.  It  was  not  as  simple  as  the  repetition  of  the  anti-rightist 
movement  in  1957.  On  the  one  hand,  the  theory,  of  the  class  struggle  in 
socialist  society,  owing  to  the  need  to  oppose  revisionism,  became,  -a 
theory  for  guiding  the  practice  not  only  of  one  country,  but  also  of  the 
international  Communist  movement.  On  the  other  hand,  because  of  the 
emergence  of  the  theory,  the  task  of  opposing  "modern  revisionism"  become 
ever  more  urgent  for  Mao. 
The  Central  Committee  of  the  CCP  sent  t-a  letter.  to'the  Central  Committee 
of  the  CPSU  on  14  June  1963,  in  reply  to  the  CPSU  letter  of  30  March,  that 
started  the  Sino-Soviet  polemics.  Mao  personally  entitled  the  letter  "The 
CCP's  Proposals  Concerning  the  General  Line  of  the  International  Communist 
Movement.  "  He  established  guidelines 
. 
for  conducting  the  polemics:  adhere 17 
to  principle  and  unity,  struggle  firmly  but  keep  room  for  manoeuvre, 
strike  back  only  after  the  Soviet  Union  strikes,  and  oppose  splits.  Mao 
also  supervised  the  work  for  rectification  of  the  "Jig  Ping"  (Nine 
Comments). 
The  polemics  ended  on  21  November  1964,  when  Hongqi  published  its 
editorial  "Why  Khrushchev  Fell".  a  period  of  one  year  and  five  months.  All 
the  polemics  can  be  summed  up  in  one  question:  that  is,  what  sort  of 
general  line  should  be  taken  by  the  international  communist  movement  at 
the  time.  Neither  side  ever  questioned  the  necessity  and  rationality  of 
having  this  general  line  for  the  socialist  countries  and  communist  parties. 
On  the  contrary,  both  considered  that  it  was  fully  necessary  to  reflect 
the  common  rules  and  needs  of  the  international  communist  movement. 
Actually  developments  have  proved  that  keeping-  a  central  or  a  general 
line  is  Fnot  beneficial  but  harmful  to  the  international  communist 
movement,  since  there  are  enormous  differences  among  the  socialist 
countries  and  communist  parties. 
During  the  polemics,  Mao's  theory  was  further  developed  to  become  a 
model,  which  made  the  whole  Party  form  the  habit  of  thinking  in  one  fixed 
way,  considering  all  the  contradictions  in  society  as  a  reflection  of 
the  class  struggle,  and-class  struggle  inside  one  country-as  a  reflection 
of  the  international  class  struggle. 
First  of  all,  Mao  concentrated  on  the  roots  of  "modern  revisionism".  The 
Moscow  Declaration  of  1957  had  said  that  "the  existing  influence  of  the 
bourgeoisie  is  the  internal  source  of  revisionism,  while  yielding  to  the 
pressure  of  imperialism  is  the  external  source  of  revisionism.  "  Mao  said 
these  two  sentences  were  proposed  by  him.  25 
After  the  Sino-Soviet  polemics  began.  Mao  became.  clearer  about'  the 18 
source  of  revisionism.  In  a  talk  with  a  Vietnamese  delegation  in  June  1963, 
he  said  that  it  was  not  accidential  for  revisionism  to  appear.  It  must 
have  its  social  and  economic  basis.  Occasional  or  non-systemic  error  could 
not  be  regarded  as  revisionism  but  only  a  question  of  understanding.  There 
was  a  process  to  realize  this.  And  there  was  also  a  process  for  the  Soviet 
leaders  to  develop  but  Mao  said  that  he  was  not-sure  the  Soviet  leaders 
could  change.  26  - 
In  September  the  same  year,  Mao  added  another  idea.  It  might  seem  quite 
strange  that  those  people  who  were  the  supporters  of  the  revolution  and 
scientific  socialism  had  become  revisionists  and  opponents  of  the 
revolution  and  scientific  socialism.  In  fact,  it  was  not  strange  atiall. 
Everything  in  the  world  could  be  divided.  This  applied  to  theory  as  well. 
The  revolutionary  and  scientific  theory  must  produce,  in  the  course  of  its 
development,  its  opposite  theory.  Now  there  was  a  division  of  classes  in 
society.  Ten  thousand  years  later  there  would  still  be  differences  among 
various  groups.  27 
While  pondering  the  roots  of  "modern  revisionism",  Mao  was  thinking 
deeply  about  one  major  problem  concerning  the  fate  of  the  country  and  the 
Party,  that  is  how  to  provent  the  "Soviet  tragedy"  from  repeating-itself  in 
China.  When  the  Sino-Soviet  polemics  began,  he  repeatedly  warned  the  Party 
that  there  was  still  a  serious  class  struggle  in  the  country.  He  speculated 
that  they  revolutionary  order  -  might  "perish"  ,  and  be  replaced  by  a 
revisionist  state.  He  became  increasingly  obsessed  with  the  possibility  of- 
historical  regression.  New  bourgeois  elements  are  produced  in  a  socialist 
society,  he  insisted,  much  more  -forcefully  than  ever  before:  "This  class 
struggle  is  a  protracted,  complex,  and  sometimes  even  violent  affair.  "26 
In  the  autumn  of  1962  he  raised  the  posibility  of  "the  restoration  of  the 19 
reactionary  class"  and  warned  that  "a  country  like  ours  can  still  move 
toward  its  opposite.  "=9  In  August  1964  he  even  estimated  that  in  China  "at 
present  approximately  one  third  of  the  power  is  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy 
or  of  the  enemy's  sympathizers.  "30 
Therefore,  from  late  1962  to  1965,  Mao  launched  what  came  to  be  known  as 
the  "Socialist  Education  Movement.  13'  The  campaign  was  an-  attempt  to 
counter  "old  and  new  bourgeois  elements",  to  reverse  socio-economic 
policies  that  Mao  condemned  as  "revisionist"  and  likely  to  create  new 
forms  of  capitalism.  But  he  was  still  unable  to  state  what  method  could 
prevent  revisionism  in  China.  It  was  to  prove  to  be  Mao's  last  attempt  to 
implement  his  vision  of  class  struggle  through  existing  Party  and  state 
institutions. 
On  14  July  1964,  at  the  end  of  the  Sino-Soviet  polemics,  the  Editorial 
Board  of  Renmin  Ribao  and  Hongai  published  the  ninth  comment  "On 
Khrushchev's  Phoney  Communism  and  Its  Historical  Lessons  for  the  World" 
which  marked  the  culmination  of  the  theory  of  class  struggle  in  -a 
socialist  society.  The  article  elaborated  fifteen  points  in  Mao's 
thinking  on  -"Soviet  revisionism.  "32  The  major  ones  were  as  follows: 
1)  In  socialist  society  there  are  two  kinds  of  social  contradiction, 
namely,  the  contradiction  among  the  people  and  that  between  ourselves  and 
the  enemy.  Many  people  acknowledge  the  law  of  the  unity  of  opposites  but 
are  unable  to  apply  it  in  studying  and  handling  questions-of  socialist 
society  and  are  therefore  unable  to  deal  correctly  with  the  issue  -"  of  the 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat. 
2)  Socialist  society  covers  a  very  long  historical  period.  The  socia- 
list  revolution  on  the  economic  front  (concerning  the  ownership  of  the 
means  of  production)  is  insufficient  by  itself  and  cannot  be  consolidated. 20 
There  must  also  be  a  thorough  socialist  revolution  on  the  political  and 
ideological  fronts.  Here  a  very  long  period  of  time  is  needed  to  decide 
"who  will  win"  in  the  struggle  between  socialism  and  capitalism.  Several 
decades  are  not  enough. 
3)  Whether  in  socialist  revolution  or  in  socialist  construction,  it  is 
necessary  to  solve  the  question  of  whom  to  rely  on,  whom  to  win  over  and 
whom  to  oppose.  It  is  necessary  to  conduct  extensive  socialist  education 
movements  repeatedly  in  the  cities  and  the  countryside.  In  these  movements 
it  is  necessary  to  wage  a  sharp,  tit-for-tat  struggle  against  anti- 
socialist,  capitalist  and  feudal  forces. 
4)  Among  those  engaged  in  science,  culture,  arts  and  education,  the 
struggle  to  promote  proletarian  ideology  and  destroy  bourgeois  ideology  is 
a  protracted  and  fierce  class  struggle.  It  is  necessary  to  build  up  a  large 
detachment  of  working-class  intellectuals  who  serve  socialism  and  who  are 
both  "red  and  expert". 
5)  It  is  necessary  to  maintain  the  system  of  cadre  participation  in 
collective  productive  labour.  This  is  a  major  measure  of  fundmental 
importance  for  a  socialist  system;  it  helps  to  overcome  bureaucracy  and  to 
prevent  revisionism  and  dogmatism. 
6)  The  system  of  Party  committees  exercising  leadership  must  be  put 
into  effect  in  all  departments.  It  is  necessary  for  the  people's  armed 
forces  in  a  socialist  country  to  be  under  the  leadership  of  the  Party  of 
the  proletariat  and  under  the  supervision  of  the  masses.  The  guns  must  for 
ever  be  in  the  hands  of  the  Party  and  the  people  and  must  never  be  allowed 
to  become  the  instruments  of  the  careerists. 
7)  In  order  to  guarantee  that  the  Party  and  the  country  do  not  change 21 
their  colour,  it  is  not  only  necessary  to  have  a  correct  line  and  correct 
policies  but  to  train  and  bring  up  millions  of  successors  who  will  carry  on 
the  cause  of  proletarian  revolution. 
All  of  this  was  extremely  important  in  determining  whether  it  was 
possible  to  prevent  the  emergence  of  Khrushchvite  revisionism  in  China.  It 
was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  for  the  Party  and  the  country. 
Thus  Mao's  theory  of  class  struggle  was  systematized.  There  were  three 
important  factors  in  its  formation:  first  was  that  he  took  a  one-sided 
view  of  the  theory  of  scientific  socialism  suggested  by  Marx;  second  was 
that  he  misunderstood  the  Soviet  reforms  of  the  1950s;  third  was  that  he 
incorrectly  observed  China's  internal-  situation.  The  core  of  his  theory 
was  the  conception  of  "modern  revisionism",  a  conception  which  went  through 
a  long  process  of  change  and  maturation  from  late  1950s,  and  which  was 
closely  connected  with  the  fate  of  China  and  the  development  of  Sino- 
Soviet  relations. 
From  1963,  when  Sino-Soviet  polemics  started,  to  the  eve  of  the  cultural 
revolution,  the  theory  was  greatly  developed  and  refined.  Through  the 
cultural  revolution,  Mao's  theory  was  finally  perfected  as  the  theory  of 
"Bu  duan  ge  ming  (uninterrupted  revolution)  under  the  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat".  And  simutanously  comprehensive  Sino-Soviet  confrontation  took 
place. 
1.4  A  Note  on  Methodology 
The  sources  employed  in  this  work  are  largely  published  materials  from 
both  Soviet  and  Chinese  Party  journals  and  newspapers,  and  Western 
literature  on  the  subject.  The-  study  of  relations  between  communist 22 
countries  like  China  and  the  USSR  is  often  handicapped  by  the  inevitable 
constraints  resulting  from  a  lack  of  access  to  the  necessary  information, 
for  instance,  to  the  records  of  meetings  of  the  political  bureaus. 
Therefore  it  is  difficult  for  academics,  sometimes,  to  follow  the  real 
intentions  of  the  communist  leaders.  Yet,  this  has  not  and  should  not 
preclude  attempts  to  analyse  them,  even  though  reading  published 
communist  documents.  Donald  S.  Zagoria  has  described  how  non-communist 
observers  can  make  "political  estimates-and  assuptions13'  by  reading  such 
documents.  As  a  Chinese  scholar,  I  am  quite  familiar  from  the  inside-with 
differences  between  the  style  and  the  actual  significance  of  an  article 
published,  for  example,  in  Renmin  Ribao.  I  think  that  I  have  two  other 
advantages.  First,  in  the  past  ten  years  both  China  and  the  USSR  have  been 
carrying  out  major  economic  and  political  reforms.  In  these  circumstances, 
much  information  concerning  their  relations,  which  had  remained  hidden, 
has  been  revealed  to  the  public.  For  example,  for  a  long  time  nothing  was 
written  either  in  China  or  in  the-Soviet  Union  about  the  meetings  between 
Mao  Zedong  and  Stalin.  But  the  last  few  years  have  seen  publications  on 
this  subject  written  by  witnesses  in  both  countries.  36 
Secondly.  I  have  been  doing  research  on  Soviet  foreign  policy  for  more 
than  ten  years,  first  in  the  International  Department  of  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  CCP  and  then  in  the  Institute  of  Soviet  and  East  European 
Studies,  of  the  Chinese  Academy  of  Social  Sciences.  This  has  helped  me  to 
get  additional  insight  into  the  evolution  of  Sino-Soviet  relations.  - 
However,  I  appreciate  that  many  of  my  techniques  and  much  of  my  approach  is 
very  Chinese.  But  even  this  has  helped  me  reach  conclusions,  sometimes 
explicit,  sometimes  only  implicit,  which  are  quite  different  from  others 
who  have  been  researching  the  same  subject.  For  example,  the  majority  of 23 
scholars  in  the  West  as  well  as  in  the  Soviet  Union  date  the  Sino-Soviet 
rift  from  the  20th  Party  Congress  of  the  CPSU  in  1956  when  Khrushchev 
denounced  Stalin.  Oddly  enough,  this  is  also  the  official  Chinese  view. 
However,  I  believe  that  the  real  clash  occured  two  years  later  for  more 
complicated  reasons.  The  evidence  I  have  that  the  Chinese  supported  the 
policy  adopted  by  the  20th  Congress  of  the  CPSU  comes  not  only  from 
speeches  made  by  Chinese  leaders  on  various  occasions  but  also  from  Sino- 
Soviet  co-operation  in  handling  the  events  in  Poland  and  Hungary  in  late 
1956,  and  from  the  strengthening  of  Sino-Soviet  economic  co-operation 
following  the  Congress. 
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II. 
Post-Stalin-Honeymoon  (1953-1957) 
All  see  that  the  solidarity  of'the  great  Chinese  and'Soviet' 
peoples,  consolidated  by  the  treaty,  is  durable,  unbreakable, 
and  steadfast-.  This  solidarity  will  inevitably  influence  not  only 
the  well-being  of  the  great  powers  China  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
but  also  the  future  of  all  humanity  and  will  lead  to  the  victory 
of  justice  and  peace  throughout  the'whole  world.  ' 
Mao  Zedong 
On  5  March  1953,  the  communist  world  was  rocked  by.,  the  news  that  Stalin, 
the  revered  yet  frightening  god  and  commander,  `  had  died.  As  the  news 
spread,  people  began  to  have  the  feeling  that  an  ole  page  in  the  history  of 
the  communist  world  was  being  turned  and  replaced  by  a  new  one.  This 
feeling-became  a'reality  in  the  relations  between  the  world's  two  largest 
communist  countries,  the  Soviet"Union  and"the  People's  Republic  of-China. 
2.1  Increased  Solidarity  after  Stalin's  Death 
The  death  of  Stalin  profoundly  --  though  not  immediately  --  affected 
Sino-Soviet  relations.  Beforehand,  there  had  been  a  shadow,  if'not  a  heavy 
one,  in  the  relationship`  between  Moscow-and  Beijing  caused  not  only  by 
Stalin's  misunderstanding  of  the  Chinese  revolution,  but  also  by  historical 27 
political  and  cultural  differences.  2  The  immediate  reaction  of  Stalin's 
successors  to  his  departure  was  to  try  to  improve  this  relationship  within 
the  first  few  days. 
Unlike  the  majority  of  the  other  communist  leaders,  Mao  Zedong  did  not  go 
to  Moscow  for  Stalin's  funeral.  He  probably  still  remembered  the  not  wholly 
favourable  circumstances  of  his  first  encounter  with  Stalin-at  the  end  of 
1949  and  the  begining.  of  1950.3  At  the  funeral  the  Chinese  Communist  Party 
was  represented  by  Zhou  Enlai,  -Prime  Minister  of  the  -State  Council  and 
Deputy  Chairman  of  the  Central  Committee.  It  was  all  the  more 
striking,  therefore,  that  Zhou  Enlai  should  be  singled  out,  by  the  protocol- 
conscious  Soviet  leaders  for  most  favourable  treatment.  On  9  March,  Stalin's 
funeral  took  place.  - 
Zhou  Enlai  was  -chosen 
from  the  mass  of  foreign 
delegates  to  stand  alongside  the  members  of,  the  Soviet  Party  Presidium.  In 
the  funeral  procession  he  walked  just.  behind  the  gun-carriage  bearing 
Stalin's  coffin,  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Malenkov,  Beria  and  Khrushchev.  4 
Even  more  significant  was  the  appearance  on  10  March  in.  Pravda.  of  -a 
photograph  of  Mao  Zedong  flanked  on  the-one  side  by  Stalin  and  on.  the  other 
by  Malenkov.  That  this  picture  ,  was  intended  to  convey  an  : 
important 
political  message  was  evident  from  a  photograph  taken  in  1950  which  did  not 
show  the  three  men  in  close-company.  There  were  two  purposes  behind  this. 
First,  to  identify  Mao  and"the  Chinese  communists  with  the  succession  to 
Stalin;  second,  to  accord  Mao  a  -position  in  the  leadership  of  world 
communism.. 
Another  immediate  sign  of  the  Soviet  leaders'  anxiety  to 
, 
improve 
relations  with  China  -was  their.  replacement  of  the  Soviet  ambassador  In 
Beijing  before  the  end  of  March 
. 
1953.  Until  then  the  Soviet-mission  in 
Beijing  had  been  headed  by  Alexander  Panyushkin,  a  senior  military  officer 28 
who  had  much  to  do  with  putting  Stalin's  China  policy  into  practice.  He  was 
replaced  by  V.  V.  Kuznetosov,  a  former  trade  union'official  who  later  became 
one  of  the  Soviet  Union's  most  capable  professional  diplomats.  & 
There  were  other  signs  of  the  improved  status  of  the  Chinese  in  the 
communist  world.  The  Chinese  Communist  Party,  which  ranked  third  after  the 
Polish  Party  at  the  19th  Congress  of  the  CPSU  in  1952,  was-raised  to  second 
place.  Similarly,  =in  all  public  references  to  the  Chinese  People's  Republic 
was  henceforward  given  priority  over  all  the  other  People's  Democracies.  - 
China  was  more  favourably  treated  than  before,,  and  most  probably  was  no 
longer  regarded,  as  a  satellite.  This  was  unfortunately  not  recognized  by 
the  Americans  at  the  time.  If  the  Americans  had  in  fact  taken-the  chance  to 
develop  relations  with  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  the  whole 
international  situation  would  have  been  much  different.  ' 
The  Chinese  for  their  part  responded  actively  and  satisfactorily  to  the 
situation.  Mao  Zedong  himself  was  among-the  loudest  in  praise  of  the 
departed  leader  and  his  successors.  Stalin's  death  quickly  drew  from  him  an 
article  entitled  "The  Greatest  Friendship"  which  hailed  the  late  Soviet 
leader  as  "the  greatest  genius  of  the  present  age".  7  Mao  was  eloquent:  "The 
Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union  is  a  party  trained  by  Lenin  and  Stalin 
and  is  the  most  advanced,  the  most  experienced  and  theoretically  the  best 
equipped  in  the  world;  it  was  and  still  is  for  us  a  model;  it  will  also 
remain  a  model  for  us  in  the  future".  e  - 
Why  did  both  sides  desire  closer  contact?  There  were,  certainly  a  number 
of  reasons.  As  far  as  the  Russians  were  concerned  it  was  because  with  the 
departure.  of  Stalin  his  successors  needed  very  much  stronger,  political, 
support  from  their  Chinese  comrades  for  the  purpose,  of-  mentaining  the 
leadership  in  the  communist  world.  In  the  first  place,  Mao,  Zedong  was  now 29 
senior  to  them  "  in  terms  of  years  and  revolutionary-  experience. 
And  in  many  respects,  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  was,  one  of  the  most 
powerful  parties  with  about  10  million-  members.  Because  of  the  Chinese 
revolution,  China  had  won  great  influence  in  the  communist  world  as  well  as 
among  the  national  liberation  movements.  At  the  World  Federation  of  Trade 
Unions  meeting  in  Beijing 
,: 
in  'November  1949  Liu  Shaoqi,  -  Deputy  :  Chairman  of 
the  Central  'Committee,  of  'the  CCP,  had  declared:  --"The  way-  which  has  been 
followed  by  the  Chinese.  people...  is  the  way  which  should  be  followed  by  the 
peoples  of  many  colonial  and-.  semi-colonial  countries  in  their  struggle  for 
national  independence  and  people's  democracy.  M9 
So  if  the  CCP  continued  to"hold  the  Soviet  flag  highly,  then  there  would 
be  nothing  to  worry.  -about  in  the  communist  world.  And  this  was  truly 
proved  by  later  events  in  Poland  and  Hungary. 
Secondly,  the  Soviet  Union  needed  China's  strong  support  for  implementing 
its  new  foreign:  policy.  The  immediate  reaction  of  Stalin's  successors  to 
his  depature  was  to  take  steps  to  soften  the  impact  of  his  policies  on  the 
world  outside,  and  to  retreat  with  as  much  dignity  as  possible  from  the 
tension  and  "cold  war"  with  the  West,  mainly  with  the  United  States.  They 
realized  that  it-would  take  several  years  to  recover  from  the  shock  of 
Stalin's  sudden  departure.  It  'was  essential,  during  such  a  period  of 
internal  weakness  and  uncertainty,  that  the  Soviet  Union  should  not  be 
faced  by  a  major  crisis  in  foreign  affairs.  Whatever  other  differences 
there  may  have  been  within  the  Kremlin,  there  was  general  agreement  on 
this.  With  the  Korean  War-China  had  made  a  sudden  and  spectacular  return  to 
the  international  scene.  -.  It  went  on  to  play  an  important,  -  independent-role 
in  three  international"  conferences:  the  two  Geneva  conferences-  (an  Korea 
and  Indochina)  in  -1954,  -and  the.  conference  at  Bandung  in-1955.  In  the 30 
following  year,  Zhou  Enlai-made  a  long  trip  round  eleven  capitals  in.  Asia 
and  Eastern  Europe,  giving  proof  of  his  country's  mounting  prestige  in  the 
world  and  of  the  importance  of  Beijing  in  international  socialist  affairs. 
In  the  event,  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  affirmed  the  similarity  of  their 
views  on  all  main  world  issues.  Khrushchev  was-  able  to  declare  on 
departing  from  Beijing  on  12  Octorber  1954:  "The  mutual  exchange  of 
opinions  and  our  joint  fruitful,  work  have  shown,  once  again,,  that  their 
exists  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China  complete 
mutual  understanding  on  all  questions  pertaining  to  our  further 
development,  and  on  all  international  questions.  "1° 
Thirdly,  there  was  a  domestic,  reason:  those  who  won  the  power  struggle 
had  to  seek  strong  support  from  the  CCP  for  the  purpose  of  strenthening 
their  own  position  inside  the  CPSU  since,  with"the  support  of  Chinese,  they 
could  say  they  were  real  communists.  "  It  was  not  surprising  that  each  set 
of  Soviet  leaders  in.  turn  praised  Chinese  leaders  in  more  glowing  terms  and 
provided--more  economic  assistance.  In  April  1953,  Beria  was  arrested 
following  the  release  of.  those  charged  in  connection-with  the.  "doctors' 
plot".  He  was  later  executed  on  the  grounds  that:  "This  hireling  of  foreign 
imperialist  forces  was  hatching  plans  to  seize  the  leadership  of  the  party 
and  the  country  with  the  object  of  destroying'  our  Communist  Party  and 
substituting  for  the  policy  worked  out  over  many  years  a  policy  of 
capitulation  which,  in  the  final  analysis,  would,  have  led  to  the  restoration 
of  capitalism.  "12  People  in  Beijing  applauded  his  execution.  '3  Not  long 
after  the  Soviet  government  decided  to  help  in  the  construction  of  91 
additional  industrial  plants  in  China.  14  Again,  a  meeting  of  the  Supreme 
Soviet  in  Moscow  on  8  February  1955,.  at,  which  the  resignation  of  Malenkov 
as  Prime  Minister  was  announced,  Molotov,  the  Foreign  Minister,  made  a  long 31 
statement  on  foreign  policy  including  the  following  significant  passage: 
"The  most  important  result  of  the  Second  World  War  was  the  formation, 
alongside  the  world  capitalist  camp,  of  a  world  camp  of  socialism  and 
democracy  headed  by  the  Soviet  Union,  or  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say, 
headed  by  the  Soviet  Union'  and  the  People's  Republic  of'China.  "'&  What  is 
more,  the  new  Prime  Minister==Marshal  Bulganin,  made  it  clear  in  one  of  his 
first  official  statements  that  "China  can  count  in  all-circumstances  on  the 
aid  of  the  USSR".  10  As  Khrushchev  put  it  later,  "the  voice  of  the  Chinese 
Communist  Party  was  then  of-great  significance"17.  I- 
As  for  the  Chinese,  -there  were  even  more  reasons  to  have  their"greatest 
frendship"  with  the  Soviet  Union.  °  First  ideologically,  although  the 
Chinese  knew  little  about  the  nature  of  -  the  Soviet  Union  other'  than  what 
they  had  read  in  official  Soviet  textbooks,  -they  regarded  itas  "the  land 
of-'socialism"  and  "a  great  and  splendid  socialist  state.  ""0  Mao  Zedong 
himself  was  remarkably  uncritical  in  accepting  the  Soviet  pattern  of 
development  as  the  appropriate  model  for  China.  'In  a  speech  to  the  fourth 
meeting  of  the  Chinese,  People's  Conference  for  Political  Consultation,  he 
said:  "...  learn  from  the  Soviet  Union.  We  must  study  not,  only  the  theory  of 
Marx,  Engels,  Lenin,  and  Stalin,  but  also  the  advanced  technology  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  In  order  to  build  our  country,  we  must  set  off  an  upsurge  for 
learning  from  the  Soviet-Union.  "t9 
For  ideological  reasons,  -Mao  was  openly  pledged-to  a  pro-Soviet  policy  in 
December  1949,  just  before  the  founding  of-  the  People's  Republic.  The 
Soviet  Union  offered  -all  authentic  Chinese  communists  the  sentimental 
attraction  of,  an  ideological'  capital.  AS  Liu1,  Shaogi,  said  in  1949:  "If  we 
attach  great  importance`and,  particular  appreciation  to  the  friendship  and 
cooperation  between  the  Chinese  and  -Soviet  peoples,  this  is  because  the 32 
road  travelled  by  the  Soviet  people  is.  exactly  that  the  Chinese  people  must 
follow.  The  experience  of  the  Soviet  people  in  the  construction  of  its 
country  is  one  that  deserves  our  attention.  "20 
This  relates  to  the  second  reason:  the  need  to  take  the  Soviet  Union  as 
the  model  for  building  socialism  in  China,  especially  with-the  adoption  of 
the  First  Five  Year  Plan.  Indeed,  in  those  early  days,  -there  was  no  model 
of  socialist  development  other  than  the  Soviet,  with  its  reliance  on 
centralized  planned  and  bureaucratically  administered  programs  of-economic 
development  which  subordinated  the  needs  of  the  countryside  to  the  demands 
of  heavy  industry.  Besides,  the  Chinese  Communists  still  lacked  the 
experience  of  managing  a  vast  country,  which  was  also,  poor  and 
disorganised.  Although  completely  at  ease  when  in  charge  of  their  rural 
bases,  they  knew  little  of  the  more  intricate  difficulties  presented  by  the 
towns,  which  had  been  largely  under  the  influence  of  the  industrial  and 
business  bourgeoisie.  A  few  years  later,  when  Field  Marshal  Montgomery 
asked  Mao  what  had  concerned  him  the  most  after  the  establishment  of  the 
new  regime,  the  Chairman  replied  that  it  was  the  extent  to  which  both  the 
Communist  Party  and  he  himself  were  lacking  in  experience  in  the  face  of 
the  enormous  problems  ahead  .  21 
The  Soviet  Union  was  a  society  which  had  achieved  industrialization  and 
collectivization,  key  goals  ofý  all  the  leaders  of  the  CCP.  The  Soviet 
victory  over  fascism  in  the  Second  World  War  was  to  many  Chinese  leaders 
proof  of  the  success  of  the  Soviet  experiment.  A  Chinese  slogan  of  the 
early  1950s,  "the  Soviet  Union  today  is  our  tomorrow",  -:  captured  the  spirit 
with  which  many  Chinese  undertook  to  copy  Soviet  methods. 
The  third  and  the  most  important  reason,  from  the  Chinese  point  of  view, 
was  to  get  as  much  economic  aid  from  the  Soviet  Union  as  possible.  The 33 
basic  job  of  restoring  the  national  economy,  which  had  been  destroyed  in 
the  civil  war,  and  of  creating  the  various  organs  of-  national  government 
and  state  administration  was  completed  in  the  years  1950  to  1952.22  The 
land  reform  was  carried  out.  The  country's  financial'  crisis  was  resolved. 
The  widespread  banditry  was  wiped  out  by  harsh,  swift  means.  All  large- 
scale  enterprises  were  nationalized,  while  small  private  industries  were 
preserved.  '- 
At  the  end  of  1952,  Zhou  Enlai  declared  that  the  period  of-restoration 
was  finished  and  that  the  level  of  the  national  economy  was  higher  than  it 
had  ever  been  before.  Hence,  from  1953  they  would  begin  to  implement  the 
First  Five  Year  Plan  for  the  expansion  of  China's  national  economy.  The 
general  outline  of  the  Plan  was,  determined  at-  a  meeting  of  the  Party's 
Central  Committee  in  the  autumn  of  1952.  It  -was  closely  patterned  on  the 
Soviet  First  Five  Year  Plan  of  1928-1932,  and  it  was  anticipatedthat  China 
could  achieve  similar  rates  of  growth  in,  both  industrial  output  and 
industrial  employment.  23  However,  the  plan  had  been  worked  out  on  the 
assumption  of  increasing  technical,  ',,  economic  and  scientific  aid  fromýthe 
Soviet  Union.  But  before  1953  Soviet  economic  aid  was  strictly  limited.  In 
his  first  well-known  trip  to-Moscow,  'Mao  Zedong  had  not  succeeded  in 
persuading  Stalin  to'provide  enough  aid  to  China.  Soviet  credits  of  US  $300 
million  were  extended  at  a  rate  of  1  percent  for  repayment  by  the  end  of 
1963,  a  sum  believed  to  beonly  10%  of  Mao's  requirement.  By  agreement,  the 
Soviet  Union  undertook  'to  provide  equipment  for.,  50  construction  'projects 
over  a  period  of  nine  years.  24  After  1953,  the  -Chinese  leaders  certainly 
hoped  that  by  supporting  the  new  leaders  of'the  Soviet  Union,  no  matter  who 
they  were,  China  would  be  given  more  aid,  ýthrough  which  they  could  build  up 
their  backward  economy. 34 
Fourthly,  the  Chinese  Communists  tried  to  gain  additional  status  within 
the  communist  movement  and  acquire  a  high  prestige  among  developing 
countries  by  keeping  good  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union.  When  Molotov 
described  the  PRC  as  the  joint  leader  of  the  "socialist  camp"215,  Chinese 
leaders  revealed  no  reluctance  to-step  into  this  position,  for  which  their 
size  and  their  revolutionary  record,  if  not  their  economic  or  military 
power.  seemed  to  qualify  them.  The  idea  was  certainly  put  into  practice 
by  the  Chinese  and  became  one  of  the  points  latercausing  the  split  between 
the  CCP  and  the  CPSU. 
Fifthly,  the  Chinese  leaders  needed  Soviet  frendship  to  get  rid  of  the 
Gao  Gang-Rao  Shushi  anti-Party  alliance.  26  It  was  well-known  that  Gao  had 
a  very  good  relationship  with  the  Soviet  leaders.  He  was  elected  Chairman 
of  the  People's  Government  of  the  Northeast  which  was  founded  at  Shenyang 
on  27  August  1949.  A  month  earlier,  Gao  had  sgone  to  Moscow  to  sign  an 
important  agreement  on  regional  trade.  On  15  November-  1952,  on  the  eve  of 
implementing  the  First  Five  Plan,  he  was  given  the  extremely  important  post 
of  Chairman  of  the  State  Planning  Commission.  He  was  called  to  Beijing  in 
1953  but  fell  into  disgrace  less  than  a  year  later.  His  political  downfall, 
and  the  expulsion  of  his  followers  from  the  Party,  were  determined  at  a 
December  1953  Politburo  meeting  and  formalized  by  the  Party's  central 
committee  in  February  of  1954.  Gao  was  charged  with  having  set  up  an 
"independent  kingdom"  in  Manchuria,  and  having  organized  a  conspircy  to 
seize  power  in  the  Party  (that  of  Liu  Shaoqi)  and  the  State  (that  of  Zhou 
Enlai).  It  was  announced  later  that  he  had  committed  suicide. 
As  Chairman  of  the  State  Planning  `Commission,  Gao  could  have  used  his 
influence  to  pay  special  attention  to  Manchuria,  "his  independent  kingdom", 
on  the  grounds  that  the  region  was  the  heart  of  the  mordern-  Chinese 35 
economy.  In  this  ,  he  would  doubtless  have  been  able  to  count  on  the 
support  of  the  Soviet  Union,  which  was  ready  to  help  with  the  development 
of  the  Northeast  so  as  to  benefit  the.,  economy  of  Siberia.  If  the  Chinese 
leaders  saw  Soviet  economic  methods  as  both  necessary  and  desirable,  they 
were  nevertheless  not  about  -to.  allow  the  Russians  to  acquire  political 
dominance  over  China  in  the  process,  -They 
had  fought  too  long  and  too-hard 
to  prevent  Moscow  from  gaining  control  over  their  Party  during  the 
revolutionary  years  to  permit  it  now  to  reap  the  political  fruits  of  their 
victory.  And  it  was  their  bitter  ecxperiences_with  the  Comintern  during  the 
revolutionary  periodthatmade  them  acutely  sensitive  to  the  danger.  There 
was  much  evidence  to  suggest  that  Gao  had  close  political  ties  with.  the 
Russians,  who  continued  to  exercise  strong  influence  in.  Manchuria  long 
after  their  military  withdrawal.  Direct  Soviet  aid  :  and  participation 
restored  Manchuria's  heavy  industrial  base  after  Soviet  troops  had  earlier 
carried  away  much  of  its  industry  as  "war  booty".  : 27  The  Russians  controlled 
the  Sino-Soviet  joint  stock  companies,,  established  in  1950,  and  retained 
their  hold  on  the  Central 
. 
Manchurian  -Railway_  (and-  its  economic 
subsidiaries)  as  well  as  on  Dalian  and  Lusong(Port  Arthur).  Moreover,  Gao 
was  the  foremost  advocate  of  Soviet  methods  of  industrial  organization, 
both  before  and  after  the  inauguration  of  the  First  Five  Year  Plan,  and 
nowhere  were  these  methods  introduced  and  pursued  more  rigorously  than  in 
Manchuria.  Several  years  after,  the  event,  in  a  private  .  talk  highly 
critical  of  Soviet  influence  in-the  Chinese  Party  over  the  decades,  Mao 
Zedong  observed:  "Stalin  was  very  fond  of  Gao  and  made  him  a  special 
present  of  a  motor  car.  Gao  sent  Stalin  a  congratutatory  telegram  every  15 
August"  (the  date  of  Japan's  surrender  to  the  Soviet  Union)2e 
Moreover  Mao  referred  to  Manchuria  and  Xinjiang  as  two  former  Soviet 36 
"colonies"  in  the  People's  Republica9.  To  bring  Manchuria  under  the  control 
of  Beijing  meant  throwing  off  Soviet  control.  It  was  not  entirely 
fortuitous  that  the  fall  of  Gao  followed  shortly  after  the  death  of  Stalin 
and  the  fall  of  Beria.  It  was  the  apparent  weakness  and  instability  of  the 
post-Stalin  leadership  that  made  Beijing  sufficiently  confident  to  remove 
Gao  and  move  against  Soviet  influence  in  Manchuria.  The  move  became  one  of 
the  factors  resulting  in  a  temporary  improvement  in  Sino-Soviet  relations, 
and  a  more  equal  relationship  between  the  two  countries,  symbolized  by 
Khrushchev's  late  1954  visit  to  Beijing  and  the  Soviet  agreement  to 
reliquish  positions  in  Manchuria. 
Sixthly,  it  was  American  policy  at  the  time  that  made  'China  adhere 
firmly  to  the  Soviet  Union.  The  formation  of  the  Chinese  People's  Republic, 
followed  by  the  treaty  of  friendship  and  mutual  aid  between  China  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  was  greeted  by  ruling  circles  in  the  United  States  with 
extreme  hostility.  While  the  Soviet  press  described  the  success  of  the 
Chinese  revolution  as  the  greatest  defeat  for  capitalism  since  the  October 
Revolution,  the  American  press  said  much  the  same  thing,  though  in  a 
critical  sense,  and  a  sense  that  was  reinforced  by  U.  S.  policy. 
Having  recalled  all  its  diplomats  from  China  by  the  end  of  1949,30  the 
United  States  banned  the  sale  of  "strategic  goods",  including  metals, 
chemicals,  equipment  for  many  branches  of  'industry,  motor  vehcles  and 
petroleum  products.  Although  China  officially  appointed  representatives  to 
the  Security  Council  and  other  United  Nations  organizations,  the  USA 
virtually  barred  them  from  their  functions.  Relations  between  the  two 
countries  became  still  more  hostile  with  the  outbreak  in  the  summerof  1950 
of  the  Korean  War.  31 
The  Truman  Administration  pursued  a  "hard"'policy  towards  China.  Why?  The 37 
answers  were: 
a)  American  policymakers'  especially  Truman  and  Acheson,  saw  the  CCP  as 
"an  instrument  of  Moscow".  32  It  was  necessary  for  them  to  carry  out  'a 
"closed  door"  policy33  in  dealing  with  this  "puppet  regime"34; 
b)  They  regarded  the  CCP  as  the  main  threat  to  American  interests  in 
Asia.  It  was  therefore  crucial  for  them  to  roll  back  Chinese  influence  by 
applying  maximum  pressure  on  them; 
c)  They  also  regarded  the  CCP  as  more  bellicose  than  the,  Russian  varity; 
d)  In  addition,  prejudice,  racial  fear  and  mistrust  played  an  important 
role  in  American  decision-making  towards  China.  For  example,  Eisenhower 
believed  that  the  Chinese  held  "peculiar  attitudes"315  toward  human  life.  In 
his  memoirs  he  openly  invoked  the  spectre  of  the  "Yellow  Peril"36. 
Not  surprisingly,  while  praising  the  Soviet  Union,  the  Chinese  press 
during  this  time  was  extremely  hostile  in  its  assessment  of  American 
policy.  Under  such  circumastances,  the  Chinese  leaders  had  no  choice  in 
public  but  to  accept  the  Soviet  Union  as  the  only  possible  source  of  the 
considerable  political,  economic  and  molitary  aid  China  must  have.  ' 
For  the  motives  mentioned  above.  the  Soviet  Union  appeared  eager  to 
maintain  the  best  possible  relations,  and  China  appeared  quite  happy  to 
accept  the  new  Soviet  leadership.  Thus  Sino-Soviet  relations  entered  the 
period  of  five  years  of  honeymoon,  the  best  in  their  history,  though 
perhaps  something  of  a  honeymoon  of  convenience. 
2.2  Augmentation  of  Sino-Soviet  Collaboration'  1953-1955 
After  the  death  of  Stalin,  Sino-Soviet  co-operation  was  greatly 
strengthened  in  all  fields.  But  the  first  and  most  important  co-operation 
was  economic.  After  three  years  of  preparation,  China  launched  its  First 38 
Five  Year  Plan  at  the  start  of  1953,  though  the  details  of"  the  plan  were, 
finally  spelt  out  only  in  1955.  This  first  step  in  the  transition  to  a 
socialist  economy  received  formal  ratification  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
PRC,  adopted  in  1954,  which  announced  that  the  necessary  conditions  had  now 
been  created  for  planned  economic  construction  and  gradual  transition  to 
socialism.  The  First  Five  Year  Plan  was  clearly  inspired  by  Soviet 
precedents,  as  far  as  the  distribution  of  effort  and  methods  of 
construction  and  management  were  concerned.  It  was  carried  out  with  the 
financial  and  technical  co-operation  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  case  of 
specific  large  projects:  factories,  laboratories,  roads,  railways,  canals, 
and  the  like. 
Only  two  and  a  half  weeks  after  the  death  of  Stalin,  on  21  March  1953,  an 
agreement  was  signed  in  Moscow  by  which  the  Soviet  Union  was.,  to  help  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  in  the  expansion  of  existing  and  the 
construction  of  new  power-,  stations,  and  with  it  went  atrade  protocol  for 
1953  and  a  second  protocol  governing  use  of  the  1950  Soviet  credit  for  the 
same  year.  ''  Two  months  later,  another  -agreement  was  signed  .  for 
assistance  in  the  construction  and  reconstruction  of  141  industrial  sites, 
comprising  50  which  had  come  under  an  agreement  of  February  1950  and  a 
supplementary  91  large  enterprises.  3e  By  the  end  of-1953,  the  total  trade 
turnover  between  the  USSR,  and  -the  PRC-,  was  increased  -by  22.5  per  cent. 
Compared  with  1952,  exports  of  the  USSR  to  China  increased  28.8  per  cent. 
while  its  import  from  China  increased  21.9  per  cent.  -China's  share  of  the 
USSR's  total  external  trade  turnover  amounted  to  20  per  cent,  while  the 
Soviet  Union's  share  of  China's  total  reached  55.6  per  cent.  39_ 
Political  collaboration  also  increased.  On  29  September  1954  an  important 
Soviet  government  delegation  including  Khrushchev,,,  Bulganin  and,  other 39 
Soviet  officials  of  high  rank  was  welcomed  with  great  pomp  in  Beijing.  They 
were  invited  to  attend  the  fifth  anniversary  of  the  founding  of  the  PRC. 
This  was  the  first  official  visit  abroad  by  the  new  Soviet  leaders. 
Khrushchev  and  his  colleagues  met  Chairman  Mao  several  times  and  they  also 
toured  the  country  widely.  Talks  between  the  Soviet  and  Chinese  leaders 
touched  on  practically  every  aspect  of  relations  between  them.  A  large 
number  of  agreements  was  signed  which  resulted  in: 
a)  Soviet  restoration  of  Port  Arthur  and  all  its  installations  by  13  May 
1955  without  any  compensation; 
b)  Soviet  relinquishing  of  all  shares  in  joint-stock  companies; 
c)  Soviet  long-term  credit  of  520  million  rubles  (then  about  U.  S.  3130 
million); 
d)  Soviet  aid  for  another  15  large-scale  projects,  and  for  the  Chinese 
army  in  the  form  of  new  types  of  weapons  and  the  training  of  officers.  On 
top  of  that,  a  joint  communique  was  issued  by  China,  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Mongolia  on  the  construction  of  a  further  section  of  railway  between  Ulan 
Bator  in  Outer  Mongolia  and  Chining,  to  be  finished  by  January  1956.  a 
project  dating  from  1952.  Communication  links  between  China  and  the  Soviet 
Union  were  greatly  improved  in  consequence.  '°  A  scientific  and  technical 
agreement  was  also  signed.  According  to  this,  the  Soviet  Union  would  hand 
over  to  China  a  large  quantity  of  drawings  and  scientific  and  technical 
documentation. 
In  matters  of  foreign  policy,  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  confirmed  the 
similarity  of  their  views  on  all  main  world  issues,  particularly  those 
concerning  China  itself,  Taiwan,  Korea,  Japan,  and  China's  seat  at  the  UN. 
China  achieved  substantial  gains  from  the  visit.  Zhou  Enlai  spoke  highly 
about  the  results  of  the  visit  at  the-reception  given  by  the  Soviet  Embassy 40 
on  October  12.  He  said:  "  ...  no  one  can  separate  (us).  The  friendship  is 
strenthening  and  developing  day  by  day,  it.  is  irresistable  and  will  develop 
generation  by  generation.  "d'  An  important  outcome  of  Khrushchev's  visit  to 
China  was  a  solemn  agreement  to  hold  mutual  consultations  an  all  matters  of 
common  interest  pertaining  to  the  socialist  camp  in  order  to  engage  in 
concerted  action  to  maintain  peace.  This  meant  that  in  any  moves  which 
involved  China  directly  or  indirectly,  or  in  negotiations  with  the  United 
States  on  world  affairs,  China  must  be  consulted,  as  it  would  be  affected. 
This  was  an  obvious  victory  for  Mao.  On  departing  from  Beijing,  Khrushchev 
also  spoke  highly  about  his  mission  to  China:  '!  .  leaving  Beijing,  we  shall 
continue  with  greater  confidence  our  common  cause  directed  towards  the 
advance  of  our  countries  and  the  further  development  of  the  great 
friendship  between  the  USSR  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  ..  w42 
In  1954,169  major  industrial  enterprises,  workshops  and  sites  were  under 
construction  with  Soviet  cooperation  and  machinery.  According  to  the 
statistics  published  on  1  January  1955,  there  were  about  800  Soviet 
technicians  working  in  China.  -13  Friendship  with  the  Soviet  Union  was 
written  into  the 
.. 
Chinese  Constitution  adopted  by  the-First  National 
People's  Congress  in  September  1954.  The  total  foreign  trade.  turnover  of 
the  two  countries  in  1954  increased  5.2  per  cent,  the  Soviet  Union's  share 
of  China's  total  volume  of  exports  was  51.8  per  cent.  t4  There  were  many 
other  exchanges  in  the  fields  of  culture,  science  and  arts  promoting 
friendship  and  co-operation. 
_It 
was  all.  very  satisfactory. 
The  promise  of  a  further  and  more  substantial  advance  in  -Sino-Soviet 
collaboration  was  heralded  in  Moscow's  announcement  on  17  January  1955  that 
it  had  made  proposals  to  Poland,  East  Germany,  Romania,  Czechoslovakia-and 
China  that  it  would  extend  them  scientific  and  technological  assistance  in 41 
the  utilization  of  atomic  -energy  for  peaceful  purposes.  And  yet  new 
political  factors  having  an-ximportant-bearing  on  the  future  of  economic  co- 
operation  had  been  introduced. 
Georgi  Malenkov  was  forced  to  resign  the  Soviet  premiership  on  8  March 
1955  and  was  succeeded  by  Bulganin,  who  was  quick  to  say  in  one  of  his 
first  offical  statements  that  "China  can  count  in  all  circumstances  on  the 
aid  'of  the  USSR".  4E  On  1  May  Moscow  "radio  announced  deatails  of  the 
agreement  on  Soviet  aid  in  atomic  research  for  peaceful  perpose.  It  was 
stated  that  the'agreement  provided  for: 
a)  the  completion  of  the  necessary  preparatory  work  in`1955-1956  and  the 
supply  of  experimental  atomic  piles  and  accelerators; 
b)  the  free  supply  of  scientific  and  technical  information  required  for 
the  installation  of  this  apparatus,  and  the  loan  of  Soviet  specialists; 
c)  the  supply  of  sufficient  quantities  of  fissile  material  and 
radioactive  isotopes  until  China  was  able  to  keep  its  atomic  piles  working 
without  further  Soviet  aid; 
d)  the  training  of  Chinese  in  nuclear  physics. 
The  Chinese  response-  was  warm.  Li  Fuchun,  China's  Vice-premier  and 
Chairman  of  the  State  Planning  Commission,  reporting  on  China's  First  Five 
Year  Plan  to  the  National  People's  Congress  in  Beijing  announced  that:  "The 
Soviet  Union  is  giving  systematic,  all-round  assistance'  to  our  country's 
construction...  Soviet  aid  plays  an  extremly  important  part  in  enabling  us 
to  carry  on  our  present  construction  work  on  such  a'=large  scale,  at  such  a 
fast  speed,  on  such  a  high  technical  level  and  at  `  the  same  time  avoiding 
many  mistakes.  "46  111,  -. 
In  foreign  policy  Moscow  and  Beijing  co-operated  very  well  in  all  fields. 
The-new  Soviet  policy  of  relaxing  tension  with  the  West  was  fully  supported 42 
by  the  Chinese.  Zhou  Enlai-made  a  forceful,  statement  to  the  First  National 
People's  Congress:  "Everyone  can  see  that  all  our  efforts  are  directed 
towards  the  construction  of  our  country,  to  make  it  into  an  industrial, 
socialist,  prosperous,  and  happy  country.  We  work  peacefully  and  we  hope  for 
apeaceful  atmosphere  and.  a  peaceful  world..  This  fundamental  fact 
determines  the  peaceful  policy  of  our  country  as  regards  foreign  policy.  ",  1" 
China  made  an  enormous  effort  to.  assist  this  peaceful  atmosphere.  As 
mentioned  above,  it  played  an  important  role  at  the  two  Geneva  conferences 
in  1954,  and  at  the  Bandung  conference  in  1955,  Chinese  delegations  were 
very  active  and  skillful.  For  example,  when  the  countries  that  advocated 
peace  and  neutrality,,  and  the  countries  that,  joined  military  cliques  started 
to  engage  in  a  battle  of  words  threatening  to  stalemate  the  conference, 
Zhou  Enlai  proposed  that  the  Asian  and  African  countries  cast  away  their 
different  ideologies,  state  systems  and  international  commitments.  He  asked 
them  instead  to  take  peace  and  co-operation  as  their  common  basis,  seeking 
the  largest  common  points  among  themselves.  4eThis  spirit  played  a  major 
role  in  making  the  Bandung  conference  a  success.  Moreover,  together.  with 
India,  China-first  proposed  the  "five  principles"  of  peaceful  coexistence 
to  deal  with  international  relations.  A9 
All  these  was  apparantly  welcomed  by  the  Soviet  leaders,  despite  their 
exclusion  from  Bandung.  In  the  last  two  months  of  1955  Khrushchev  and 
Bulganin  made  a  long  tour  of  Asia  including  official  visits  to  India,  Burma 
and  Afghanistan.  While  demonstrating  Soviet  military  power  and  economic 
strength  through.  various  promises  of  trade  and  military  aid,  Khrushchev 
subscribed  to  the  "five  principles"  as  the  basis  of  relations  between 
states  of  all  kinds.  On  the  other  hand,  the  beginnings  of  a  reconciliation 
between  Moscow  and  Belgrade  in  May  did  not-produce  any  hostile  reaction  on 143 
the  part  of  the  Chinese,  who  had  already  opened  normal  diplomatic  relations 
with  Yugoslavia  on  10  January-  1955.  In'  Tune  Wu  Xuzhuan  n-arrived  in  Belgrade 
to  take  up  his  post  as  ambassador.  Along  with  his  credentials,  he  presented 
Marshal  Tito  with  personal  gifts  from  Chairman  Mao.  In  his  report  to  the 
Eighth  Congress  of  the  'Chinese  Communist  Party,  Liu  Shaoqi  said:  "The 
Soviet  Union  and  -other  socialist  countries  have  established  friendly 
relations  with  the  Federal  People's  Republic  of  Yugoslavia.  Our  country  has 
also  established  diplomatic  relations  and  developed  friendly 
intercourse.  "50  I 
2.3  Did  the  Rift  Begin  with  the  20th  Congress  of  CPSU?  " 
1956  was  very  important  for  the  world  Communist  movement.  The  20th 
Congress  of  the  'Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union  (14-25  February  1956) 
and  the  8th  Congress  of  the  Communist  Party  of  China  (15-27  September 
1956)  were  regarded  as  a  milestone  in  Sino-Soviet  relations. 
Almost  every  Western  expert  as  well  as  Soviet  scholars  believes  that  the 
first  crack  in  Sino-Soviet  relations  was  produced  by  the  20th  Congress 
because  of  its  criticism  of  Stalin  and  his  personality'  cult,  and  its 
advocacy  of  peaceful  coexistence  and  different'  roads  to  socialism.  61  This 
view  'was  further  reinforced  by  the  -later  declaration  of  the  Chinese 
Communist  Party  that,  "  from  the  very  begining  they  had  had  reservations 
about  the  questions  of  principle  dealt  with  by  Khrushchev",  "the  first  step 
on  the  revisionist  road".  82  The  20th  Congress  of  the  CPSU,  it  said,  had 
"both  positive  and  negative  aspects",  "We  have  expressed  our  support  for 
its  positive  aspects.  As  for  its  negative  aspects,  namely  the  wrong 
viewpoints  it''  put  forward  on  certain  important  questions  of  'principle 
relating'  to  the  international  communist  movement,  we  have  held  different 44 
views  all  along.  "1-3 
Was  this  true  or  not?  What  was  the  real  picture  at  the  time?  Undoubtedly, 
the  speech  denouncing  Stalin  that  Khrushchev  made  to  a  closed  session  of- 
the  Congress  was  a  great  shock  to  all  the  communist  leaders,  including  the 
Chinese  who  continued  to  think  -  in  Stalin's  way.  It  posed  more  serious 
political  and  ideological  issues  for  them  than  such  personal  embarrassment 
they  may  have  felt  because  of  the  extravagant  public  praise  they  had 
bestowed  on  the  Soviet  leader-for  over  a  quarter  of  a  century.  It  raised 
grave  questions  about  the  social  and  moral  validity  of  the  socialist  system 
which  the  Chinese  were  then  emulating.  If  socialism  was  a  high  stage  of 
socio-historical  development,  and  Soviet  socialism  its  most  advanced  model, 
then  how  could  it  have  produced  and  been  presided  over  for  so  long  by  a 
leader  -whose  crimes-  and  brutalities  Khrushchev  had  so  vividly  if 
selectively,  described?  And  it  raised  the  more  specific  andimmediate 
problem  for  the  Chinese  of  the  relationship  between  leader  and  Party  in  a 
presumably  socialist  society.  The  major  theme  of  Khrushchev's  speech,  after 
all,  and  his  explanation  of  the  evils  he  recounted,  was  that  Stalin  was  a 
usurper  who  had  "placed  himself  above  the  Party"  and  beyond  criticism  by 
fostering  a  "cult  of  personality".  Had  not  Mao  also  placed  himself  above 
the  Party?  And  was  not  Mao  also  becoming  the  object  of  a  similar  form  of 
hero  worship? 
Khrushchev  devoted  one  whole  section  of  his  report  to  certain  questions 
of  principle  affecting  international  developments  at  the  time  which,  he 
said,  defined  "not  only  the  course  of  current  events  but  also  further 
perspectives".  r,  4  The  questions  were  peaceful-'coexistence,  the  possibility 
0f  averting  wars  in  the  present  epoch  and  the  forms  of  transition  to 
socialism  in  various  countries. 45 
His  ideas  ran  as  follows:  "peaceful  coexistence"  had  always  been  and 
would  remain  the  general  line  of  Soviet  foreign  policy;  it  was  not  a 
tactical  move,  but  a  fundamental  principle  of  Soviet  foreign  policy;  for,  the 
present  world,  there  would  be  only  two  ways,  either  peaceful  coexistence  or 
the  most  destructive  war  in  history"  -  "There  is  no  third  way".  66 
Discussing  whether  a,  third  world  war  was  inevtable,  Khrushchev  had  to  face 
up  to  the  objection  that,  from  a  Marxist  point  of  view,  '  wars  were 
inevitable  as  long  as  imperialism  existed.  Khrushchev  disposed  of  this 
not  very  convincingly,  by  arguing  that  although  so  long  as  imperialism 
existed  there  would  continue  to  be  an  economic  basis  for  war.  the  peace- 
loving  forces  in  the  world  had  acquired  such  moral  and  material  strength 
that  they,  could  either  prevent  the  imperialists  from  lauching  a  war  or 
could  "deliver  a  smashing  rebuff'  to  the  aggressors  and  frustrate  their 
adventurist  plans.  '"s' 
In  fact,  Khrushchev's  advocacy  of  peaceful  coexistence  did  not  mark  in 
any  sense  a  new  departure  in  Soviet  policy,  nor  was  it  incompatible  with 
views  on  international  relations  at  that  time.  At  the  19th  Congress  of  the 
CPSU  in  October  1952,  at  which  Stalin  was  present,  Malenkov  had  said  same 
thing.  The  new  feature  of  Khrushchev's  report  were  his  rejection  of  the 
theory  of  the  inevitablility  of  war  and  his  acceptance  of  the  possibility 
of  a  peaceful  transtion  to  socialism.  Yet,  although  these  theories,  with 
his  denunciation  of  Stalin,  were  later  to  become  the  subject  of  bitter 
controversy  between  the  Soviet  and  Chinese  Parties,  they  were  not  publicly 
questioned  at  the  time  by  the  Chinese  Party.  On  the  contrary,  the  Chinese 
appeared  to  approve  the  down-grading  of  Stalin,  and  to  be  firmly  behind 
Khrushchev's  new  line.  This  will  be  dealt  with  later  on. 46 
At  the  20th  Congress  the  Chinese  representative,  Marshal 
Zhu  Deh,  apparently  applauded  de-Stalinization.  He  said:  "The 
20th  Congress  of  the  CPSU  will  not  only  further  promote  the 
cause  of  building  communism  and  safeguarding  world  peace  by 
the  Soviet  Union,  'but  also  encourage  Chinese  people  for  the 
struggle  of'  building  socialism  and  safeguarding  peacefor  Asia 
as  well'  as  '  for'  the  whole  world.  Mao  Zeodong  also  spoke 
highly  of  the  20th  Congress  at  the  opening  session  of  the  8th 
Congress  of  the  CCP  in  September  1956:  "The  Communist  Party  of 
the  Soviet  Union  has  laid  down  the  'main  correct  guiding 
principles-  and...  their  work  has  a  great  future.  "F°  The 
political  report  to  the  8th  Congress  took  a  similar  line:  "The 
20th  Congress  of-the  CPSU  held  last  February  was  an  important 
political  event  of  world  significance.  It  not  only  drew  up  a 
Sixth  Five  Year  Plan  of  gigantic  proportions,  decided  on  many 
important  policies  and  principles  for  further  development  of 
the  cause  of  socialism  and  repudiated  the  cult  of  the 
individual  'which  had  grave  consequences  inside  'the  Party, 
it  also  advocated  further  promotion  of  peaceful  coexistence 
and  international  co-operation,  making  an  outstanding 
contribution  to  the  easing  of  international  tension.  "-ý 
Renmin  Ribao  published  two  important  articles  entitled  "On  the 
Historical  Experience  of  the  Dictatorship  of  the  Proletariat" 
and  "More  on  the  Historical  Experience  of  the  Dictatorship  of 
the  Proletariat"  confirming  China's  positive  attitude:  "The 
20th  Congress  of  the  CPSU  showed  great  determination  and 
courage  in  doing  away  with  blind  faith  in  Stalin.  in  exposing 
the  gravity  of  Stalin's  mistakes  and  in  eliminating  their 
effects...  The  unanimity  of  view  was  not  surprising,  but 
the  complete  absence  of  criticism  was  significant. 
In  1957  the  meeting  of  leaders  of  Communist  Parties  in 
power  (with-'the  exception  of  the  Yugoslavian  Party)  was 
attended  by'  Mao  Zedong  who  supported  the  declaration  that: 
"The  historic  decisions  of  the  20th  Congress  of  the  CPSU  are 
of  tremendous  importance  not  only  to  the  CPSU  and  to  the 47 
building  of  communism  in  the  USSR;.  they  have  opened  a  new 
stage  in  the  world  Communist  movement  and  pushed  ahead  its 
further  development  along  Marxist-Leninist  lines.  '""  However, 
in  March  1958..  Mao  showed  some  ambiguity  in  his  ,  reaction  to 
Khrushchev's  attitude.  He  said  at  a  Party  conference  held  in 
Chengdu:  "When.  Stalin  was  criticized  in  1956,  -  we  were  on  the 
one  hand  happy,  but  on  the  other  hand  apprehensive.  It  was 
completely  necessary  to  remove  the  lid,  to  break  down  blind 
faith,  to  release  the  pressure,  and  to  emancipate  thought.  But 
we  did-not  agree  with  demolishing  him  at  one  blow.  "-aYet  this 
was  simply  a  matter  of  timing.  Mao  was  happy  at  the 
downgrading  of  Stalin,  both  because  the  Chinese  revolution  had 
suffered  from  his  errors  of  judgement,  and  because  he  himself 
had  been  obliged  to  bow  to  his  dictates.  -Stalin,  Mao 
complained  repeatedly,  tried  to  prevent  the  Chinese  from 
carrying  the  revolution  forward  in  1945,  and  regarded  their 
revolution  as  a-"fake"  and  Mao  as  a  potential  Tito  when  it  did 
succeed.  1---,  11  He  complained  that  in  China-  Stalin  -loomed 
symbolically  larger  than,  himself,  "Buddhas  are  made  several 
times  life-size  in  order  to  frighten  people.  When  heroes  and 
warriors  appear  on  the  stage  they  are  made  to  look  quite 
unlike  ordinary  people.  -Stalin  was  that  kind  of  person.  The 
Chinese  people  had  got  so  used  to  being-  slaves  that  they 
seemed  to  want  to  go  on-When  Chinese  artists  painted  pictures 
of  me  together  with  Stalin,  they  always  made  me  a  little  bit 
shorter,  thus  blindly  knuckling  under  to  the  moral  pressure 
exerted  by  the  Soviet  Union  at  that  time.  "C$-"  , 
In  addition,  there  were  many  events  to  show  the  solidarity 
of  the  two  Parties  after  the  20th  Congress-of  the  CPSU.  The 
8th  Congress  of  the  CCP  provided  the  opportunity,  through  the 
presence  and  statements  of  Mikoyan,  for  a  further 
demonstration  of  Sino-Soviet  solidarity,  and  of  China's  support 
for  Khrushchev's  new  policy.  The  8th  Congress  is  now  regarded 
by  the  Chinese  as  one  of  the  most  important  events  in  their 
Party's  history.  It  had  three  main  features  which  were  greatly 
influenced  by  the  20th  Congress:. 48 
a>  It  concluded  that  China's  collectivization  had 
progressed  to  the  point  where,  as  Liu  Shaoqi  said,  "the 
principal  method  of  struggle"  could  no  longer-be  "to  lead  the 
masses  in  direct  action"65-,  as  :  "Now,  however,  the  period  of 
revolutionary  storm  is  past,  new  relations  of  production  have 
been  set  up,  and  the  aim  of  our  struggle  is  changed  to  one  of 
safeguarding  the  successful  development  of  the  productive 
forces  of  society,  (and  thus)  a  corresponding  change  in  the 
methods  of  struggle  will  consequently  have  to  follow...  "66 
With  the  collectivization  of  agriculture  and  the  public 
ownership  of  the  means  of  production  basically  accomplished  by 
1956,  the  CCP  stressed  the  need  to  focus  all  energies  on 
promoting  the  productive  forces.  This  it  did  in  a  way  deeply 
influenced  by  the  Soviet  model  of  development.  For  by 
maintaining  that  "the  essence  of  this  contradiction(in 
socialist  society)  is  a  contradiction  between  the  advanced 
social  system  and  the-  backward  social  productive  forces"---',  ý,  it 
turned  its  back  on  the  need  for  a  simultaneous  and 
interrelated  socialist  revolution  on  the  political  and 
ideological  fronts.  Revolutionary  struggle,  the  Chinese 
leaders  accepted,  would  not  unleash  the  productive  forces,  but 
would  only  undermine  the  stability  needed  for  their  rapid 
growth.  Periods  of  acute  class  struggle  were  no  longer 
essential  to  create  , 
the  new  cooperative  organizations  and 
attitudes  favorable  to  economic  growth.  This  doctrine,  of 
course,  was  regarded  as  reactionary  ten  years  later  during  the 
cultural  revolution,  when  Liu  Shaoqi  was  attacked  as  China's 
Khrushchev,  the  arch-revisionist  of  China. 
b)  The  principle  of  collective  leadership  and  the 
development  of  democracy  within  the  Party  were  discussed  at 
length.  The  result  was  that  the  wording  of  the  1945  Party 
constitution,  "the  Chinese  Communist  Party  takes  the  theories 
of  Marxism-Leninism  and  the  combined  principles  derived  from 
the  practical  experience  of  the  Chinese  revolution-the  ideas 
of  Mao  Zedong-as  the  guiding  principles  of  all  its  work",  -was 
deleted  from  the  new  one'"'.  The  8th  Congress  further  reduced 49 
Mao's  power  in  the  Party  by  reestablishing  the  post  of  General 
Secretary,  which  had  been  abolished  in  1937.  Appointed  to  the 
revived  office  was  Deng  Xiaoping  who  came  to  exercise 
considerable  control  over  the  organizational  apparatus  of  the 
Partyr,  y. 
c)  Concerning  the  international'situation,  the  8th  Congress 
fully  approved  the  Soviet  leader's  policy  of  relaxation. 
Friendship  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  socialist  countries 
was  reaffirmed.  In  his  political  report  to  the  Congress,  Liu 
Shaoqi  pointed  out:  "Under  these  circumstances,  the  world 
situation  is  tending  toward  a  relaxation  of  tension,  and  now 
lasting  world  peace  has  started  to  become  a  possibility.  "  0 
And  Mao  Zedong  too,  in  his  opening  declaration,  put  it  that: 
"Owing  to  ceaseless  efforts  on  the  part  of  peace-loving 
countries  and  peoples,  the  international  situation  already 
shows  a  tendency  towards  detente.  "" 
Speaking  of  the  permanence  of  Sino-Soviet  friendship,  Mao 
went  on:  "  "Our  enemies  would  really  like  to  create  a  split  in 
our  relations  and  make  a  breach,  however  small,  'in  our 
friendship.  But  failure  can  dream  this  dream.  They  see  our 
friendship  in  the  light  of  their  bourgeois  relationship.  Their 
speciality  is  to  get  on  well  today,  to  separate  tomorrow,  and 
inflict  mutual  injury.  Never  has  there  been  a  friendship  in 
the'  world  comparable  with  that-  between  our  `,  two  great 
parties.  "'7=ý  In  return  Khrushchev  was  certainly  satisfied  to 
see  that  "the  CPSU  Central  Committee's  measures  have  met  with 
full  understanding  and  support  from  the  great  CCP.  "-7ý 
Sino-Soviet  'co-operation  in  handling  the  events'  in  Poland 
and  Hungary  in  1956  was  another  proof  of  their  solidarity 
after  the  20th  Congress.  The  first  efforts  at  de-Stalinization 
in'the  East  European  socialist  countries  were  barely  mentioned 
in  the  Chinese  press  as  if  not  raising  any  problems,  though 
the  coming  to  power  of  Gomulka  in  Poland  met  with  approval. 
On  1"November,  a  few'days  before  the  crushing  of  the  Hungarian 
insurrection,  an  official  communique  was  issued  by  the  Chinese 
government  supporting  the  Soviet  declaration  of  30  October  on 50 
the  principles  of  developing  and  reinforcing  friendship 
between  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  socialist  countries. 
Indeed,  `during  the  events  the  Chinese  were  so  closely 
involved  with  the  Soviets  that,  afterwards,  they  claimed  that 
Soviet'success  was  the  result  of  their  advice74  . 
Yet  Khrushchev's  prestige  was  damaged  by  the  events.  It  was 
China  which  had"  'to  step  in  and  help-the  USSR  to  'maintain 
unity.  On  29  December  1956,  a  second  important  editorial  "More 
on  the  Historical  Experience  of  the  Dictatorship  of  the 
Proletariat"  was  published  by  Renmin  bao  -defending  the 
Soviet"  Union  and  acknowledging  its  position  as  the  centre  of 
the  international  Communist  Movement.  `Stalin  'had  made  some 
serious  mistakes,  but  the  socialist  system  must  not  be 
condemned.  A  joint  communique  stressing  Sino-Soviet  unity  on 
the  Hungarian  affairs  was  published  on  18  January  1957 
following"  a  visit  'by-  Zhou  Enlai  to  Moscow,  Warsaw'  and 
Budapest  to  play  the  role  of  the  -great  conciliator.  The 
communique'  stated:  "By  helping  the  Hungarian  people  -to  put 
down  the  counter-revolutionary  rebellion,  the  Soviet  Union 
has  fulfilled  its  duty  to  the  working  people  of  Hungary  and 
the  other  socialist  states,  which  is  completely  in  line  with 
the  interests  of  safeguarding'  world  peace.  "7S 
Nothing  was  said  specifically  about  the  case  of  Poland.  But 
when  the  Chairman  of  the  Polish  Council  of  Ministers,  "  Jozef 
Cyrankiewicz,  headed  a  delegation  to  Beijing  in  April,  he  and 
Zhou  Enlai  joined  in  a  communique  asserting  that  the  Chinese 
and  Polish  Parties  '"  are  determined  to  continue  their  best 
efforts  to  strengthen  further  the  solidarity  of  the  countries 
in  the  socialist  camp  based  on  the  Marxist-Leninist  principles 
of  proletarian  internationalism  and  equality  among  nations  .  1176 
The  two  sides  agreed  to  expand  their  cooperation-in  the  fields 
of  politics,  economy,  shipping  industry  and  culture. 
2.4  Expanding  Sino-Soviet  Co-operation  1956-1957 
In  1956-1957  Sino-Soviet  co-operation  continued-  to  develop. 
In  the  two  years  there  was  an  enlivening  of  'Sino-Soviet 51 
governmental  contacts,  besides  Zhou  Enlai's  visit  to  Moscow  in 
January  1957.  On  14  September  1956  the  Standing  Committee  of 
the  National  People's  Congress  adopted  a  resolution  which  said 
that  the  recent  Supreme  Soviet  proposal  for  disarmament  met 
the  interests  of  both  the  Soviet  and  Chinese  peoples  and-other 
nations  of  the  world  and,  therefore,  had  its  full  support. 
In  November-December 
, 
1956"a  Chinese  delegation  headed  by  the 
Vice-chairman  of  the  Standing  Committee  of  the  National 
People's  Congress,  visited  the  Soviet  Union.  In  April-May 
1957  the  Chairman  of  the  Presidium  of  the  USSR  Supreme  Soviet, 
K.  E.  Voroshilov,  went  on  an  offical  friendship  visit  to  China. 
And  Mao  Zedong  was  invited  to  visit  the  Soviet  Union.  At  a 
reception  given  by  the  Soviet  Embassy  in  Beijing  on  3  May,  Mao 
declared  that:  "In  these  days,  the  whole  world  has  again 
witnessed  the  massive  unity  and  cohesion,  as  well  as  the 
closest  and  deep-rooted  friendship  between  the  peoples  of 
China,  and  the  Soviet  Union.  This  cohesion  and  friendship  is 
not  only  a  factor,,  contributing  to  the  cause  of  socialist  and 
communist  construction  in  our  countries  but  is  also  an 
important  element  in  the  closeness  of  the  socialist  countries, 
a  reliable  guarantee  of  universal,  peace  and  mankind's 
progress.  The  Chinese  people,  just  like  the  Soviet  people, 
will  continue  to  bend  every  effort,  in.  the  name  of  the 
continued  strengthening  and  development  of  the  relations  of 
cohesion,  friendship  and  cooperation  between  our  countries.  1177 
In  September  and  October  1957  a  delegation  of  the  USSR  Supreme 
Soviet  was  invited  to  take  part  in  the  celebration  of  the  8th 
anniversary  of  the  Peoples  Republic  of  China.  And  on  29 
October  1957  the  Soviet-Chinese  Friendship  Society  was  set  up 
in  Moscow  to  develop  and  strengthen  Sino-Soviet  relations. 
It  was  November  1957  that  was  to  be  a  crucial  month  for  the 
future  of  Sino-Soviet  relations  and  for  the  future  of  the 
socialist  world  as  a  whole.  The  fortieth  anniversary  of  the 
October  Revolution  was  celebrated  with  great  ceremony.  The 
outstanding  event  was  the  launching  of  the  first  satellite 
(Sputnik)  on  4  October  and  the  second  on  3  November,  a 52 
considerable  technical  and  military  achievement.  Above  all, 
the  occasion  was  marked  by  a  congress  of  the  twelve  Communist 
and  Workers'  Parties  then  in  power  (with  the  exception  of  the 
Yugoslav  from  14  to  16  November),  followed  by  a  meeting 
attended  by  a  total  of  sixty-four  Communist  and  Workers' 
Parties  from  16  to  19  November. 
Indicating  the  importance  that  Beijing  attached  to  the 
event.  Mao  Zedong  himself  headed  the  Chinese  delegation. 
Addressing  the  jubilee  session  of  the  USSR  Supreme  Soviet  on  6 
November,  he  'praised  the  Soviet  Union  for  its  achievements 
over  the  forty  years  of  its  existence  and  thanked  it  warmly 
for  assistance  rendered  to  China  in  the  task  of  socialist 
construction.  He  asserted  that  the  Chinese  revolution  "has  its 
own  national  characteristics,  "  and  that,  "it  is  entirely 
necessary  to'  take  them"  into  consideration",  but  "in  both 
revolution  and-socialist  construction  China  had  "made  full  use 
of  the  rich  experience  of  the  CPSU  and  the  Soviet  people.  "  In 
concluding  his  speech,  he  stressed  the  importance  of  accepting 
the  Soviet  Union  as  leader:  "  We  regard  it  as  the  sacred 
international  obligation  of  all  socialist  countries  to 
strengthen  the  solidarity  of  the  socialist  countries  headed  by 
the  Soviet  Union.  "71 
A  joint  declaration  was  issued  at  the  end  of  discussion  held 
by  the  ruling  Parties  ''which  reaffirmed  the  principle  of 
peaceful  coexistence  and  the  possbility  of  achiving  socialism 
through  parliamentary  means,  and  condemned  both  "revisionism" 
and-  "dogmatism".  According  to  later  Chinese  statements, 
however,  the  final  form  of  this  incorporated  significant 
amendments  on  which  the  Chinese  Party  had  insisted.  In  a 
speech  to  the  conference,  which  later  aroused  much 
controversy,  Mao  agreed  that  there  was  a  possibility  of 
preventing  another  world  war,  but  that  even  if  nuclear  war 
broke  out  at  least  half  the  world's  population  would  survive 
and  "the  whole  world  would  become  socialist".  73ýHe  also  made  a 
figurative  remark  that  attracted  wide'  attention:  "The  East  wind 
is  prevailing  over  the  West.  "°o  As  things  turned  ouall  these 53 
issues  were--to.  dominate  the  -Sino-Soviet  controversy  in  the 
1960s;  -.  _ 
the  seeds-  were  already  present  during  the,  1957 
conference. 
The  visit  of.  Mao  Zedongto  Moscow  in--the  autumn  of  1957,  was 
probably  one  of 
-  -the  summits  in  the  history  of  the 
international  communist  movement.  The  leader  of  the  CCP-  had,  to 
face-and  accept  some  hard  facts.  Moscow  intended  to  remain  the 
centre  of,  the-  world,  revolutionary  movement  and,  in  spite  of 
polite  treatment  and  -.  several  formal  concessions,  it  showed 
that-  Mao's  personal  influence  was  bound  to  remain  limited. 
This  was  something  Mao  did  not  like.  The  new  policy  adopted 
by  Stalin's  successors  of  coexisting  with  the  United  States 
and  of  pursuing  economic  advantage  was  increasingly  in  direct 
opposition  to  emerging  Chinese  interests,  whether  in  domestic 
or  foreign  policy  or  in  ideology,  given  the  situation,  the 
Chinese  leaders  were  beginning  to  face.  °14. 
In  the  fields  of  economics  and  science  there  were  signs  in 
1956  that  Moscow  was  in  fact-  prepared  to  expand  its  co- 
operation  with  China.  In  January  of  that  year,:  the  new  trans- 
Mongolian  railway  line  was  formally  opened  to  traffic,  thus 
providing  an  additional  transportation  link.  In  April  Mikoyan 
made  another-.  trip  toý  Beijing,  and  as  a-  result  the  USSR 
undertook  to,  construct  55  more  factories  and  industrial 
plants,  , 
supplying  designer.  ,.  services,  equipment,  and 
technological  skills,  to  a  total  value  of  U.  S.  $625  million.  O2 
No  new  Soviet  -credit  was  involved:  China  was  to  pay  by 
deliveries  of.  goods.  -A  second  agreement  provided  for 
completion  by  1960  of  the  Lanzhou-Aktogai  railway  line.  In 
August,  Beijing  announced  an  agreement  to  undertake  joint 
development  of..  the  hydraulic  power  potential  of  the  Amur  and 
Argun  river  basin  by  construction  of  a  network  of  electric 
power  plants  designed  to  generate  seventy  billion-  kilowatt- 
hours  to  meet  the  power  demands  of  Chinese  and  Soviet  urban 
and  industrial  centers  in  the  regions.  The  network  would  also 
provide,  power  to  make  possible:  the  electrification  -  of  the 
Irkutsk-Vladivostok  section  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway. 54 
Among  the  hydraulic-engineering  projects  contemplated  was  one 
for  the  construction  of  a  new  outlet  for  the.  Amur  to 
facilitate  the  passage  of  deep-draft  oceangoing  vessels  and 
reduce  the  long  period  when  passage  was  impossible  because 
the  shallow-mouth  was  frozen  over. 
On  25  July  1956.  a  Sino-Soviet  protocol  on  additional-  goods 
deliveries  was  signed  in  Beijing  under  which  the  Soviet  Union 
was  to  supply  machine-tools,  cranes,  compressors,  pumps, 
diesel  engines,  generators,  motor,  vehicles,  farm  machinery, 
tools  and  other  goods.  China  undertook  to  supply  sulphur, 
mercury,  caustic  soda,  rice,  tea  and  woollens.  Other 
agreements  in  1956  included'  , 
a)  the  15  June  agreement  for  ten  years  cooperation  between 
the  USSR,  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam,  the  PRC  and 
the  Korean  People's  Democratic  Republic  for  fishing  surveys 
and  oceanological  and°limnological  explorations  in  the  Western 
Pacific. 
b)-the  3  July  agreement  between  the  USSR  ,  the  PRC  and  the 
Korean  People's  Democratic  Republic  on  cooperaton  in  saving 
human  lives  and  rescuing  ships  and  aircraft  An  distress  at 
sea. 
c)  the  30  March  protocol  on  the  free  handover,  to  China  of 
the  property  of  the  Russian  church  mission,  -  buildings,  real 
estate,  -a-print  shop,  a  dairy  farm  and  such  like.  - 
d)  the  5  July  Sino-Soviet  cultural  co-operation  agreement 
providing  for  exchanges  in  the  fields  of  science,  technology, 
education,  . 
literature  and  the  arts,  .  public  heath,  the  press 
and  publishing,  broadcasting  and  television,  cinematography 
and  sports.;  This  summed  up  the,  results  of  fruitful  exchanges 
over  many  years  and  laid  the  groundwork  for  extensive  future 
developments. 
The  sixth  -session  of  the  Sino-Soviet  commission  on 
scientific  and  technical  co-operation  held  in  Beijing  in  July 
1957  was  particularly  important.  It  decided  further  to 
encourage  ,  direct  contacts  between  related  government 
departments,  ministries,  and  research  and-  design  centers  and 55 
to  convene  scientific  and  technical  conferences  on  key 
problems  facing  industry  and  agriculture.  The  Soviet  Union 
undertook  to  hand  over  free  of  charge  -design  documents, 
process  charts  and  machine  tools  for  the  construction  of 
hydroeletric  -power  stations  and  building  materials  factories, 
for  the  manufacture  of  equipment  for  power  stations  and 
metallurgical  production,  for  the  manufacture  of  steel,  and 
rubber  goods,  pulp  and  paper,  dyestuffs  and  medicines,  and 
seeds  and  other  agricultural  requirements.  .  In  exchange, 
China  was  to  hand  over  to  the  Soviet  Union  free  of  charge 
process  charts  for  manufacturing  some  non-ferrous  metals  using 
natural  stone  as  refractory  material,  and,  blueprints  for 
equipment  used"-in  manufacturing  refractories  and  in  coal- 
agglomeration,  in  grain-processing  and  tea-storing,  and  in 
similar  activities.  °4 
More  important  still,  back  on  15  October,  as  revealed  by 
Chinese  later,  °JS  an  agreement  was  signed  on  new  technology  for 
defence.  The  Soviet  Union  was  to  supply  China  with  the  models 
and  the  technological  information  required  for  the  manufacture 
of  atomic  weapons.  To  crown  matters,  an  agreement  was 
signed  on  11  December  1957  between  the  Academies  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  China  which  provided  for  joint  research  and 
expeditions  on  key  problems  of  science  and  technology.  And  ten 
days  later  the  two  governments  concluded  an  agreement  on  the 
sensitive  issue  -of  -  the  rules  of  navigation  on  their  border 
and  on  adjoining  rivers  and  lakes. 
Altogether,  in  1956-1957,  a  large  group  of  Soviet  scientists 
and  experts  were  sent  to  work'  in  China.  In  1956  alone,  1,800 
Chinese  ssholars  and  researchers  went  to  the  Soviet  Union  for 
study.  In  practice,  the  Soviet  Union  and,  some  of  the  East 
European  countries  were  China's  major,  source  of  industrial 
and  agricultural--modernization. 
i_. 
2.5  An  Evaluation  of  the  Period:  A  Positive  Picture  with 
Negative  Features- 
Solidarity  and  co-operation  was  the  main  feature  of  Sino- 56 
Soviet  relations  in  the  period  1953-1957.  This  development  met 
the  vital  interests  of  the  peoples  of  both  -  the  Soviet  Union 
and  China.  The  relationship  was  based  on  the,  principles  of 
equal  rights,  on  close  collaboration  and  mutual  aid  and  on  a 
common  striving  for  the  -preservation  of  peace  and  for  the 
building  of  socialism.  The  leaders  of  the  two  countries  were 
enthusiastic  in  seeking  support-  from  each  other.  On  China's 
part,  the  appeal  "learn  from  the  Soviet  Union"  was  by  no  means 
an  empty  slogan.  The  importance-of  Soviet  experience  was 
admitted  by  all,  'the  Chinese  leaders,  including  Mao  Zedong.  In 
his  speech  "On-the*  Correct  Handling  of  Contradictions  Among 
the  People"  at  an  'enlarged  session  of  the  Supreme  State 
Council  on  27  February  1957,  Mao  declared:  "It  is  perfectly 
true  that  we  should  learn  from  the  good  experiences  of  all 
countries,  socialist  or  capitalist,  but  the  main  thing  is 
still  to  learn  from  the  Soviet  Union.  `9"  On  6  November  1957, 
at  a  public  meeting  in  Beijing  on  the  occasion  of  the  40th 
anniversary,  of  the  October  Revolution,  Liu  Shaoqi  declared  on 
behalf  of  the  CCP:  ""The  Soviet  Union  has  accumulated  rich 
experience  in-  revolution  and  construction,  Until  today  no 
socialist  country  has  yet  gained  such  relatively  comprehensive 
experience  as  is--possessed  by  the  Soviet  Union.  This 
experience  is  a  precious  asset,  a  contribution  of  the  Soviet 
people  to-the  treasure-store  of  all  mankind.  Not  to  cherish 
this  asset  is  impermissible;  it  would  be  aganist  the  interests 
of'our  people,  the  cause  of  socialist  revolution  and  socialist 
construction.  "e7 
For  their  part  the  Soviet  leaders  were  very  happy  to  have 
Chinese  support  for  their  new  policies.  Solidarity  and  co- 
operation  with  China  gave  them  the  most  favourable  position  in 
the  struggle  for  maintaining  their  leading  role  in  the  world 
communist  movement  and  in-the  socialist  countries,  and  -for 
carrying  out-their  new  foreign  policy  of  relaxation  with  the 
West,  mainly  with  the  United  States. 
-Secondly,  economic  co-operation  played  a  very  important  part 
in  the  Sino-Soviet  relationship.  It  was  mutually  benificial. 0 
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The  Soviet  Union  gave  "systematic,  all-round  assistance"0'°'  to 
China's  construction,  mainly  in  the  field  of  heavy  industry. 
At  the  same  time,  cooperation  with  China  facilitated  the 
solution  of  some  economic  problems  in  the  Soviet  Union  which 
imported  from  China  valuable  raw  materials  and  other  goods 
required  for  economic  development. 
However,  there  were  already  several  disturbing  features 
concerning  the  Sino-Soviet"ecnomic  co-operation: 
a)  Repayment  of  credits  and  payments  for  equipment  from 
the  Soviet  Unionwere  through  the  channels  of  trade  -  Chinese 
agricultural  products  and  rare  minerals.  In  this  equation 
there  was  an  inequality:  the  Soviet  Union  already  qualified  as 
an  industrial  nation;  China,  while  proudly  demanding  to  be 
treated  as  a  political  equal,  was  in  an  inferior  stage  of 
economic  development,  and  felt  it. 
b)  The  conditions  surrounding  prices,  transport  costs  and 
varying  exchange  rates  were  not  well  enough  known  to  enable 
people  to  reach  identical  and  definite  conclusions  as  to  the 
financial  value  of  Soviet  aid.  Figures  quoted  by  both  sides 
are  useful  because  they  -throw  some  light  on  the  subject,  but 
they  do  not  provide  a  complete  answer.  Li  Hsien-nien,  then 
Minister  of  Finance,  said  in  July  1957  that  Soviet  aid(long- 
term  credits,  industrial  equipment  and  military  supplies) 
totalled  5,294  million  yuan  ($2,100  million).  2,174.  million 
yuan  of  which(about  $820  million)  had  already  been  used  before 
1953.  e9  Khrushchev,  addressing  the  20th  Congress  of  the  CPSU 
in  February  1956,  gave  the  value  of  the  Soviet  contribution  as 
5,600  million  rubles,  to  which  should  be  added  a  further  2,500 
million  rubles  for  the-.  55  projects  dating  from  7  April  1956  if 
the  comparison  is  to  be  exact.  This  gives  a  total  figure  of 
8,100  million  rubles,  equivalent  to  $2,025  million  at  the  rate 
of  4  rubles  to  the  dollar.  The  Soviet  periodical  Communist 
(No.  12,  August  1968)  stated  that  socialist  countries  supplied 
China  with  equipment  worth  2,500  million  rubles  and 
contributed  to  the  carrying  out  of  350  large  projects. 
Military  aid  does-not  seem  to  be  included  in  this  calculation. 58 
One  way  and  another,  differing  estimates  were"to  raise  doubts 
about  the  real  value  of  economic  co-operation. 
c)  Geographically,  the  Northeast  of  China  had  been  a  heavy 
exporter  of  goods  to  the  Soviet  Union  since  1949,  and  it  was 
to  be  assumed  that  much  of  the  new  economic  construction  would 
be  in  that  critical  region.  Therefore  it  played  the  most 
important  part  in  the  Sino-Soviet  economic  cooperation, 
leaving  the  rest  of  China  wondering  about  its  advantages. 
Accordingly,  even  in  those  years,  minor  Sino-Soviet 
differences  were  already  in  evidence.  The  Soviet  leaders  were 
clearly  dissatisfied  with  some  of  the  independent  actions  and 
decisions  China  took  in  its  relations  with  Asian  countries  and 
which  had  not  been  agreed  with  Moscow.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
did  not  see  any  need  to  consult  the  Chinese  over  major  acts  of 
their  own  foreign  policy  which  broke  the  1954  Beijing 
agreement,  for  example,  their  relaxation  with  the  West  and 
rapprochement  with  Yugoslavia.  Moreover,  the  Soviet  leaders 
were  continuously  critical  of  the  Chinese  policy  of  the  Three 
Red  Banners.  Yet  they  themselves  indulged  in  adventurist 
campaigns,  'attempting,  for  example,  to  catch  up  and  overtake 
the  United  States  in  the  per  capita  production  of  meat,  milk 
and  butter. 
Differences  became  a  little  more'  pronounced  after  the  20th 
Congress.  On  the  whole,  the  Chinese  approved  the  downgrading 
of  Stalin,  but  at  the  same  time  they  `  implied  that  it  was  a 
"grave  error"  to  think  that  Stalin  had  been  wrong  in 
everything.  They  expressed  their  tentative  criticism  in  two 
articles  in  Renmin  Ribao  already  mentioned.  Mao  himself 
expressed  more  serious  criticism  in  his  private  talks  with 
Chinese  Party  leaders'I"31:  "There  are  two  kinds  of  cult  of  the 
individual.  One  is  correct,  such  as  that  of  Marx,  Engels, 
Lenin,  and  the  correct  side  of  Stalin.  These  we  ought  to 
revere  and  continue  to  revere  for  ever...  "  °  In  particular, 
Mao  did  not  fully  agree  with  demolishing  Stalin  at  one  blow, 
not  only  because  of  the  implication  for  the  evaluation  of 
other  leaders  (himself  included),  but  because  he  feared  that 59 
the  attack  on.  the  abuses  of  Stalinism  might  open  the  door  to  a 
repudiation  of  those  aspects  of  the  Soviet  past  which  he 
regarded  as  worthy,  of  respect  and  emulation.  However,  he  still 
entertained  hopes  of  Khrushchev:  "Perhaps  Khrushchev  had  been 
too  hasty,  adrupt...  but.  he  might  still  undertake  his  own  self- 
criticism.  91  The  'Italian  Party  chief,  Palmiro  Togliatti,  had 
the  impression  that  Mao  defended  the  20th  Congress  because  his 
practice  towards  a  comrade  was  not  to  talk-behind  his  back.  112` 
From  the  economic  point,  of  view,  the  Chinese  became  aware  of 
an  increasing  number  of  drawbacks  in  their  co-operation.  The 
cost  of  Soviet  aid  began  to  prove  too  high  in  relation,  to  the 
rate  of  capital  accumulation  and  to  available  exports.  The 
practice  of  concentrating  heavy  industry  in  large  combines-,  or 
huge  factories,  like  those  at  Loyang  (tractors)  or  Changchun 
(trucks),  seemed  out  of  scale;  medium-sized  enterprises  were 
more  suited  to  administrative  and  technical  conditions  in 
China.  Some  Soviet  material  was  also  too  modern  for  poorly 
qualified  Chinese  personnel.  These  conclusions  made  the 
Chinese  begin  to  reduce  their  imports  as  far  as  possible, 
taking  their  economic  destiny  into  their'  own  hands.  This 
inevitably  affected.  ideological  and  'political  relations  as 
well.  Meantime,  on  the  Soviet  side  the  co-operation  deprived 
them  of  industrial  products  that  they  themselves  needed,  and 
apart  from  a  few  rare  minerals  all  they  received  in  exchange 
were  agricultural  products  of  secondary  importance. 
So  by  the'  end  of,  1957  there  was,  a  somewhat'  . 
'complicated 
picture  in  Sino-Soviet  relations-  There  were  many  more 
positive  elements  but  still  a  few  negative  ones.  Change  might 
go  in  either  direction,  depending-  on  the 
. 
fluctuations.  in  the 
political  factors  in  the  coming  years.  ' 60 
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'III 
The  Cracks.  Begin  to  Show  (1958-1959) 
The  truth  is  that  the  international  differences  aaong  the  -- 
fraternal  parties  were  first  brought  into  open...  in  September 
1959-on  September  9...  to  be  exact.  ' 
Rennin  Ribao 
The  years  1958  and  1959  were  critical  in  the  history  of  Sino-Soviet 
relations.  packed  with  events,  starting  with  an  apparent  reapprochment 
between  Moscow  and  Beijing  but  ending  with  relations  so  strained  that  a 
reconciliation  between  Mao  Zedong  and  Khrushchev  had  become  practically 
impossible.  It  was  the  events  of  these  two  years  that  determined  the  whole 
future  course  of  the  Sino-Soviet  dispute. 
3.1  Mao's  Challege  to  the  Soviet  Model 
Before  1958  China's  economic,  and 
, 
other  policies  appeared  basically 
similar  to  those  of  the  Soviet  Union.  After  1958  China  embarked  on  a 
series  of  initiatives  radically  different  from  those  of  the  Soviet  Union 
both  in  style  and  content.  Why  thesudden  change? 
Toward  the  end  of  the  First  Five-year  Plan  the  Chinese  leaders  found  that 
agriculture  could  not  subsidise  the  growth  of  industry,  (which  included 
refunding  debts  to  the  Soviet  Union)  and  that  industry  would  have  to 67 
finance  its  own  growth.  2  In  this  situation,  they  saw  two  possible 
solutions.  The  first,  from  which  agriculture  stood  to  gain,  was  an 
agonizing  reappraisal  of  the  Second  Five-year  Plan,  which  had  been  drawn  up 
on  the  basis  of  Soviet  aid  and  advice.  This  solution  was'  contrary  to  the 
firmly  established  idea  that  a  close  and  direct  link-  existed  between 
socialism  and  heavy  industry  and  departed  from  the  tested-model,  which  in 
1957  was  still  accepted  by  all  the  Chinese  leaders  in---every  field  of 
development.  Yet  this  modelwas  very  difficult  to  pit  into  practice  since 
Chinese  agriculture  was  of  a  traditional  and  intensive  type. 
The  second  solution--the  one  that  was  chosen--was  to  rely  on  a  general 
heightening  of  the  ideological  awareness  and  working  capacities  of  the 
masses  in  all  sectors  of  the  national  economy.  At  the  begining  of  1958, 
just  such  a  mobilization-of  the  whole  population  of  gave  birth  to  the 
mystique  of  -the  Great-  Leap  Forward,  which  was  to  force-  China  almost 
overnight  out  of,  its  backward  state  and  launch  it  into  an  era  of  rapid  and 
regular  development  following  the  example  of  othermodern  states.  In  the 
towns,  industry-  provided-  the  framework  for  the  mobilization;  in  the 
countryside,  the  framework  was  soon  found  in  the  unexpected  formula  of  the 
People's  Communes,  since  the  co-operatives  were  considered  too  narrow  in 
scope  and  too  agricultural  in  vocation  to  be  able  to  absorb  a  large  labour 
surplus.  3  In  doing  this,  Mao  and  his  colleagues  stayed`close  to  the  Chinese 
tradition  and  departed  from  the-  Soviet  model;  while  still  remaining 
Marxists,  they  took  the  line  that-nothing  could  be  done  that  was  not  based 
on  man  himself.,  Theoretically,  too,  there  was  a  growing--dissatisfaction 
which  focused--  on  three  main  aspects  of  the  Soviet  model.  .  --Mao  in 
particular  raised  the  question  -  whether,  it  could  meetChina's  long- 
termnational-  economic  needs  and  he  began  to  'challege  it  in  terms  of 68 
theories  of  primitive  socialist  accumulation  at`  the  expense=  of  the 
peasantry,  and  of  productive  forces  and  dictatorship  of,  the  proletariat,  -and 
of  his  conception  of  the  Communist  Party  of  China. 
From  early  1958  onwards,  Mao-wrote  a  series  of  articles  and  comments 
criticising  the  Soviet  model,  -  including  "Reading  Notes  on  the  Soviet 
Textbook  of  Political  Economy",  "Concerning  Economic  Problems  of  Socialism 
in  the  Soviet  Union",  and  "Critique  of  Stalin's  Economic  Problems  of 
Socialism  in  the  Soviet  Union.  14  These  can  be  read  from  three 
perspectives: 
a)  as  a  crucial  -initial  summing  up  --  of  what  the  Soviet  model  was  and 
what  it  implied  for  China; 
b)  as-a  strong  defence  of  the  Great  Leap  Forward  from  the  perspective  of 
buduan  geming  (uninterrupted  revolution);  and 
c)  as  a  path-breaking  examination  of  the  principles  of-Soviet  political 
economy  and  of  several  key  aspects  of  the  Russian  revolutionary  experience. 
With  the  founding  of  the  People's  Republic,  the  Chinese  saw  the  Soviet 
Union  as  the  only  model  for  socialist  construction.  Mao  wrote  in  one  of  his 
comments:  "In  the  early  stages  of  liberation,  we  had  no  experience  of 
managing  the  economy  of  the  entire  nation.  So  in  the  period  of  the  First 
Five-year  Plan  we  could  do  no  more  than  copy  the  Soviet  Union's  methods, 
although  we  never  felt  altogather  satisfied  with  them.  16  So,  China's  First 
Five-year  Plan  was  notable  for  its  exclusive  reliance  on  heavy  industry; 
highly  centralized,  bureaucratic  methods  of  planning;  and  little  space  for 
light  industry  and  the  production  of  consumer  goods.  The  peasantry  was 
considered  largely  as  a  source.  of  savings.  Powerful,  centralized  economic 
ministries  were  established  in  -Beijing.  6  But  opposition  to  this  rapid 
"Sovietization"  was  not  far  below,  the  surface  even  in  the  early  years..,  Many 69 
Party  leaders  voiced  some  of  the  criticisms  which  Mao  later  raised  7'Even 
in  the  early  1950s,  Mao  began  to  warn  of  the  dangers  the  Soviets  would  pose 
to  the  revolutionary  transformation  of  the  countryside,  but  not  until 
April,  1958,  in  his  speech  "On  the  Ten  Major  Relationships",  did  he 
directly  challenge  it.  ®  He  sharply  criticized  the  Soviet-"lopsided  stress 
on  heavy  industry  to  the  neglect  of  agriculture  and  light  industry.  "9 
Thus  Mao  for  the  first  time  clearly  rejected  -the  idea  of  development 
through  a  privileged  sector-  (heavy  industry  firstand  only  later  other 
sectors)  and  through  distinct  phases  (material  'progress,  first  and  only 
later  social  relations  and  ideology).  He  showed  his  disappointment  in  the 
Soviet  way  of  managing.  agriculture:  In  forty  years,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
been  able  to  produce  only-  such  a--  little-  of  food  and  other  stuff.  If  in 
eighteen  years,  we  can  equal  what  they  have  done  in  the  past  forty  years, 
it  will  naturally  be  all  right,  and  we-should  do  precisely  that.  "1°  Mao 
also  -criticized  the  Soviet  theory  of  productive  forces.  He  argued  that  at 
the  heart  of  this  theory  was  a  profound  fear  and  distrust  of  the  masses  and 
of  mass  struggle.  On  the  other  hand,  he  showed  himself  even  more  concerned 
at  Soviet  meddling  in  Chinese  affairs.  '  He  complained  that  Soviet  influence 
was  so  strong  in  China  that  he  could  not  have  eggs  or  chicken  soup  for 
three  years  because  an  article  appeared  in  the  Soviet  Union  which  said  that 
one  should  not  eat  them.  "  He'  made  a  wholesale  attack  on  China's  Soviet- 
style  First  Five-year  Plan:  "Our  statistical  work  was  practically  a  copy  of 
Soviet  work;  in  the  educational  field  copying  was  also  pretty  bad...  the 
same  applied  to-  public  health  work,  the  Chinese  listened  all  the  same  and 
respectfully  obeyed.  In  short.  the  Soviet  Union  was  tops.  "'2 
Mao  summed  up  the  reasons  for  this,  -slavish  imitation  as  the,  following: 
a)  The  Chinese  could  not  manage  the  planning,  construction  and  assembly 70 
of  heavy  industrial  plants.  They  had  to  make  use  of  Soviet-  experience  and 
Soviet  experts  to  break  down  the  bourgeois  habits  of  their  existing 
experts;  - 
b)  The  Chinese  lacked  comprehension  of  the  whole  economic  situation,  and 
understood  still  less  the  economic  differences  between  the  Soviet  Union  and 
China,  so  all  they  could  do  was  to  follow  blindly; 
c)  The-Chinese  still  had  a  blind-  faith  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  this 
brought  spritual  burdens  to  the  leaders  and  the  people. 
d)  The  Chinese  had  forgotten  the  lessons  of  historical  experience,  and 
did  not  understand  either  the  comparative  method,  or  the  establishment  of 
opposites.  13  However,  with  the  "  Ten  Major  Relationships",  as  Mao  later 
said,  "we  made  a  start  in  proposing  our  own  line  of  construction".  14 
In  practice,  between  April  and  August  1958,  the  movement  for  the  grouping 
of  agricultural  co-operatives  into  large  People's  Communes  combining  small- 
scale  industry  with  agriculture  swept  triumphantly  acrossChina.  15  The 
Central  Committee  formally  rubber-stamped  the  movement  in  August,  and  at 
the  same  time  approved  the  Great.  Leap  Forward  for  rapid  industrialization 
.  16  The  Chinese  leaders'  new  -  economic  policy  was  certainly  not  -  received 
with  approval  by  the  Communist  Party  in  the  USSR,  where  the  press  and  radio 
were  extremely  reticent  in  their  references  to  it.  17  What  China  was  doing, 
in  the  view  of  the  Soviet  leaders,  was  challeging  not  only  orthodox 
thinking  on  building  socialism,  but  also  the  leading  position  of  the  CPSU 
in  the  socialist  camp  and  'the  world  communist-  movement.  '®  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  Chinese  then  failed,  it  would  increase  the  economic  burdens  the 
Soviet  Union  would  be  called  upon  to  bear.  The  Soviet  leaders  were  trully 
aware  of  the  challege  and  soon  started  to  attack  it.  The  Washington  Post 
reported  on  17  December  1958  that,:  at  'a  meeting  with  Senator  Hubert 71 
Humphrey,  Khrushchev  v-had  described  the  Commune  system  as  "reactionary"  and 
inappropriate.  19  -I 
Unfortunately,  Mao's  challege  had  a  cruel  and  tragic  irony.  The  break 
with  the  Stalinist  pattern  of  socio-economic  develop  was  not  accompanied.  by 
a  break  with  Stalinist  methods  in  political  and  intellectual  life.  China 
thereafter  was  to  follow  a  new  path  to  socialism  but  not,  one  that  was  to 
lead  to  the  goals  of  political  democracy  and  freedom  that  Mao  seemingly 
promised  in  the  mid  1950s. 
3.2  Khrushchev's  Two-Pronged  China  Policy 
From  the  begining  of  1958,  Khrushchev's  China  policy  appeared  to 
developtwo  main  objectives: 
a)  to  increase  the  scale  of-  Soviet,  economic,  ýaid  to  China,  -  thus 
reassuring  it  of  Soviet  friendship  and  support  and  increasing  Soviet 
penetration  of  its  economy  and  society;  -  s 
b)  to  counter-attack  Mao's  challege  by  trying  to-oust  him  and  other 
anti-Soviet  elements  from  the  Chinese  leadership.  1958  was  dominated  by 
the  first  objective,  and  1959  saw  the  second.  Khushchev  made  a  ,  desperate 
and  expensive  effort  in  those  years  to  bring  China  under--Moscow's  control. 
But  he  failed  because,  ,  like  Stalin.,  he  -did  notknow  China  and  made  some 
strategic  mistakes. 
In  1958  and  1959  Sino-Soviet  co-operation  in  the  fields  of  economy, 
science,  technology  and  culture  was.  still  developed.  on  18  January  1958 
the  governments  of  the  USSR  and  the  PRC  signed  an  agreement  in  Moscow  on 
major  research  in  science  and  technology.  The  agreement  provided  -  for  joint 
research  during  1958-1962  on  122  key  scientific  and  technological..  problems, 
as  well  as  for  an  extension  of  direct  contacts  between  Soviet  and  Chinese 72 
institutions.  20  Simultaneously,  parallel  agreements  were  signed  between 
the  Ministries  of  Higher  Education  and  the  Academies  of=Agriculture  of  the 
USSR  and  the  PRC.  21  `- 
In  April  1958,  the  two  countries  signed  a  treaty  on  trade  and 
navigation,  by  which  they  undertook  to  conduct  trade  exchanges-in  a  spirit 
of  friendly  co-operation  and  mutual  assistance,  and  on  a'basis  of,  equality 
and  mutual  benefit.  22  '  This  had  a  supplement  on  the  legal  status  of  the 
USSR  trade  delegation  in  the  PRC  and  the  PRC  trade  delegation  in  the,  USSR, 
which  were  to  perform  the  following  functions: 
a)  to  facilitate  the  development  of  trade  and  economic'  relations  between 
the  two  states;  '-", 
b)  to  represent  their-respective  states  in  foreign  economic  affairs; 
c)  to  regulate  on  behalf  of  their  respective  states  trade  exchanges 
with  other  states; 
d)  to  conduct  trade  operation'  between  the  USSR  and  the  PRC.  23 
In  many  ways  this  was-quite'a  remarkable  document  which  might  have  been 
the  fore-runner  of  some  kind  of  economic  union.  ''  '  !,  II 
From  31  July  to  3  'August  Khrushchev  made  an  unexpected  visit  to  Beijing 
and  had  talks  with  Mao  Zedong.  A  communique  issued  after  the  talks  said 
that  relations  between  the  governments  and  the  Communist  Parties  of  China 
and  the  Soviet  Union  were  "being  developed  successfully  and  becoming  more 
firmly  established"  and  that  they  were  in  complete  agreement  about  future 
policy.  24  On  8  August  an  agreement  followed  on  Soviet  technical  aid  to 
China  in  the  building  and  expansion  of  47  industrial  enterprises  and  power 
stations.  25  And  at  the  end  of  1958,  E  trade  negotiations  were  held  in 
Moscow  as  a  result  of  which  the  trade  turnover  originally  envisaged  in  the 
protocol  for  1958  was  exceeded  by,  over  600'million  rubles.  26  The  talks  on 73 
goods  turnover  in  1959  were  also  to  culminate  in  success. 
At  the-  end  of  January  1959,  "  Zhou  Enlai  visited  Moscow  for  the  21st 
Congress  of  the  CPSU.  As  so  often,  such  a  visit  was  followed  on  7  February 
1959  by  a  new  agreement  on  Soviet  assistance  in  building  78  big  projects 
in  steel,  chemicals,  coal,  oil,  engineering,  electrical  engineering,  radio 
engineering,  building  materials  and  energy.  27  The  total  value  was  to  be 
over  5,000  million  rubles  and  China  was  to  repay  with  supplies  of  goods.  2' 
It  was  pointed  out  in  announcing  the  signing  of  the  agreement  that  the 
two  governments  regarded  it  as  a  new  and  important  contribution  to  the 
further  extension  of  their  mutually  advantageous  relations.  29  And  five 
months  latera  successful  consular  agreement  was  signed,  which  helped 
strengthen  and  develop  formal  relations.  30 
But  even  at  this  time  Khrushchev  began  to  implement  the  other  side  of  his 
China  policy,  trying  to  bring  it  under  his  control  by  making  use  of  Soviet 
economic  and  military  aid.  In  this  respect  he  made  at  least  two  serious 
mistakes:  one  was  -to  propose  setting  up  a  joint  fleet,  an  idea  that 
reminded  the  Chinese  of'  their  bitter  encounters  with  foreigners  in  the 
past;  the  other  was  to  try  ,  to  'oust  Mao  from  the  leadership  by 
suruptitiously  supporting  those  people"inside  the  CCP  who  were  against  his 
policy. 
Khrushchev  seemed,  from  the  Soviet  point  of  view,  to  have  some 
advantages.  After  the  Korean  War,  Peng  Dehuai,  Chinese  Minister  of  Defence 
and  a  veteran  Long  Marcher,  began  the  sovietization  of  the  PLA.  There  was 
a  debate  in  Chinese  military  circles  about  partnership  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  In  Peng's  view,  China's-  domestic  socio-economic  -policies  were 
intimately  related'to  its  military  policies  and  to  its  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  China's  military  security  required  a  rational  plan  of  modern 74 
economic  development  to  support-  professional  modernisation  as  well  as"the 
sophisticated  weapons  and-nuclear  shield  provided  by  the  Soviet  Union.  When 
Khrushchev  visited  Beijing  at  the  end  of  July  1958,1,.  he-was  accompanied  by 
Defense  Minister  Malinovski,  who  was  known  to  the,  Chinese  from  his  period 
as  commander  of  the-Soviet  forces  in  Manchuria  in  1945-1946.  Marshal  Peng 
Dehuai  participated-  in  discussions  ,  as-  the  counterpart  of  Malinovski. 
Obviously,  the  meetings  dealt  with  matters  of  major  political  and  military 
significance.  31  It  was  at  a  highly  important  strategy  meeting  that  the 
Soviet  side  proposed  a  joint  Sino-Soviet  naval  command%  for,  the  West 
Pacific  and  a  joint  long-wave  radio  station  in  the  North-East  of  China. 
Since  the  Soviet  Union  simultaneously  refused  to-'shoulder  ,  military 
undertakings  for  China,  Moscow's  proposal  looked  as  if  it  was  meant  to 
exert  a  degree  of  control  and  guidance  over  China's  strategy  and  defence. 
There  was  no  possibility  of  Beijing  accepting.,  r,  Itwas  reported  that  Mao 
was  so  angry  that  he  shouted  at  the  Soviet  Ambassador,  considering--the 
proposal  a  sort  of'indignity.  32  The  Chinese  later-charged  that:  "In  1958 
the  leadership  of  the  CPSU  put  forward  unreasonable,  demands  designed,  to 
bring  China  under  military  control.  These  unreasonale  demands  were  rightly 
and  firmly  rejected  by  the  Chinese  Government.  033  And  by  1962  Mao  was  even 
more  blunt:  "From  the  second  half  of  1958,  he  (Khrushchev)  has  attempted  to 
close  China's  seacoast,  to  launch  a  joint  fleet  to  dominate  the  coastal 
area,  and  to  blockadeýus.  Khrushchev  came  to  China  because  of  this  "3d 
Inevitably  the  naval  proposal  became  a  major  contribution  to  the 
development  of  the  Sino-Soviet  dispute. 
Despite  what  had  happened  at-the.  2lst  Conference  of°the  CPSU  from  27 
January  to  5  February  1959,  Khrushchev  affirmed  that  there  were  no 
divergences  with  China,  the  two  were  in  total  agreement,  and  that  the  only 75 
trouble  was  that  some-people,  meaning  Mao,  -..  were  dogmatists.  The  keynote 
of  the  21st  Congress  was  the  transition  to  communism  in  the  USSR,  the 
impossibility  of  a  return  to  capitalism  and  the,  dying 
.  out  of  the  class 
struggle  -  which  was  totally  contrary  to  Mao's  theory.  In  short 
Khrushchev  counter-challeged  Mao  on  two  counts.  This  was-  another  major 
mistake  made  by-  Khrushchev.  He  made  a  faulty  judgement  about  .: 
the 
development  of  China's  internal  situation  and  to  the  stability  of  Mao's 
position  inside  the  CCP.  -- 
In  January  1959-Mao's-announced  his  resignation  from  the  Chairmanship  of 
the  People's  Republic  (though  not  from  the  Chairmanship  of  the  Party  or  of 
the  Military  Affairs  Committee),  stunning  many  people-  in  China.  Abroad 
this  was  interpreted  as  a  "demotion".  It  seemed  as-,  if  Mao's  stiff-necked 
opposition  to  Khrushchev  had  led  to  his  replacement  by  someone  more 
pliable  'and  better  liked  by  the  Soviet  leadership,  Liu  Shaoqi.  The  facts 
were  different.  -On  Mao's  return  from  the  Moscow  meeting,  back  in"November 
1957,  he  ordained-many  conferences  which  not  only  debated  the  Leap  policy 
but  also  discussed  problems  arising  from  an  emerging  dispute-with-  the 
USSR,  and  the  possible  results  , 
if  it  worsened.  Mao  blamed  some  of  what  he 
regarded  as  the  swift  degeneration  of  the  Soviet  Party  upon  the  fact  that 
Stalin  had  not  prepared  a  successor.  And  from,  then  on,  he  began 
increasingly  to 
.  realize  that  the  Moscow  encounter-  was  only  a  begining; 
there  would  be  a  prolonged  and  very  serious  ideological  debate  on  at  the 
international  level.  -  It  was  a  struggle  "which  may,  last  one  thousand 
years.  131  What  he  then  considered  was  a  retreat  from  his  position  in 
charge.  of  day-to-day  work.  to  take  much  more  time  to  think  about  strategic 
and  ideological  issues  for  the  Party.  305  It  was  this  that  made-  Khrushchev 
believe  that  Mao  was  being  demoted.  But  in  any  case,  he  '-  shortly  began  to 76 
engage  in  activities  encouraging  to  the  opposition  to  Mao  within  the  CCP 
itself. 
The  initial  attack  on  Mao's  policy  came  from  Peng  Dehuaiat  the  8th  Plenum 
of  the  8th  Central  Committee  held  in  July  1959-in  Lushan,  the  cool  and 
beautiful  mountain  resort.  Peng  had  left  China  in  April  that  year,  during 
the  session  of-  the  National  People's  "Congress,  to  attend  a  meeting  of 
Ministers  of  the  Warsaw  Pact.  For  several  weeks  he  toured  the  USSR  and  East 
European  countries  in  order  to  learn  advanced  modern  techniques.  -But  before 
his  departure,  the  Politiburo,  had  received  another  note  ,  from  Khrushchev 
demanding  united'  action  and  joint  defense:  Soviet  use  of'Chinese  military 
and  naval  facilities  in  return  for  nuclear  knowledge;  joint  nuclear  bases 
in  China  under  Soviet  advisers;  and  'linked  economies.  The  latter°was  a 
fifteen-year  plan  which  Soviet  experts-  had  drawn  up  as  long  ago  as  1955- 
56  for  Chinese-industrial  takeoff  by  -1967.37 
While  the  Politburo  studied  what  amounted  to  an  ultimatum  Peng  left 
Beijing  to  look  at  the  other  side  of  the  fence.  0e 
He  was  more  impressed  than  ever  with'  Soviet  'weaponry.  While  visiting  the 
USSR,  he  also  heard-the  Leap  and  the  Communes  deplored  as  "petty  bourgeois 
adventurism'".  Perhaps  with  encouragement  from  Soviet  leaders,  he  decided 
to  speak  up.  -  In  Tirana  he  met  Khrushchev  and  showed  him  the  text  of  his 
criticisms  of  the  Leap,  the  Communes,  and  'other  of  Mao's  policies.  What 
Khrushchev  said  exactly  is  unknown,  but  he  must  have  promised  support.  On 
13  June  Peng  'was'-back  in  Beijing.  And  on  20  June,  having  received  a 
negative  answer  to  his  ultimatum  of'April,  Khrushchev  abruptly  cancelled 
the  agreement  for  sharing  nuclear  technology.  The  Politburo,  of  which 
Peng  was  'a  member,  sat  throughout  late  June.  -Mao's  opposition  took  heart. 
The  USSR  had  cancelled  the  agreement.  Did  not  this  prove  Mao  utterly  wrong? 77 
In  July,  Peng  toured  China,  investigating  and  collecting  data  against 
the  Communes  and  the  Leap.  On  14-July  he  circulated  his  "letter  of 
opinion".  On  the  17th  Mao  received  a  copy.  On  the  18th  Khrushchev  attacked 
the  Communes  and  the  Leap  as  "petty  bourgeois...  fanatic...  adventurism!  ',  the 
same  terms  as  in  Peng's  letter.  On  1  August,  Army  Day,  articles  appeared 
in  the  Soviet  press  lauding  Peng.  Khrushchev's  overt  attempt  to  topple  Mao 
was  not  fully  revealed  until  1963.39  But  the  debate  in  China  occupied 
almost  the  whole  of  the  three  weeks  allotted  to  the  August  Plenum.  Finally, 
a  resolution  passed  on  17  August-  1959  by  the  8th  Plenum  took  an  extremely 
harsh  line  toward  Peng  and  his  supporters,  saying  that  the  "activities  of 
the  anti-Party  clique  headed  by  Peng  Dehuai  prior  to  and  during  the  Lushan 
meeting  were  intentional,  prepared,  planned  and  organized.  1411  Peng  and 
all  his  supporters  were  dismissed  from  their  posts.  41  Marshal  Lin  °Biao 
replaced  Peng  Dehuai  as  Minister  of  Defence.  ' 
It  is  not  known  when  Mao  learned  of  Peng's  consultation  with  Khrushchev 
in  Tirana.  But  he  mentioned  the  matter  indirectly  on  11  September  the  same 
year  at  an  enlarged  session  of  the  Military  Affairs  Committee:  "It  is 
absolutely  impermissible  to  go  behind  the  back  of  our  motherland  and  to 
collude  with  a  foreign  country.  M43  It  is  also  still  impossible  to 
determine  how  much  Soviet  inspiration  was  behind  Peng's  action.  But 
Khrushchev  was  reported  at  the  Bucharest  meeting  in  June  1960  to  have 
protested  at  Peng's  dismissal.  44,  '  >, 
On  a  cold  September  day  Mao  swam  in  the  Miyun  reservoir  in  Beijing,  a 
creation  of  the  Great  Leap  Forward.  He  was  bracing  himself  for  Khrushchev's 
visit  to  Beijing  for  the  celebration  of  New  China's  tenth  anniversary. 
Khrushchev  was  coming  to  China  straight-  after  his  Camp  David  talks  with 78 
President  Eisenhower.  He  and  his  colleagues  never  came  empty-handed;  but 
less  and  less  of  what  they  brought  was  welcome. 
3.3  Differences  in  Foreign  Affairs  -  and  Personalities 
It  was  in  1958  that  it  first  became  apparent  that  China  and  the  Soviet 
Union  shared  different'  views  on  a  number  of  foreign  policy  issues  which 
brought  the  conflict  to  a  state  of  high  tension. 
It  was  not  until  the  begining  of  1958  that  Khrushchev  firmly  established 
his  position  in  the  Soviet  Union.  With  his  defeat  of  the  so-called  anti- 
Party  group  in  mid-1957,  his  removal  of  Marshal  Zhukov  at  the  end  of  the 
year,  and  his  assumption  of  the  Premiership  in  addition  to  the  First 
Secretaryship  of  the  Party  in  February  1958,  he  was  at  last  in  a  good 
position  to  put  his  ideas  on  foreign  policy  into  practice  and  not  worry  to 
be  directly  confronted  with  the  Chinese.  Therefore  there  was  nothing 
11  strange  in  the  fact  that  fundamental  international  differences  between 
China  and  the  USSR  first  became  apparent  in  the  summer  of  1958.  Following 
the  Iraqi  revolution  of  14  July  a  crisis  over  Lebanon  took  place,  which  led 
to  a  voluminous  exchange  of  letters  between  Khrushchev  and  Western 
statesmen.  Finally  on  28  July  they  agreed  to  hold  a  summit  meeting  at  the 
UN  Security  Council,  'which  would  be  attended  by  America,  Britain,  France, 
the  USSR  and  India.  It  was  this  that  obviously  injured  Mao's  pride,  that 
India,  instead  of  China,  would  attend  the  summit.  "Nothing  can  be  saved  by 
yielding  to  evil,  and  coddling  wrong  only  helps  the  devil",  Renmin  Ribao 
wrote  sourly  on  20  July. 
From  31  July  to  3  August,  Khrushchev,  clearly  concerned,  visited 
Beijing  for  talks  with  the  Chinese  leaders.  4S-The  communique  issued  at 
their  conclusion  referred  to  the  "complete  identity  of  views"  between  the 79 
two  countries  and  called  for  an  urgent  conference  of  heads  of  government 
and  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  American  and  British  troops  from  Lebanon 
and  Jordan.  It  also  added  in  passing  that  the  two  Communist  Parties  would 
"wage  an  uncompromising  struggle  against  revisionism-the  principal  danger 
in  the  communist  movement"46  which  had  found  its  clearest  manifestation  in 
the  programe  of  the  Yugoslav  League  of  Communists.  After 
. 
returning  to 
Moscow  Khrushchev  sent  a  note  to  Eisenhower  on  5  August,  withdrawing  his 
support  for  the  proposed  summit  meeting  on  the  grounds  that  the  Security 
Council  was  dominated  by  the  USA  and  its  allies,  and  demanding  the 
admission  of  the  PRC  to  the  UN.  It  was  the,  general  opinion  that  his  sudden 
change  of  attitude  was  directly  connected  with  his  visit  to  Beijing.,  But  if 
he  reversed  gears  on  this  issue,  he  nevertheless  made  his  other  big  mistake 
by  suggesting  the  creation  of  a 
_joint 
fleet. 
_ 
On  the  Taiwan  problem,  Khrushchev  seems  to  have  done  little  better  by 
expostulating  over  the  dangers  of  imminent,  nuclear  war.  In  Mao's  view  the 
United  States.  despite  its  missile  bases  ringing  China,  would  not  start  a 
nuclear  war  because  China  had  no.  intention  of  aggression  anywhere.  Equally 
the  U.  S.  was  not  allowing  Jiang  control  of  nuclear  weapons  in  Taiwan.  But 
it  was  on  this  occasion  that  Khrushchev  first  hinted  that  China  should 
accept  an  accomodation  with  the  United  States  over  Taiwan,  promising  not  to 
use  force  to  liberate  the  island.  '?  But  this  again  was  contrary  to  China's 
principle  of  sovereignty. 
On  23  August  China  began  shelling  Jinmen  (Quemoy)  and  Mazu  (Matsu).  The 
first  shelling,  in  September  1954,  had  not  provoked  massive  American 
retaliation.  'a  On  this  occasion,  the  initiative  was  an  independent  action 
taken  by  China,  asserting,  a  different  viewpoint  and  forcing  the  Soviet 
Union  to  take  its  part.  Indeed,  Khrushchev  complained  that  the  Chinese 80 
were  trying  to  command  Soviet  foreignrpolicy.  "3  However,  on  7  September,  14 
days  after  the  bombing  of  Jinmen  and  one  day  after  the  long-suspended 
American-Chinese  talks  had  resumed,  Khrushchev  sent  a  message  to 
Eisenhower  that  an  attack  against  China  would  be  "an  attack  against  the 
USSR".  On  the  19th  he  repaeted  that  if  an  aggressor  should-use  nuclear 
bombs  on  China,  the  Soviet'Union  would  use  its  to  defend  China.  But  by 
then  it  was  clear  there  would  be  no  confrontation  so  these  efforts  by 
Khrushchev  to  appear  as  if  he  was  defending  China  against  U.  S.  imperialism 
were  considered  by  Mao  to  be  simply  a  propaganda  ploy.  The  whole  incident 
pointed  to  a  complete  lack  of  co-ordination  between  China  and  the  USSR  in 
foreign  affairs  and  to  an  apparent  lack  of  clear  military  commitments. 
At  the  21st  Congress  of  the  CPSU  early  in  1959,  no  open  signs  of 
international  differences  between  the  USSR  and  the  PRC  appeared.  In  his 
report  to  the  Congress  Khrushchev  suggested  the  creation  of  a  nuclear  free 
zone  in  the  Far  East  -and-  Pacific,  but  Zhou  Enlai,  the`  Chinese 
representative,  totally  ignored  it.  Nevertheless  the  year  1959  saw  the 
development  of  two  trends  in  Soviet  foreign  policy  both  of  which  gave  rise 
to  increasing  apprehension  and  resentment  in  Beijing;  -  the  first  was  the 
policy  of  direct  approach  to  the  United  States  with  the  aim  of  promoting 
detente,  and  the  second  was  the  effort  to  cultivate  close  relations  with 
India,  with  which  China  had  come  into  conflict.  As  it  happened.  the  '  year 
1959  also  saw  the  begining  of  a  most  difficult  time  for  the  New  China.  The 
whole  world  appeared  to  be  against.  it  and  predicted  its  failure.  It  was 
beset  at  home  with  climatic  and  agricultural  disasters,  besides  the  mistake 
of  the  Great  Leap  Forward.  It  got  involved  in  seemingly  major 
confrontations  with  both  -the  United  States  and  -the  Soviet  Union.  And  the 
border  conflict  with  India  in  the  -second  half  of  the  year  brought  the 81 
differences  between  the  USSR  and  the'PRC  over  foreign  policy  to  a  head. 
The  good  relations  established  between  India  and  China  between  1951"  and 
1956  deteriorated  in  1957.  India's  need  for  massive  aid  from  both  the  U.  S. 
and  the  USSR  dictated  a  policy-of-hostility  to  China.  The  confrontation  was 
mainly  over  the  Tibet  problem.  Technically,  -Tibet  is  internationally 
recognized  as  a  region  of  China.  -  Nehru  recognized  it  as  such  in  1954.  But 
in  1958  the  Indians  and  Chinese  began  exchanging  notes,  at  first  polite, 
but  gradually  colder,  on  the  parachuting  of  weapons  and  money  by  the  CIA  to 
the  Khamba  rebels  in  Tibet.  SO  This  led  to  fierce  denunciation  of  the 
Indian  Government  by  Beijing  and  a  serious  cooling-off  in  Sino-Indian 
relations.  The  fact  that  the  Dalai  Lama  settled  at  Tezpur,  in  Indian 
territory,  brought  India  back  into  Tibetan  affairs,  or  as  Beijing-saw  it, 
into  Chinese'  internal  affairs.  Chinese  suspicion  strengthened  when  the 
Dalai  Lama  appealed  to  the  United  Nations. 
The  first  open  clash  between  Indian  and  Chinese  border  patrols  occurred 
on  26  August  1959.  'On'  6  September  the  Chinese  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
approached  its  Soviet  counterpart,  pointing  out  that  the  USSR  should  not 
"fall  into  the  trap  prepared  by  Nehru",  who  was  utilizing  the  Soviet  Union 
to  pressure  China.  On  9  September  the  Soviet  Foreign  Ministry  prepared  a 
statement  on  the  border  clash.  The  Chinese  Foreign  Ministry  asked  that  it 
should  not,  be  'published,  because  Premier  Zhou  was  writing  to  Nehru 
requesting  negotiations.  Moscow  ignored  the  Chinese  request  and  published 
its  statement  that  very-  night.  This  pointed  out  that  the  Soviet  Union 
"maintains  friendly  'relations  with  the  Chinese  People's'  Republic  and  the 
Republic  of  India",  that  the'Chinese  and  Soviet  peoples  were  "linked  by 
unbreakable  bonds  of  fraternal  friendship  based  on  the  great  principles  of 
socialist  internationalism",  and  that  "friendly  co-operation  between  the 82 
USSR  and  India  is  developing  successfully.  in  keeping  with,  the  ideas  of 
peaceful  coexistence".  '-'  It  expressed  confidence  that  China  and  India.  would 
settle  their  misunderstandings  arising  out  of  the  "deplorable"  frontier 
incidents,  and  declared  that  "attempts.  to  exploit  these  incidents...  for  the 
purpose  of  fanning  the  cold  war...  should  be  resolutely  condemned".  52  China 
later  declared  that  this  "tendentious"  statement  provided  the  first  public 
indication  to  the  world  that  relations  were  tense.  63 
Did  the  Soviets  really  play  a  neutral  part  in  the  Sino-Indian  border 
dispute?  The  answer  is  no.  While  cancelling  agreements  with  China,  the  USSR 
increased  aid  its  to  India,.  so  that  by  1960  India  had  received  three  times 
the  amount  loaned  to  China.  s4  Soviet  interest  in  India  from  1955,  on, 
generous  economic  aid,  ss  military  aid,  the  policy  of  favouring  New  Delhi, 
and  the  clumsiness  of  Khrushchev's  suggestion,  made  during  the  Lebanon 
crisis,  that  India  should  take  the  place  of  China  at  the  summit  conference 
inevitably  excited  Chinese  irritation.  China's  ,  reproaches  were  not 
groundless  when  it  accused  the  Soviet  Union  of,  -dropping  all  -Marxist- 
Leninist  criteria  in  its  analysis  of  the  Sino-Indian  question  and  of 
completely  abandoning  proletarian  internationalism.  5B,  ;  - 
The  Soviet  repudiation  on  20  June  1959  of  the,  secret  agreement  of  1957 
on  the  supply  of  aid  to  China  to  manufacture  nuclear  weapons  particularly 
enraged  the  Chinese  since  they  regarded  it  as  "a  gift  for  the  Soviet 
leader  to  take  to  Eisenhower  when  visiting  the  USA  in  September".  67  But  on 
15  September  Khrushchev  had  his  Camp  David  summit,  with  Eisenhower. 
However,  the 
, 
reasons  for  the  Soviet  attitude  over  India  were  many.  There 
was  the  fear  that  negotiations  over  the  disputed  Sino-Indian  border  might 
lead  to  a  demand  for  negotiations  over  the  Sino-Soviet.  border. 
, 
Secondly, 
Soviet  long-term  strategy  focused  on  the  Indian  Ocean.  The  deliberate 83 
choice  of  India  as  its  major  Asian  territory  for  -economic  expansion 
dictated  the  betrayal  of  a  "fraternal"  country.  --There  was  also  a 
coincidence:  as  the  border  clash  with  India  escalated  into  bloodshed  in 
August,  an  unpublicised  border  clash  took  place  on  the  Sino-Soviet 
frontier  in  Xinjiang.  5° 
Khrushchev  and  Gromyko  (the  Soviet  Foreign  Minister)  arrived  in  Beijing 
on  30  September,  the  eve  of  the  tenth  anniversary  of  the  Peoples'  Republic. 
Mao  Zedong  met  them  at  the  airport.  Khrushchev  -later  said  he  was  not  as 
enthusiastic  as  he  had  been  on  -  his  first  visit*  to  China  in  1954.  He  was 
very  well  aware  that  the  Sino-Soviet  honeymoon  was  over  and  that  face-to- 
face  confrontation  could  appear.  59  His  speech  at  the  formal-  anniversary 
reception  insulted  his  hosts.  He  extolled  the  Camp  David  spirit  and 
exalted  the  "free  exchanges"  he  had  had  with  the  U.  S.  President.  '  whom  he 
saw  as  a  man  who  understood  well  the  necessity  for  diminishing  tension.  He 
attacked  the  Chinese  as  attempting  to  test  the  stability  of,  the  capitalist 
system  by  force  and  as  "craving  for  war  like  a  cock  for  a  fight".  60  He 
tried  to  soothe  their  impatience  over  Taiwan  by  reminding  them  of  the 
precedent  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  at  the  end  of  World  War  I.  61  'The 
Chinese  refused  to  be  associated  with  his  statements,  and  various  foreign 
witnesses  reported  on  the  extremely  cold  relations  between  him  and  Mao, 
which  persisted  until  the  first  secretary  of  the  CPSU  departed. 
Three  days  were  spent  in  discussion  behind  closed  doors.  Khrushchev  took 
up  the  Sino-Indian  border  calsh,  blaming  China's  aggressiveness,  and 
refused  to  shake  hands  with  Marshal  Chang  Yi,  the  Chinese  Foreign 
Minister,  saying  he  disliked  militarists.  He  emphasized  the  terrors  of 
nuclear  war  and  boasted  that  only  the  USSR-could  stop  the  U.  S  from  making 
such  a  war  upon  China.  For  their  part,  -  the  Chinese  reminded  Khrushchev  that 84 
the  subjects  to  be  discussed  had  significance  for  the  future  of  the  world, 
so  that  nothing  must  be  done  lightly.  Zhou  Enlai  tried  to  explain-  the 
Chinese  stand  on  the  Sino-Indian  border,  but'Khrushchev  brushed  the  maps 
aside  and  said,  "You  can't  make  history  all  over  again".  1-2 
As  if  to  add  insult  to  injury  Khrushchev  recalled-the  phrase  that  "When 
the  masters  quarrel,  the  servants  shake  in  their  shoes".  This  he  did  when 
he  referred  to  "the  two  greatest  states  in  the  world,  on"whom  depended  war 
and  peace".  The  differences  were  so  great  between  the  two  sides  that 
there  was  no  joint  communique  when  Khrushchev  left  Beijing  on  4  October. 
Later,  in  1963,  the  Chinese,  criticized  the  Soviet  leader's  attitude: 
"After  the  Camp  David  talks  the  heads  of  certain  comrades  were  turned  and 
they  became  more  and  more  intemperate  in  their  public  attacks  on  the 
foreign  and  domestic  policies  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party...  They  also 
attacked  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  for  its  general  line  of  socialist 
construction,  its  Great  Leap  Forward  and  its  People's  Communes,  and  they 
spread  the  slander  that  the  Chinese  Party  was  carrying  out  an  'adventurist' 
policy  in  its  direction  of  the  state.  "64  1 
The  American  writer  Anna  Louise  Strong  saw  Mao  Zedong  that  winter.  66  In 
their  talk,  Mao  suggested  that  the  Soviet  Union  might  'now  change  colour, 
become  "revisionist",  and  take  the  road  to  capitalism:  "Russia  will  now  try 
to  strangle  us,  to  choke  us.  But  China  will  not  knuckle  down.  It  concerns 
our  children  and  the  children  of  the  world's  for  a  thousand  years,  whether 
to  be  slaves  or  free.  "66 
Mao  went  on  to  declare  that  detente  between  the  U.  S.  and  the  USSR  would 
also  entail  rivalry  and  conflict:  "they  both  collude  and  contend;  never 
would  either  trust  the  other  or  sleep  in  peace.  At  each  moment,  everywhere, 
there  would  be  confrontation...  Meanwhile,  neither  of  the  two  great  powers 85 
would  engage  in  war  with  China,  because  this  would  mean  giving  a  big 
advantage  to  the  other.  China  was  'tough  meat'.  Of  course,  it  was  possible 
that  both  of  them,  together  with  India  and  Japan,  would  attack  China.  But 
this  would  mean  a  great  deal  of  preparation.  The  Chinese  people  would 
defend  themselves,  and  in  the  end  there  would  be  revolution  in  India  and 
Japan,  in  America  and  Russia.  The  time  is  not  far-  off  when  the  Third  World 
will  rise,  and  the  peoples  of  the  world  will  throw  off  their  chains".  67 
The  meeting  in  October  1959  was  the  last  to  take  place  between  Mao  and 
Khrushchev.  Both  the  PRC  and  the  USSR  were  highly-centralized. 
-  states  in 
which  policy  was  to  a  considerable  extent  a  reflection  of  the  personal 
views  of  the  leader.  Of  course,  national  interests  and  ideological 
factors  played  the  more  important  part  in  the  Sino-Soiet  conflict.  But  the 
personal  factor,  the  conflict  between  Mao  Zedong  and  Nikita  'Khrushchev, 
must  not  be  neglected.  Mao  is  regarded  as  a  poet  of  distinction,  as  a 
political  philosopher  and  as  a  strategist  full  of  romanticism.  Khrushchev 
is  thought  of  as  more  practical,  tactical,  and  straight.  Either  way,  they 
did  not  harmonise.  Their  personalities  were  important  especially  given  the 
different  stages  of  development  of  the  two  countries.  Relatively  speaking, 
the  USSR  was  an  advanced  country  with  strong  industrial-  and  military 
forces.  But  China  was  still  a  poor  and  weak  developing  country.  Moreover, 
the  two  men  were  burdened  by  the  combination  of  their  separate  national 
interests  with  the  principles  of  Marxism.  There  were  factors  enough 
contributing  to  a  steady  deterioration  in  Sino-Soviet  relations.  The  clash 
of  personalities  simply  ensured  that  the  deterioration  would  be  far- 
reaching  and  lasting. 86 
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IV. 
The  Sino-Soviet  Cold  War  (1960-1964) 
Russia  has  lost  an  Albania.  China  has  gained  an  Albania.  ' 
Khrushchev 
The  year  1960  was  the  turning-point  in  the  development  of  Sino-Soviet 
relations.  From  this  year  the  Sino-Soviet  cold  war  started  with  polemics  in 
the  field  of  ideology,  and  then  expanded  into  the  field  of  economic  and 
political  relations.  But  until  the  end  of  1962  both  sides  refrained  from 
attacking  each  other  directly.  The  Chinese  aimed  their  attacks  at 
"revisionism"  in  general  and  the  Yugoslavs  in  particular;  the  Russians 
directed  their  polemics  against  "dogmatism"  in  general  and  the  Albanians  in 
particular. 
4.1  The  Major  Issues  in  Dispute 
From  1960  Mao  Zedong  became  increasingly  concerned  about  the  struggle 
against  "revisionism",  partly  because  of  deteriorating  Sino-Soviet 
relations,  partly  because  of  what  was  happening  inside  China.  With  the 
failure  of  the  Great  Leap  Forward  internally  and  the  restoration  of 
"capitalism"  in  the  Soviet  Union  externally,  he  began  to  speculate  that 
the  revolutionary  order  might  perish  and  be  replaced  by  a  non-revolutionary 
one.  New  bourgeois  elements  were  produced  in  a  socialist  society,  he 
insisted  much  more  than  ever  before,  classes  remained,  the  class  struggle 91 
persists,  and  "this  class  struggle  is  a  protracted,  complex,  sometimes  even 
violent  affair"' 
In  the  autumn  of  1962  Mao  raised  the  possibility  of  the  restoration  of 
the  reactionary  classes  and  warned  that  "a  country  like  ours  can  still  move 
toward  its  opposite"3,  stressing  particularly,  the  necessity  and 
inevitability  of  class  struggle  to  combat  the  growing  danger  of 
"revisionism".  He  must  have  had  the  Soviet  leaders  in  mind  when  he  said 
this.  But  how  was  Khrushchev  to  be  prevented  from  going  ahead  with  his  new 
policy?  How  was  China  to  be  safeguarded  against  Soviet  influence?  The 
Soviet  Union  was  far  too  strong  and  self-confident,  with.  its  boomimg 
industrial  production  and  military  strength,  to  be  turned  aside  by  any 
normal  methods  of  persuasion  or  diplomatic  pressure.  As  Hudson  observed, 
there  was  only  one  way  for  China  to  exert  a  compelling  influence  on 
Khrushchev,  and  that  was  by  attacking  him  at  his  most  vulnerable  point--his 
standing  as  the  supreme  representative  of  the  Marxist-Leninist  cause.  He 
was  the  leader  of  a  Party  that  based  its  claim  to  permanent  and  exclusive 
rule  over  the  Soviet  Union  and  to  the  loyalties  of  Communists  throughout 
the  world  on  an  ideology  of  which  it  had  been  the  first  successful 
practical  exponent.  If  it  could  now  be  shown  that  the  First  Secretary  of 
the  CPSU  was  betraying  the  principles  for  which  not  only  Stalin  but  also 
Lenin  had  stood,  that  he  had  in  fact  fallen  into  heresy,  then  the  very 
basis  of  his  power  would  be  undermined  and  he  would  have  at  the  very  least 
to  compromise  with  the  purists  of  Beijing  in  order  to  save  himself  from 
anathema.  " 
When  the  Sino-Soviet  conflict  came  into  the  open,  the  Chinese  charged 
that  "between  the  20th  and  22nd  Congresses,  the  leaders  of.  the  CPSU 
developed  an  all-round  system  of  revisionism.  They  put  forward  a 92 
revisionist  'line  which  contravened  the  proletarian  revolution  and  the 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  a  line  which  "consisted  of  'peaceful 
competition',  'peaceful  transition',  'peaceful.  coexistence',  'a  state  of 
the  whole  people'  and  'a  party  of  the  entire  people".  s  The  first  three  "P" 
phrases  were  regarded  as  the  general  line  of  Soviet  foreign  policy;  and 
the  last  two  were  connected  with  Soviet  domestic  policy. 
Over  the  years  Chinese  criticism  was  mainly  concertrated  on  the 
following  issues:  I 
1)  The  Chinese  rejected  Khrushchev's  view  that  war  was  no  longer 
inevitable  under  imperialism,  and  held  that  his  foreign  policy  involved  not 
only  rejection  of  the  class  struggle  but  also  peace  at  any  price. 
2)  They  rejected  his  view  that  nuclear  war  would  prove  equally  disatrous 
to  all  concerned,  and  put  forward  Mao's  view  that  a  third  world  war  would 
result  in  further  victories  for  communism.  - 
3)  The  Chinese  rejected  the  viewpoint  that  the  policy  of  peaceful 
coexistence  of  the  socialist  countries  should  be  the  general  line  for  all 
Communist  Parties  and  for  the  international  communist  movement  and  could 
not  be  substituted  by  the  people's  revolution. 
4)  They  adopted  a  sceptical  attitude  towards  the  viewpoint  that  peaceful 
coexistence  could  be  made  the  general  line  of  foreign  policy  for  socialist 
countries. 
5)  They  blamed  the  CPSU  for  violating  the  accepted  standards  of 
relations  between  fraternal  parties,  charging  the  Soviet  leaders  with 
pursuing  a  policy  of  great-power  chauvinism  and  attempting  to  force 
fraternal  countries  which  were  backward  economically  to  abandon 
industrialization  and  become  their  sources  of  raw  materials  and  markets  for 
surplus  products. 93 
6)  The  Chinese  blamed  the  leaders  of  the  CPSU  for  violating  the  Sino- 
Soviet  Treaty  of  Friendship,  Alliance  and  Mutual  Assistance,  making  a 
unilateral  decision  to  withdraw  1.390  Soviet  experts  working  in  China,  to 
tear  up  343  contracts  and  suplementary  contracts  on  the  employment  of 
experts,  to  cancel  257  projects  of  scientific  and  technical  cooperation  and 
to  support  anti-Party  elements  in  the  CCP. 
7)  They  criticised  the  leaders  of  the  CPSU  for  colluding  with  the 
United  States  and  not  wholeheartedly  assisting  national  movements  in 
colonial  and  developing  countries. 
8)  They  criticised  them  for  abolishing  the  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat,  altering  the  proletarian  character  of  the  CPSU  and  opening  the 
flood-gates  for  capitalist  forces  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
9)  The  Chinese  rejected  the  Soviet  view  that  in  developing  countries 
Communists  should  ally  themselves  with  the  national  bourgeoisie  in  the 
struggle  for  national  independence,  which  would  prepare  the  way  for  the 
transition  to  socialism. 
10)  They  adopted  a  sceptical  attitude  towards  Khrushchev's  view  that  in 
certain  circamstances  it  was  possible  for  Communist  Parties  to  attain  power 
by  parliamentary  means  without  revolution. 
11)  They  accused  the  Soviet  leaders  of  seeking  to  impose  their  will  on 
the  world  Communist  movement  and  on  international  democratic  organizations, 
and  of  trying  to  create  splits  in  them. 
12)  They  opposed  the  Soviet  repudiation  of  the  personality  cult 
surrounding  Stalin. 
Overall  the  Chinese  accused  the  Soviet  leaders  of  counterposing,  their 
revisionism  to  Marxism-Leninism,  their  great-power  chauvinism  and  national 
egoism  to  proletarian  internationalism  and  their  sectarianism  and  splittism 94 
to  the  international  unity  of  the  proletariat.  6  It  was  a  long  list  and  a 
serious  challenge. 
For  -their  part,  Soviet  leaders  were  critical  on  the  following  points 
during  the  'cold  war"period: 
1)  They  blamed  the  CCP  for  trying  to  isolate  the  USSR  from  the  socialist 
camp  and  making  use  of  the  political'and  economic  strength  of  the  socialist 
camp  to  meet  their  own  national  interests. 
2)  They  criticized  the  leaders  of  the  CCP  for  seperating  national' 
liberation  movements  from  the  USSR  and  other  socialist  countries. 
3)  The  CPSU  held  that  China's  *nationalist  foreign  policy  seriously 
harmed  the  international  Communist  movement. 
4)  It  also  criticized  the  leaders  of  the  CCP  for  undermining  the  policy 
of  peaceful  coexistence,  sharpening  international  tension  and 
accelarating  a  decisive  military  confrontation  with  imperialism. 
5)  The  Soviet  leaders  blamed  the  Chinese  for  replacing'Marxism-Leninism 
with  Mao  Zedong  Thought  and  trying  to  build  an  independent  centre  for 
world  revolution. 
6)  They  criticized  the  Chinese  for  violating  the  principles  of  Marxism- 
Leninism,  advocating  ethnic  tendencies  in  foreign  policy  and  trying  to 
provoke  a  war  between  the  USSR  and  the  USA. 
7)  They  also  criticized  the  Chinese  for  their  policy  on  the  Cuban 
crisis  and  for  trying  to  provoke  large-scale  international  conflicts. 
8)  They  condemned  China's  position  on  the  Sino-Indian  border  dispute, 
saying  it  had  damaged  the  prestige  of  the  socialist  countries. 
9)  They  criticized  China  for  damaging  Sino-Soviet  relations  and 
developing  friendship  with  Japan. 
10)  The  CPSU  attacked  the  Chinese  communes  as  an  attempt  to  by-pass 95 
certain  historical  stages  and  criticized  the  Great  Leap  Forward  as 
adventurism. 
Overall,  the  Soviet  leaders  accused  the  Chinese  of  counterposing  their 
dogmatism  to  Marxism-Leninism,  their  ethnic  and  adventurist  policy  to 
proletarian  internationalism,  and  their  anti-Sovietism  and  splittism  to  the 
international  unity  of  the  proleteriat.  7 
4.2  Open  Conflict 
In  February  1960,  the  conference  of  the  Political  Consultative  Committee 
of  the  Warsaw  Pact  was  held  in  Moscow;  Kang  Sheng,  the  Chinese  observer, 
made  a  violent  criticism  of  the  leaders  of  the  United  States,  their  feigned 
pacificism,  their  dream  of  a  preaceful  evolution  for  the  socialist 
countries,  and  their  repeated  sabotage-of  disarmament.  He  stated  that  China 
would  not  be  bound  by  any  international  agreement-  reached  without  its 
formal  participation  and  signature.  In  the  context,  his  statement  appeared 
directed  at  the  United  States.  But  it  naturally  had  an  equal  relevance  to 
Soviet  policy. 
Almost  at  the  same  time,  Khrushchev-made  his  second  tour  of  South  and 
South-East  Asia.  e  He  glorified  the  Soviet  Union  on  every  possible  occasion 
and  made  most  extravagant.  professions  of  undying  friendship  for.  the  peoples 
of  India  and  Indonesia,  but  he  did  nothing  to  honour  China  or  to  present 
the  Chinese  case  either  in  Delhi  or  Jakarta.  The  insult  was  symbolised  by 
the  fact  that-  Khrushchev  was  in  India  on  the  occasion  of  the  10th 
anniversary  of  the  signing  of  the  Sino-Soviet  Friendship  Treaty.  Chinese 
anger  at  this  performance  expressed  itself  in  an  almost  complete  news 
boycott;  the  tour  was  not  mentioned  in  the  Chinese  press  for  a  week  and 
thereafter  was  treated  as  a  matter  of  no  importance.  The  impression 96 
produced  by  the  Khrushchev-tour  was  probably  the  last  straw  in  causing  Mao 
to  lose  patience  with  him  and  embark  on  a  systematic  campain  against  him. 
The  first  chance  came  on  16  April  1960.  The  Chinese  Party-journal  Hong 
'￿  published  a  long  article  entitled  "Long  Live  Leninism"  commemorating 
Lenin's  ninetieth  anniversary,  and  forcefully  stating  the  Chinese  view  on 
many  of  the  issues  in  dispute.  It  leaned  upon  the  Moscow  Declaration  of 
1957  to  condemn  the  modern  revisionism  that  would  contend  that  Marxism- 
Leninism  was  outmoded.  It  rejected  the  view  that  a  nuclear  war  would 
destroy  civilization,  and  declared  that  "on  the  ruins  of  destroyed 
imperialism  the  victorious  peoples  will  create  with  tremendous  speed  a 
civilization  a  thousand  times  higher  than  the  capitalist  system,  and  will 
build  a  bright  future".  9  It'  stated  its  belief  that  "until  the  imperialist 
system  and  the  exploiting  classes  come  to  an  end,  wars  of  one  kind  or 
another  will  always  appear".  10  Quoting  Lenin  in  support  of  the  view  that 
the  transition  to  socialism  was  impossible  without  revolutionary  violence,  ' 
the  article  advocated  that  all  revolutionary  movements'  should  be  supported 
"resolutely  and  without  the  least  reservation". 
The  Soviet  reply  to  the  Chinese  challenge  was  soon  given  by  Otto  V. 
Kuusinen,  member  of  the  Soviet  Party  Presidium,  in  editing  a  new 
comprehensive  work  "Fundamentals  of  Marxism-Leninism".  The  book  presented 
in  detail  the  new  Soviet  line  that  "the  official  doctrine  of  Soviet  foreign 
policy  is  the  Leninist  principle  of  the  peaceful  coexistence  of  -states 
regardless  of  the  differences  in  their  social  and  political  systems".  -11  A 
number  of  pointed  references  to  the  controversy  also  appeared  in  the  Soviet 
press  in  1960  in  articles  commemorating  the  40th  anniversary  of  the 
publication  of  Lenin's  "Left-Wing  Communism".  The  Soviet  journal-Kommunist 
declared  on  23  June  that  "the  tendency  of  some'  political  leaders  to  see 97 
the  policy  of  peaceful  coexistence  and  the  struggle  for  disarmament  as  a 
retreat  from  Marxist-Leninist  positions...  and  the  desire  to  show  distrust 
for  the  decisions  of  the  20th  and,  -21st  Party  Congresses  regarding  the 
policy  of  averting  a  new  war  in  present  circumstances  cannot  be  described 
otherwise  than  as  being  mistaken,  dogmatic  and  left-sectarian". 
The  Chinese  press  in  turn,  replied  vigorously  to  these  criticisms.  The 
Renmin  Ribao  asserted  on  25  June  that  "so  long  as  the  monopoly  capitalist 
clique  continues  its  rule  in  the  USA  and  American  imperialism  exists,  the 
threat  of  war  will  not  be  eliminated  and  world  peace  will  not  be 
guaranteed".  It  also  denounced  the  "revisionists"  who,  "frightened  out  of 
their  wits  by  the  imperialist  blackmail  of  nuclear  war,  have  exaggerated 
the  consequences  of  such  a  war  and  have  begged  imperialism  for  peace  at  any 
cost". 
Khrushchev's  argument  in  favour-of,,  peaceful  coexistence  received  a  rude 
and  unexpected  setback  when,.  on  i  May,  an  American  U-2  spy-plane  penetrated 
the  Soviet  Union  and  was  shot  down  1,200  miles  inside  Soviet  territory.  The 
Chinese  took  the  chance  to  teach  him  a  lesson.  "We  have  always  supported 
talks,  but  never  have  we  nourished  the  slightest  illusion  as  to  the 
possibility  of  achieving  a  lasting  peace  through  negotiations  alone",  '?  was 
how  Deng  Xiaoping  put  it. 
The  disagreement  at  the  Third  Congress  of  the  Rumanian  Worker's  Party  in 
Bucharest  from  20  to  25  June  was  much  more  serious.  Khrushchev,  who  was 
determined  to  pursure  his  policy  of  coexistence,  launched  a  "surprise 
attack",  backed  by  a  long  letter  denouncing  in  insulting  terms  the  CCP's 
bellicosity,  leftism,  nationalism,  and  Trotsky-like  methods  of  action  with 
regard  to  the  CPSU.  13  Peng  Zhen,  the  head  of  the  Chinese  delegation,  a 
member  of  the  Party's  Politburo  and,  Secretariat,  replied  with  a  protest 98 
against  the  abusive  use  to°which  the  CPSU  put-its  credit  when  imposing  its 
will  on  the  other  Parties'and"disagreed  with  several  opinions  expressed  by 
Khrushchev;  but  he  signed  the  communique  at  the  end  of  the  meeting.  14,  The 
Central  Committee  of  the  Soviet  Party  ,  meeting  on  13-16  July  1960,  adopted 
a  resolution  approving  the  Soviet  delegation's-line  at  the  Bucharest 
Conference,  and  condemning  dogmatic  and  left-wing  sectarian  deviation. 
The  Chinese  Party  then  replied-in  detail-to  the  Soviet  letter  of  21  June 
in  a  letter  of  10  September  1960  stating  that  the  conflict  of  views  went 
back  to  the  20th  Congress  of  the  CPSU  of  1956,  when  the  Soviet  Party  had 
ignored  Stalin's  "positive  role"  and  had  put  forward  a  false  theory,  of 
"peaceful  transition"  without  previously  consulting  the  other  Communist 
Parties.  Is 
However,  with  the  confrontation  at  Bucharest,  the  Soviet  leaders  decided 
to  make  a  major  counter-offensive  which,  -  as  the  Chinese  later  put  it, 
brought  the  ideological  quarrel  into  the  realm  of  state,  relations.  This 
informed  the  Chinese  government  on  16  July  1960,  of  their  decision  to 
withdraw  the  following  month  all  Soviet  technicians  working  in  China.  This 
unilateral  decision,  which  aroused  greater  resentment  in  China 
-than 
any 
other  action  struck  a  crushing  blow  at  China's  economy  at  a  time  when  the 
country  was  suffering  from  a  series  of  natural  disasters  described  by 
Beijing  Radio  as  "without  parallel  in  the  past  century",  including  drought, 
typhoons,  floods,  and  plagues  of  insects.  The,  withdrawal  involved  1390 
specialists,  scattered  among  250  enterprises.  A=roughly  equivalent  number 
of  Chinese  students  and  trainees  in  the  Soviet  Union-also  returned  home. 
All  the  agreements  for  scientific  and  technical  cooperation  (343  contracts 
and  257  projects)  were  suspended.  Two  newspapers,  one  published  in  China  by 
the  Russians,  the  other  in  the  USSR  by  the  Chinese,  were  supressed.  16 99 
Whatever  the  intention,  the  effect  was  electric.  The  Soviet  measures  were 
very  conspicuous  as  well  as  damaging  and  insulting;  and  they  made  the  mass 
of  Chinese  people  more  united  than  ever  around  the  CCP,  a  result  totally 
unexpected  by  the  Soviet  leaders.  , 
The  withdrawal  of  experts  certainly  inflicted  serious  damage  on  Chinese 
industry,  especially  the  larger  complexes.  The  Wuhan  steel  plant-stopped 
functioning.  Ashan  was  80-percent  paralyzed.  Mikhail  Klochko,  a  Soviet 
chemist  (and  Stalin  Prize  winner)  who  was  a  member  of  two  Soviet  scientific 
missions  to  China,  has  provided  a  vivid  summary  of  the  -  immediate  economic 
impact  of  the  Soviet  attempt  to  punish  -  the  Chinese  for  their 
insubordination:  "The  abruptness  of  the  withdrawal  meant  that  construction 
stopped  at  the  sites  of  scores  of  new  plants-and  factories  while  work  at 
many  functioning  ones  was  thrown  into  confusion.  Spare  parts  were  no 
longer  available  for  plants  built  according  to  Russian  design,  and  mines 
and  electric  power  stations  developed  with  Russian  help  were  closed  down. 
Dvelopment  of  new  undertakings  was  abandoned  because  the  Russians 
simultaneously  cancelled  contracts  for  the  delivery  of  plans  and  equipment. 
A  planned  power  and  irrigation  project  for  the  Yellow  River,  which 
frequently  overflows  its  banks,  was  one  of  those  which  had  to  be 
abandoned.  "  " 
The  main  reason  put  forward  for  the  decision  was  that  the  experts 
working  in  China  had  been  ill-treated.  ""  Yet  the  move  surprised  and  shocked 
the  Russian  specialists  as  much  as  it  did  to  the  Chinese.  In  the  words  of 
Klochko,  "As  one  of  those  who  was  suddenly  and  surprisingly  ordered  home  in 
1960,  I  can  testify  that  all  of  the  anger  at  the  move  was  not  limited  to 
the  Chinese.  Without  exception  my  fellow  scientists  and  the  other  Soviet 
specialists  whom  I  knew  in  China  were  extremely  upset  at  being  recalled too 
before  the  end  of  their  contracts.  Like  myself,  "  others  must  have  had 
difficulty  hiding  their  amazement  when  told  by  Soviet  representatives  in 
Beijing  that  dissatisfaction  with  our  living  and  working  conditions  was  an 
important  reason  for  our  recall.  Inýfact  few  of  us  had  ever  lived  better  in 
our  lives  than  we  did  in  China.  Our  Chinese  hosts  were  even  more  mystified; 
again  and  again  they  asked  why  we  were  leaving  and  whether  anything  could 
be  done  to  prevent  our  going.  The  suddenness  with  which  events  developed 
indicated  that  the  decision  was  irreversible.  The  first  telegrams  giving  us 
the  news  arrived  in  mid-July  1960.  By  late  August  the  hundreds  Of 
scientists,  engineers,  and  technicians  who  had  been  scattered  throughout 
China  had  departed  with  their  families.  At  the  begining  of  September  not  a 
single  Soviet  citizen  remained  in  China,  apart  from  diplomats  and  a  few 
trade  officials.  "19 
The  alledged  mistreatment  of  Soviet  specialists  was  clearly  not  by  itself 
enough  to  have  brought  the  Soviet  decision.  The  real  reason  was  quite 
different,  revealed  by  a  journalists  question.  Writing  "On  Lenin's  Teaching 
on  the  Victory  of  Socialism  and  the  Present  Day"  in  Pravda  V  sstoka  of  23 
August,  S.  Titarenko  asked,  Can  one  imagine  socialism  being  successfully 
built  in  present-day  circumstances  even  in  such  a  mighty  country  as,  say, 
China  if  that  country  is  in  an  isolated  position  and  not  supported  by  the 
cooperation  and  mutual  assistance  of  all  the  other  socialist  countries?  "  He 
then  proceeded  to  answer  his  own  question:  "that  country  would  be 
subjected  simultaneously  to  economic  blockade  and  military  blows,  and  even 
if  it  were  able  to  withstand  the  enemy  onslaught,  it  would  experience  the 
most  formidable  internal  difficulties.  "  This  expressed  the  real  hope  of 
the  Soviet  leaders.  The  Chinese  would  retreat  because  they  could  not 
survive  in  a  hostile  relationship  both  with  the  United  States  and  with 101 
the  Soviet  Union  simultaneously  and  thus  isolated  from  the  two  major  world 
power  centres. 
But  Khrushchev  was  really  wrong  this  time.  Mao  had  committed  an  enormous 
blunder  in  launching  the  Great  Leap  in  1958  and  had  come  into  bitter 
conflict  with  some  of  his  old  comrades  in'1959.  The  quarrel  with  Khrushchev 
was  patently  Mao's  quarrel.  He  doubtless  felt  that  he  could  not,  upon  the 
departure  of  the  Soviet  specialists,  promptly  admit  a  major  error  in  the 
field  of  foreign  affairs  to  top  his  blunder  at  home.  He  had  no  other  ways 
to  go  but  continuing  to  fight,  mainly  for  himself.  But  Khrushchev's 
particular  decision  had  given  him  an  excellent  opportunity  to  get  people 
more  united  around  him  in  support  of  his  own  policy.  His  call  for  self- 
reliance  found  a  deep  echo  among  the  Chinese  people.  2° 
A  conference  of  Eighty-one  Communist  and  Workers'  Parties  was  held  in 
Moscow  from  11  to  23  November  1960.  At  the  preparatory  gatherings  the 
Chinese  submitted  a  draft  with  five  proposals  which  asked  for  strict 
adherence  to  the  Declaration  and  Manifesto  of  the  1957  meeting;  respect  for 
the  equality  among  all  Communist  Parties  and  all  socialist  countries; 
settlement  of  all  disputes  through  comradely  and  unhurried  discussion  on 
all  important  questions  of  common  concern;  a  clear  demarcation  between 
imperialism.  the  enemy,  and  socialist  countries;  and  adequate  and  full 
preparation  for  "a  programme  of  united  struggle  against  imperialism".  2' 
The  Chinese  delegation  was  prestigious:  Liu  Shaoqi,  Deng  Xiaoping,  Peng 
Zheng,  Kang  Sheng  and  many  others.  By  contrast,  the  original  draft 
proposals  submitted  by  the  Soviet  side  banned  "factionalism",  reiterated 
the  "peaceful  transition"  theory,  and  made  majority  decisions  binding  upon 
all  parties. 
The  Chinese  position  was  stated  on  14  November  by  Deng  Xiaoping,  who 102 
accused  the  "modern  revisionists"  of  violating  the  1957  Declaration  and  of 
capitulating  to  imperialism.  He  insisted  that  the  minority  could  not  be 
bound  by  majority  decisions  because  the  minority  was  sometimes  right  and 
what  applied  inside  a  party  could  not  apply  between  fully  equal  and 
independent  parties.  Deng  Xiaoping  cited  Lenin,  who  had  been  in  the 
minority  in  his  great  battle  against  revisionism  in  the  Second 
International,  yet  had  been  correct.  Voluminous  articles  in  the  Chinese 
press  explained  what  the  debate  was  about.  Their  principal  target  was  the 
concept  of  peaceful  transition  to  socialism.  22 
After  weeks  of  wrangling  and  hours  of  speeches,  a  document  emerged  from 
the  Conference  containing  clauses  which  Mao  still  considered  too  much  of  a 
compromise.  "We  made  it  plain  at  the  time  to  the  leaders  of  the  CPSU  that 
this  would  be  the  last  occasion  we  accommodated  ourselves  to  such  a 
formulation  from  the  20th  Congress;  we  would  never  do  so  again".  23 
The  final  statement,  therefore,  referred  both  to  armed  struggle  and  to 
the  peaceful  parliamentary  road  to  socialism,  but  did  not  make  a  commitment 
to  the  latter  binding  upon  Communist  Parties,  as  Khrushchev  had  sought.  The 
sovereignty  of  each  socialist  country  was  reasserted.  and  the  socialist 
camp  was  defined  as  comprising  "social,  economic  and  political  cooperation 
between  sovereign  states".  24  The  CPSU  was  referred  to  as  only  the  vanguard, 
not  the  leader  of  the  world  movement.  So  in  the  first  major  battle  of  the 
open  conflict,  it  was  the  Chinese  who  won.  The  Moscow  Conference  was  an 
obvious  victory  for  Mao,  although  he  still  thought  the  Chinese  had  made 
compromises.  In  Moscow  in  January  1961  Khrushchev  appeared  very 
conciliatory  in  a  speech  at  the  Supreme  Soviet:  "We  must  not  talk  about 
who  won  or  who  lost  at  this  Eighty-one  Parties  Conference".  ` 
On  reflection,  there  were  at  least  three  significant  features  of  the  1960 103 
Conference.  The  first  was  that  the  Russians  and  the  Chinese-  had  failed, 
after  long  and  exhaustive-  discussions,  to  compose  their  differencs  on 
ideological  questions;  the  second  was  that  the  Russians  had  to  make 
concessions  to  the  Chinese  on  the  question  of  "fractionalism"  and 
"revisionism"  although  they  had  no  doubt  about  getting  a  voting  majority; 
the  third  was  that,  -  for  the  first  time  in  thirty  years,  the  leaders  of 
world  Communism  were  faced  with  real  political  issues  upon  which  they  had 
to  take  a  position.  It  was  a  development  welcome  to  the  Chinese,  but  less 
welcome  to  the  Russians. 
4.3  Albania  and  Yugoslavia  as-Pawns 
After  the  Moscow  Conference,  neither  the  Russians  nor  the  Chinese  lost 
much  time  in  making  it  clear  that  they  were  unchanged  in  their  basic  views. 
The  continued  difference  in  their  positions  was  largely  expressed  by 
their  contrasting  attitudes  towards  Albania  and  Yugoslavia. 
From  the  begining  of  1961  co-operation  between  China  and  Albania  was 
substantially  strengthened.  On  2  February  they  signed  a  treaty.  of  commerce 
and  navigation,  an  agreement  for  a  Chinese  loan  to  Albania  and  four  other 
documents.  26  The  press  communique  on  the  Albanian  delegation's  visit  to 
Beijing  emphasized  the  two  governments'  complete  agreement  on-ideological 
questions.  Both  parties  would  "oppose  modern  revisionism  represented  by  the 
Tito  clique  in  Yugoslavia".  27 
On  23  April,  following  talks-  between  government  economic  delegations 
China  and  Albania  signed  three  further  documents,  which  included:  a 
protocol  on  the  complete  range  of  equipment  and  technical  assistance  to  be 
provided  by  China;  an  agreement  on  the  living  conditons  for 
_specialists, 
technicians  and  trainees  staying  in  each  other's  country;  and  a  second 104 
protocol  on  the  use-of  the  Chinese  loan  from  February  1961.  Notes  on  the 
supply  of  grains  and  other  foodstuffs  by  China  were  also  exchanged.  28  The 
Chinese  Government  would  grant  Albania  credits  totalling  112.5  million 
rubles  ($123  million)  spread  over  four  years.  Later  in  the  year  China 
purchased  60,000  tons  of  wheat  from  Canada,  at  a  cost  of  some  $3  million, 
and  had  it  shipped  to  Albania.  ýg  I 
Relations  between  the  USSR  and  Albania,  on  the-other  hand,  deteriorated 
in  1961,  and  eight  Soviet  submarines  which  had  been  stationed  at  a  base  off 
the  Albanian  coast  were  withdrawn  in  May.  In  the  summer,  Albania  was 
deprived  of  aid,  experts  and  machinery  as  China  had  been.  The  really  big 
clash  occured  in  October  at  the  22nd  Congress  of  the  CPSU.  Khrushchev 
attacked  the  Albanians  by  name.  The  USSR,  he  said,  would  not  give  in  to 
Albanian  dogmatists  nor  to  anyone  else  on  questions  of  principle.  Since  it 
had  not  been  invited,  the  Albanian  Party  did  not  take  part  in  the  Congress. 
So  its  naming  ,a  deliberate  provocation,  was  a  very  serious  matter. 
The  Chinese  response  was  firm.  On  19  October  Zhou  Enlai.  while  asserting 
Albania's  continuing  membership  of  the  socialist  camp,  made  it  clear  that 
"a  dispute  or  difference  arising  between  fraternal  parties  should  be 
resolved  patiently...  in  the  spirit  of  proletarian  internationalism.  Any 
public,  one-sided  censure  of  any  fraternal  party  does  not  help  unity".  30  He 
then  left  the  platform  without  shaking  hands  with  Khrushchev.  The  next 
morning  he  went  to  Moscow's  Red-Square  to  lay  wreaths  on  the  tombs-  of 
Stalin-and  Lenin,  and  the  following  day  he  left  for  Beijing  where  he  and 
was  received  at  the  airport  by  Mao  Zedong  in  person  as  a  gesture  of 
approval  for  the  stand  he  had  taken.: 
"  Within  a  fortnight  the  body  of"Stalin  was  removed  from  Red  Square,  an  act 
which  was  intended  primarily  as  a  reply  by  the  Soviet  leaders  to  Z.  hou 105 
Enlai's  wreath-laying,  and  was  a  guarantee  that  such  "Stalinist"  gestures 
would  not  be  possible  in  Moscow  in  future. 
The  rift  with  the  Albanian  Party  was  also  completed.  On  20  October  it 
issued  a  statement  replying  to  Khrushchev's  charges  and  for  the  first  time 
criticising  him  by  name.  And  at  the  end  of  November  the  Soviet  government 
informed  the  Albanian  that  it  would  withdraw  its  ambassador  from  Tirana 
and  required  the  Albanian  ambassador  to  leave  Moscow.  This  showed 
Khrushchev  not  only  used  atacks  on  Albanian  Communists  to  demonstrate  how 
far  he  was  prepared  to  go  in  defence  of  his  policies,  but  also  tried  to 
sever  governmental  relations  as  well. 
The  Soviet  treatment  of  Albanian  was  in  fact  of  great  significance-:  for 
relations  within  the  Communist  world,  for  by  severing  Party  and  state 
relations  with  Albania.  Khrushchev  arrogated  to  himself  the  right  to 
decide  unilaterlly  which  country  was  and  which  was  not  socialist.  By 
refusing  to  have  the  Albanians  attend  the  22nd  Congress  in  Moscow,  by 
keeping  them  out  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  Comecon,  and  by  cutting  off  all 
diplomatic  and  commercial  relations,  Khrushchev  had  in  fact  imposed  his 
will  on  the  socialist  camp.  Thus,  in  practice,  the  criterion  of  whether  a 
country  was  socialist  or  not  was  how  it  conducted  its  relations  with 
Moscow. 
While  excluding  the  Albanian  Communists  for  their  lack  of  subordination, 
Khrushchev  tried  hard  to  draw  the  Yugoslavs  back  into  the  socialist  camp 
for  the  very  simple  reason  that  they  were  better  disposed  towards  Moscow. 
The  first  sign  of  Moscow's  intention  to  improve  relations  with  Yugoslavia 
came  at  the  end  of  March  1961  when  the  Soviet  and  Yugoslav  Governments 
signed  a  five-year  trade  agreement.  The  Russians  undertook  to  supply 
considerable  quantities  of  equipment  and  raw  materials-  for  Yugoslav 106 
industry,  in  exchange  for  the  products  of  Yugoslav  factories.  In  July  the 
same  year,  the  Yugoslav-Foreign  Minister,  Koca  Popovic,  visited  Moscow  and 
had  talks  with  Khrushchev,  'Mikoyan  and  Gromyko.  'A  communique  was  issued 
saying  that  the  views  of  the  two  governments  were  similar  or  coincided  on 
major  international  questions.  Although  'Gromyko  did  not  visit  Belgrade 
until  April  1962,  it  was  quite  clear  that  early  in  1961  a  decision  had  been 
taken  to  restore  relations  with  Yugoslavia  whatever  the  Moscow  statement  of 
1960  said  or  the  Chinese  might  think.  Though  the  Soviet  leaders  had  many 
reasons  for  wanting  better  relations  with  Yugoslavia,  it  was  clear  that 
their  main  motive  was  deliberätely  to  provoke  the  Chinese.  It  was 
Khrushchev's  way  of  trying  to  force  the  Chinese  to  yield.  He  used  the  same 
ploy  over  India.  The'  Chinese  reaction  was  almost  automatic  -  an 
intensificaton  of  anti-Yugoslaav  propaganda  in  China.  On  28  September 
1962;  the  Central  Committee  of  the  CCP  issued  a  statement  violently 
attaking  "the  Tito  clique  ",  which,  it  declared,  had  "become  still  more 
despicable  in  betraying  the  cause  of  Communism  and  meeting  the  needs  of 
imperialism".  31 
4.4  Intensification  of  the  Polemics  and  the  Dispute 
'r4 
Five  events  in  the  year  1962  --  the  re-eastablishment  of  friendly 
relations  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  Yugoslavia;  the  curtailment  of 
relations  between  it  and  Albania;  the  Cuban  crisis;  the  Sino-Indian  war 
and  the  Sino-Soviet  border  conflict  --  led  to  a  intensification  of  polemics 
between  the  two  rivals. 
It  was  in  the  autumn  that  major  crises  occurred  in  the  foreign  affairs  of 
both  China  and  the  Soviet  Union.  On  the  one  hand,  China  had  a  further 
border  conflict  with  India;  and,  on  the  other,  the  Soviet  Union  had  a 107 
dangerous  confrontation  with  the  United  States  over  Cuba. 
The  Indian  Prime  Minster,  Nehru,  continued  to  refuse  border 
negotiations  except  on  his  own  terms,  and  he  also  continued  to  lay  claim  to 
large  tracts  of  territory  which  had  not  previously  been  included  in  maps  of 
India.  32  In  August  the  Indian  Defence  Minister,  Krishna  Menon,  announced 
that  the  Russians  had  concluded  an  agreement  for  the  manufacture  of  MIG 
fighters  in  India,  a  fact  which  was  carefully.  recorded  in  the  Beijing  press 
on  17-18  August.  This  must  have  seemed  to  the  Chinese  an  almost  perfect 
issue  through  which  to  expose  Khruhchev's  "revisionism"  in  practice.  For  he 
was  giving,  not  only  substantial  economic  aid,  but  military  aid  as  well  to 
a  country  which  did  not  pretend  to  be  Communist  or  even  an  ally  of  the 
Communist  countries,  and  which,  moreover,  was  in  a  state  of  suspended 
conflict  with  its  neighbour  China.  Whose  side  was  Khrushchev  on? 
On  8  October  1962,  the  Soviet  ambassador  in  Beijing  was  told  by  the 
Chinese  Foreign  Ministry  that  India  was  about  to  lunch  a  massive  attack  on 
the  frontier.  Soviet  helicopters  and  planes  were  being  used  for 
transporting  military  supplies  to  the  border.  On  10  October  there  were 
patrol  clashes  occurred;  on  12  October  Nehru  instructed  the  Indian  Eastern 
Command  to  "drive  out"  the  Chinese;  on  14  October  Renmin  Ribao  published  a 
formal  appeal:  "Mr.  Nehru,  it  is  time  to  withdraw  from  the  brink  of  the 
precipice";:  3  on  20  and  24  October  the  Chinese  made  proposals  for  the 
peaceful  disengagement  of  troops,  a  cease-fire  and  negotiations.  India 
ignored  the  call  and  on  20  October,  launched  a  massive  advance.  By  16 
November  the  Chinese  counter-attack  had  pushed  the  Indian  troops  back  and 
penetrated  into  Indian  territory.  The  world  clamoured  "aggression".  On  21 
November  the  Chinese  unilaterally  ordered  a  cease-fire  and  withdrew  their 
troops  to  twenty  kilometers  behind  the  line  of.  actual  control  as  it  existed 108 
on  7  November  1959.  -They  then  announced  the  freeing  of  captured  personnel 
and  the  return  of  all  equipment  without  compensation.  34  An  appeal  for,  the 
resumption  of  negotiations  was  made  by  Zhou  Enlai. 
On  25  November  Pravda  seemed  to  turn  tail  when  it  -wrote  that  the  attack 
had  been  from  the  Indian  sideýand  that'  the  proposals  from  the  Chinese 
Government  were  "constructive".  On  12  December  Khrushchev  followed  suit  at 
the  Supreme  Soviet:  "These  areas...  have  very  little,  population...  it  is 
possible  to  believe  that  India  wants  war".  35 
Border  clashes  between  the  USSR  and  the  PRC  also  took  place  in  the  summer 
of  1962  in  Xinjiang.  "In  April  and  May  1962,  "'--according  to  the  Chinese 
version,  "the  leaders  of  the  CPSU  used  their  organs  and  personnel  in 
Xinjiang,  China,  to  carry  out  large-scale  subersive  activities  in  the  Illi 
region  and  enticed  and  coerced  "several  tens  of  thousands  of  Chinese 
citizens  into  going  to  the  Soviet-  Union"  .  36-Whatever  the  truth  of  the 
matter  the  incident  represented  a  hightening  of  tension. 
Almost  at  same  time,  the  Cuban  missile  crisis  brought  the  USSR  and  the 
United  States  to  the  verge  of'nuclear  war.  With'the  apparent  expansion  of 
American  worldwide  power,  Khrushchev  -designed  .  the  Cuba  manoeuvre  to 
increase  his  prestige  and  make  the  USSR  an  equal  and  the  sole-  valid 
partner  of  the  USA  in  a  dual  hegemony  over  the  globe.  '.  On  22  October 
President  Kennedy  stated  that  he  had  unmistakable'  evidence  of  the 
installation  in  Cuba  of  Soviet  missile  sites  capable  of  delivering  nuclear 
warheads  to  large  areas  of  the  USA  and  Central,  America.  The,  decision  to 
blockade  Cuba,  to  inspect  all  Soviet  ships-on  the  high  seas,  '  and  to  prepare 
for  war  was  announced  soon  afterward.  At  the  end  of  a  tense  week,  -  the 
crisis  was  resolved  by  the  Soviet  removal  of  its  missiles'from'Cuba.  Moscow 
claimed  that  the  USSR  had  obtained  assurances  from  Kennedy  that  neither  the 109 
United  States  nor  other'  Western  countries  would  invade  Cuba.  37  Khrushchev 
said  in  his  report  to  the  Supreme  Soviet  on  12  -December-  that  the  Soviet 
Union  had  achieved  what  it  had  set  out  to  do.  And  in  passing  he  criticized 
the  Albanian  leaders,  meaning  the  Chinese,  for-trying  to  bring  on  a  clash 
between  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States.  -38  .  -_. 
But  the  Chinese  saw  the  matter  very  differently.  They  blamed  the  Soviet 
leaders  for  having  placed  missiles  in  Cuba  in  the  first  instance, 
condemning  the  action  as  foolish  adventurism.  They  then  condemned  Soviet 
capitulation  to  the  threat  of  American  military  action:  "In  contrast  to 
the  imperialists,  socialist  countries  have  no  need  to  use  nuclear  weapons 
for  blackmail  or  gambling  and  must  not  to  do  so..  -.  The  Soviet  leaders  never 
weary  of  asserting  that  there  was  =a  thermonuclear  war  crises  in  the 
Caribean  Sea...  But  before  the  Soviet  Union  sent  rockets  into  Cuba,  there 
did  not  exist  a  crises  either  of  the  US  using  nuclear  weapons  nor-of  a 
nuclear  war  breaking  out".  39 
.i 
After  the  Cuban  affair  Mao  Zedong  was  indignant;  he  realized  that 
Khrushchev's  course  was  set.  The  Albanians  warned  that  true  Marxists  could 
not  coexist  with  revisionists  in  the  same  Party.  It  was  at  this  time  that 
the  descision  was  taken  by  Mao  to  expose  Khrushchev  and  revisionism  both 
abroad  and  at-  home.  Mao  made  a  widespread  call  for  the  overthrow  of 
Khrushchev's  leadership.  As  he  said  at  a  Party  conference  in  1962:  "The 
Soviet  Union  was  the  first  socialist  country,  and  the  Soviet  Communist 
Party  was  the  Party  created  by  Lenin.  Although  the  Party  and  the  state 
leadership  of  the  Soviet  Union  have  now  being  usurped-by  the,  revisionists, 
I  advise  our  comrades  to  believe  firmly  that  the  broad  masses,  the  numerous 
Party  members  and  cadres  of  the  Soviet  Union  are  good;  that  they-want 110 
revolution,  and  that  the  rule  of  the  revisionists  will  not  last'  long.  "4O 
The  stage  was  thus  set  for  a  new  battle  in  the  political  war  between 
Beijing  and  Moscow.  From  November  1962  to  -January  1963  the  Bulgarian, 
Hungarian,  Czechoslovakian,  Italian,  and  East  German  Parties  held  their 
respective  congresses,  and  both  Soviet  and  Chinese  delegations  attended  all 
of  them.  There  were  fierce  debates  about  Albania  and  'about  the  Soviet- 
Yugoslav  reconciliation.  41  Tito  paid  a  formal  visit  to  Moscow  in 
December  and  was  warmly  received.  The  Soviet  Union  and  Yugoslavia  had  drawn 
closer  together;  the  Soviet  Union  and  China  were  moving  farther  apart.  This 
led,  between  15  December  1962  and  8  March  1963,  to  a  first  series  of  seven 
explicit  articles  appeared  in  Renmin  Ribao:  "Proletarians'  of  All  Countries 
Unite  Against  the  Common  Enemy"  (15  December  1962);  "The  Difference  Between 
Comrade  Togliatti  and  Us"  (31  December  1962);  "Leninism  and  Modern 
Revisionism"  (5  January  1963);  "Let  Us  Unite  Under  the  Banner  of  the  Moscow 
Declaration  and  Statement"  (27  January  1963);  "Where  the  Differences  Come 
From:  A  Reply  to  Maurice  Thorez"  (27  'February  1963);  "More  on  the 
Differences  Between  Comrade  Togliatti  and  Us"  (4  March  1963);  "Comments  on 
the  Statement  of  the  Communist  Party  of  the  United  States"(8  March  1963). 
A  little  later  two  articles  appeared  that  were  particularly  concerned  with 
the  attitude  of  the  socialist  camp  to  the  Indian  question:  "A  Mirror  for 
Revisionists"  (9  March  1963)  and  "The  Truth  about  How  the  Leaders  of  the 
CPSU  Have  Allied  Themselves  with  India  Against  China"  (2  November  1963). 
All  these  articles  defined  Beijing's  fundamental  position  on  many 
questions,  and  made  clear  how  deep  the  Sino-Soviet,  dispute  had  become  -  as 
well  as  making  it  deeper. 
Oddly  enough  -  or  not  so  oddly  in  view  of  his  difficulties  at  home  after 
Cuba  -  Khrushchev  called  almost  politely,  in  February  1963,  for  a 111 
cessation  of  polemics.  China  appeared  to  agree.  Mao  received  the  Soviet 
ambassador,  Chervonenko,  on  23  February,  and  was  given  a  letter  from  the 
CPSU  (dated  21  February)  proposing  a  meeting  between  representatives  of  the 
two  parties.  42  The  CCP  accepted  on  9  March.  43  On  30  March  the  CPSU 
suggested  that  the  meeting  be  held  in  mid-May.  -  Beijing  proposed  mid-June. 
On  14  June,  the  Chinese  launched  a  most  important  document,  "A  Proposal 
Concerning  the  General  Line  of  the  International  Communist  Movement",  which 
was  intended  as  a  reply  to  the  opinions  stated  in  Khrushchev's  letter  dated 
30  March.  It  is  a  full  statement  of  the  Chinese  case.  It  did  not  mention 
Khrushchev  by  name,  but  it  criticized  indirectly  his  positions  on  numerous 
points  of  doctrine  or  practical'questions.  44  On  18  June  1963,  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  CPSU  in  a  plenary  session  announced  that  the  Chinese 
letter  would  not  be  published  in  the  Soviet  Union  "at  the  present  time"  as 
it  was  "unwarranted...  groundless  'and  slanderous".  45  Three  Chinese  embassy 
officials  and  some  students  were  expelled  for  distributing'  copies  of  it,  an 
incident  which  ensured  that  the  Sino-Soviet  meeting  would  take  place  in  an 
unfavourable  atmosphere.  In  any  case  the  exchange  of  letters  had  already 
prejudiced  a  reasonable  conclusion. 
Nevertheless,  the  meeting  began  on  5  July.  Deng  Xiaoping  headed  the 
Chinese  delegation.  The  Soviet'  Party  was  represented  by  Mikhail  Suslov, 
Yury  Andropov,  Boris  Ponomaryov,  Leonid  Ilyichev,  and  the  Soviet  ambassador 
in  Beijing,  Stepan  Chervonenko.  With  this  level  of  representation,  it  was  a 
great  opportunity.  But  on  20  July  the  talks  were  adjourned  -a  failure. 
The  Chinese  delegation  returned  home  almost  immediately.  The  basic  reason 
for  the  failure  was  clearly  the  irreducible  gap  between  the  real  positions 
of  the  two  Parties,  with  their  different  interpretations  of  doctrinal 
formulae  common  to  the  Declaration  of  1957  and  the  'Statement  of  1960. 112 
Another  reason  was  the  -  prospect  -of  the  treaty  shortly  to  be  signed.  (25 
July)  by  Britain,  America  and  the  Soviet  Union  on  the  partial  suspension  of 
nuclear  tests,  which  Beijing  tried  in  vain  to-oppose.  It  would  have  been 
extremely  humiliating  for  the  Chinese  tobe  in  Moscow  at  the  same  time  as 
the  Western  parties  to  the  agreement.  Their  resentment  and  their  point  of 
view  were  fully  expressed  in  the  statement  on  31  July.  4' 
Before  the  CCP  delegation  left  Moscow,  on  14  July,  the  Soviet  reply  to 
its  letter  of  14  June  was  issued  in  the  form  of  an  open  letter,  accusing 
the  Chinese  leaders  of  being  prepared  to  sacrifice  hundreds  of  millions  of 
lives,  of  belittling  Soviet  aid,  wishing  for  world  war,  and  thinking  that 
"wearing  rope  sandals  and  eating  watery  soup...  is  communism".  47  -  On  19 
July  a  spokesman  for  the  Chinese  Central  Committee-said  ironically  that 
both  the  14  June  and  14  July  letters  would  be  broadcast  in  many  languages. 
The  Soviet  letter  was  "a  remarkable  piece  of  work".  To  quote  a  Chinese 
poem:  "A  remarkable  work  should  be  enjoyed  together,  and  dubiety 
scrutinized  in  company".  It  was  "superlative  material  for  learning  by 
negative  example"  .  40  The  full  text  of  the  Soviet  letter  was  published  in 
Renmin  Ribao  on  20  July,  together  with  an  editorial  note  which  declared 
that  "the  methods  used  in  the  letter  are  the  distortion  of  facts  and  the 
reversal  of  right  and  wrong--methods  which  Marxists-Leninists  can  in  no 
circumstances  tolerate".  For  its  part,  Pravda  in  September  denounced  the 
"neo-Trotskyist"  Chinese  leadership  and  called  for  a  conference,  to-  "rebuff 
the  schismatics",  saying  that  fifty-two  parties,  in  great  indignation  at 
the  Chinese  attacks,  had  asked  for  this  move.  SO  The  intended  meeting,  of 
reconciliation  had  in  fact  increased  the  mutual  hostility. 
Mao  kept  up  a  great  flood  of  comments  on  the  ideological  positions  of 
Khrushchev.  According  to  his  own  statements,  he  had  three  purposes:  one  was L13 
the  genuine  one  of  "talking  revisionism  to  death";  another  was  to  force  all 
communists  in  the  world  to  question  themselves  and  clarify  their.  own  minds; 
and  the  third  was  to  teach  the  Chinese  ý  people  and  the  "revisionists"  at 
home.  From  15  August  1963  to  14  July  1964,,  there  were  nine  documents,  all 
in  reply  to  the  Soviet  letter  of  14  July:  "The  Origin  and  Development-of 
the  Differences  Between  the  Leadership  of  the  CPSU  and  Ourselves"  (6 
September  1963);  "On  the  Question  of  Stalin"  (13  September-1963);;  "Is 
Yugoslavia  a  Socialist  Country?  ",  (26  Septemper  1963);  "Apologists  of  Neo- 
colonialism"  (22  October  1963);  "Two  Different  Lines  on  the  Question  of 
Peace  and  War"  (19  November  1963);  "Peaceful  Coexistence--Two  Diametrically 
Opposed  Polemics"  (12  December  1963);  "The  Leaders  of  the  CPSU  Are  the 
Greatest  Splitters  of  Our  Time"  (4  February  1964);  "The  Proletarian 
Revolution  and  Khrushchev's  Revisionism"  (31  March  1864);  and  "On 
Khrushchev's  Phoney  Communism-and  Its-Historical  Lessons  for  the  World"  (14 
July  1964).  These  materials  are  of  course  as  valuable  as  for  the  history  of 
the  Sino-Soviet  relations  and  Chinese  modern  history. 
Mao  was  certainly  merciless.  In  comment  No.  4,  "Apologists  of,  Neo- 
colonialism",  he  denounced  Khrushchev  as  a  lackey  of  imperialism,  wanting 
to  share  in  a  dual  -hegemony  to  enslave  the  world.  To  someone  who  asked 
him,  "when  will  these  polemics  cease?  ",  he  answered,  "The  sky  won't  fall, 
trees  will  grow,  women  will  have  children  and  fish  will  swim,  even  if  we  go 
on  forever,  "  and  then  added  that  it-  might  take  "ten  thousand"  years.  s'  By 
contrast,  increasingly  troubled  within  the  Soviet  Union,  RKhrushchev  -was 
somewhat  contrite.  -  In  October  1963  he  offered  to  end  open  polemics 
between  the  two  countries,  to  deliver  again  industrial  equipment  and  spare 
parts,  and  to  return  the  technicians  to  China.  He  also  offered  to  negotiate 
the  troublesome  Sino-Soviet  border  -dispute,  which  had  started  with  the 114 
clashes  in  1959  and  1962  in  Xinjiang.  E2 
As  early  as  8  March  1963,  Renmin'Ribao  had  recalled  nine  unequal  treaties 
which  former  Chinese  governments  had  been  forced  to  sign.  The  Soviet 
position  was  that  the  "unequal  treaties"  must  be  accepted'  as  binding  and 
legal,  for  "no-one  makes  history  all  over  again".  5-3  The  Chinese  standpoint 
was  that  China  would  never  recognize  the  unequal  treaties  as'equal,  though 
it  was  ready  to  accept  them  as  a  basis  for  an  overall  settlement  of  the 
frontier.  Meanwhile  the  status  quo  should  be  preserved.  Boundary 
negotiations  actually  began  in  Beijing  in  February  1964,  but  they  were 
suspended  without  result  in  May.  Then  on  10  July,  speaking  to  aýJapanese 
Socialist  Party  delegation,  Mao  Zedong'  brought  'up  the  Siberian  frontier 
question.  s4  Thereupon  each  side  accused  the  other  of  systematic  border 
violations.  ' 
Pravda  fiercely  attacked  Mao's  Japenese  interview  on  2September:  "Mao 
Zedong's  pronouncements  on  the  territorial  question  patently  show  how  far 
the  Chinese  leaders  have  gone  in  the  'cold  war'  against  the  Soviet  Union. 
He  is  not  only  claiming  this  or  that  part  of  Soviet  territory,  but  is 
portraying  his  claims  as  a  part  of  some  'general  territorial  question.  '  We 
are  faced  with  an  openly  expansionist  program  with  far-reaching 
pretensions.  "'"';  Under  such  circumstance  it  was  impossible  for  the  Chinese 
to  accept  Khrushchev's  tentative  olive-branch. 
In  a  letter  of  reply,  the  Chinese  blamed  the  Russians  for  withdrawing 
experts  and  scrapping  contracts  in  1960  and  causing  enormous  damage'  to 
Chinese  industrialization.  S6  "For  many  years  we  have  been  paying  the 
principal  and  interest  on  these  Soviet  loans",  said  the  letter;  Russian 
aid  was  "neither  a  one-way  affair  nor  gratis",  the  repayments  of  food 
products  alone  amounted  to  more  then-  two  billion  rubles.  and  in  minerals 115 
and  rare  metals  essential-for  missile  production.  1.4  billion  rubles.  "Now 
you  have  again  suggested  sending  experts...  To  be  frank,  the  Chinese  people 
no  longer  trust  you...  You  have  -for  years  used  trade  for  political 
pressure...  You  violate  the  independence  and  -soverrignty  of  fraternal 
countries...  oppose  their  efforts  to  develop  their  economy  independently".  e' 
As  far  as  concerned  to  the  Soviet  desire.  to  stop  the.  polemics,  the  Chinese 
answer  was  to  try  to  talk  revisionism  to  death.  The  war  of  words  continued 
briefly. 
From  the  autumn  of  1963  to  the  summer-of  1964,  Sino-Soviet-  relations  were 
dominated  by  the  question:  of  a  further  conference  of  Communist  and  Worker's 
Parties  proposed  by  Khrushchev,  now  more  determined  then  ever  to  have  the 
Chinese  doctrines  and  leaders  condemned.  0n,  14  February  1964,  Suslov,  who 
had  had  a  long  and  bitter  contrversy  with  Deng  Xiaoping  in  1960,  prepared 
an  indictment,  in  the  form  of  a  letter  sent  to  all  Communist  Parties  except 
the  CCP,  openly  advocating  the  toppling  of  Mao  at  an  international 
conference.  "There  must  be..,.  a  struggle.  against  the  Troskyite  --views  and 
sectarian  and  undermining  activities  of  the  Chinese  leaders".  5°  It  was  not 
published  in  the  Soviet  press  until  3  April  because  the  Romanians  tried  to 
mediate  for  some  weeks.  89--But  on  31  March  Mao's  comment  No.  8,  "The 
Proletarian  Revolution  and  Khrushchev's  Revisionism",  called  Khrushchev 
the  greatest  capitulationist  in  history  and  advised  "leading  comrades"  of 
the  Soviet  Party  to  throw  him  "on  the  rubbish  heap  of  history". 
Khrushchev  counter-attacked  with  his  strongest  comments  yet  on  Mao  in 
Budapest  in  April,  accusing  him  of  "hegemony",  irresponsible  gambling, 
great  China  chauvinism,  and  so  on.  '°  On  28  July  the  Chinese  Party 
definitely  rejected  the  calling  of  a  world  Party  conference,  dubbing  it  a 
"schismatic  meeting"  whose  purpose  was  to  split  the  international  Communist 116 
movement.  '-'  The  name-calling'  reached  a,  crescendo  when  two  days  later,  on  30 
July,  the  CPSU  invited  twenty-five  Communist  Parties-to  send  delegations  to 
Moscow  to  plan  for  a  world  conference  in  1965;  and  in  August  the  Chinese 
reprinted  all  Khrushchev's'  pro-Stalin'  speeches  and  'opportunistic 
statements.  Both  sides  had  previously  intensified  their  radio  propaganda, 
and  by  1964  Moscow  radio  was  broadcasting  for  70  hours  a  week  and  Beijing 
radio  for  63  hours. 
There  were  specific  internal  and  external  grievences  between  China  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  The  'cold  war'  atmosphere  was  also  fuelled  by  a  deep-seated 
ideological  dispute  with  domestic  implications  for  both  Parties  and  both 
leaders.  But  it  is  difficult  to  resist  the  conclusion  that  the  actual 
polemics  had  taken  on  a  life  of,  their  own,  preventing  attempted 
reconciliations  and  promoting  further  tension. 
4.5  Sino-Soviet  Economic  Relations  and  their  Interaction  with  Politics 
Economic  considerations  in  these  years  lost  much  of  their  significance 
as  an  indicator  of  and  a  factor  in'  Sino-Soviet  relations;  the  political 
aspects  were  both  more  publicised  and,  as  the  dispute  intensified,  more 
important.  But  in  fact  Sino-Soviet  economic  co-operation  deteriorated-  for 
several  reasons. 
First,  from  1959  to  1961,  the  Chinese  economy  had  been  'struck  by  an 
unprecedented  series  of  natural  disasters  in  which  over  half  of  China's 
arable  land  had  been  more  or  less  seriously  affected.  Droughts,  floods  and 
disease  had  had  a  disastrous  effect  on  crops,  bringing  '  famine  and 
suffering  to  the  whole  nation.  The  Chinese  leadership  had  been  forced  to 
change  their  economic  policy  and  particularly  to  abandon  the  Great  Leap 117 
Forward,  though  their  position  in  the  country  had  not  been  called  into 
question.  At  the  same  time,  they-had  been  made  even  more  dependent  upon 
Soviet  economic  aid,  a  situation  Khrushchev  had  attempted  to  make  use  of 
to  bring  economic  pressure  to  bear  on  them  for  political  reasons. 
However,  1960  was  a  turning-point  not  only  in  Sino-Soviet  political 
relations,  but  also  in  economic  relations.  As  a  result  of  the  unilateral 
Soviet  decision  to  withdraw  specialists  and  cancel  contracts  with  China, 
Sino-Soviet  economic  co-operation  was  greatly  damaged. 
Secondly,  the  Chinese  government  had  to  take  emergency  measures  to 
overcome  the  effects  of  the  natural  disasters  and  man-made-difficulties. 
The  9th  Plenary  Meeting  of  the  CCP  Central  Committee  held  in  January  1961 
decided  to  curtail  the  scope  of  capital  construction  and  to  adjust  rates  of 
development.  The  measures  proceeded  in  accordance  with  a  policy  of  taking 
"agriculture  as  the  foundation  of  the  economy  and  industry  as  the  leading 
sector"  formally  adopted  at  the  Plenum.  This  implied  a  massive  suspension 
of  work  at  enterprises,  and  from  mid-  1961  the  termination  of  capital 
construction  in  industry  and  transport.  All  this  reduced  the  need  for 
Soviet  deliveries  and  technical  assistance. 
Thirdly,  from  the  Soviet  point  of  view,  in  the  midst  of  international 
political  rivalry  with  China,  it  would  have  been  troublesome  to  subsidise 
competition  in  socialist  construction.  So  the  Soviet  Union  was  unwilling 
to  extend  assistance  that  would  reduce  its  own  pace  of  development  or 
provide  for  a  rate  of  Chinese  growth  faster  than  its  own.  This  was  an 
attitude  that  became  more  rigid  as  time  went  on. 
Fourthly,  the  Chinese  began  to  complain  about  the  inferior  quality  of 
Soviet  goods.  In  Feburary  1964,  in  responding  to  the  alleged  Soviet  desire 
to  expand  commercial  relations,  Mao  claimed:  "We  can  do  a  little  business, 118 
but  we  can'  t  do  too  much,  for  Soviet  products  are'  heavy,  '  crude  and  high- 
priced,  and  they  always  keep  something  back.  So  it's  not  so  good  to  deal 
with  them  as  with  the  French  bourgeoisie,  who  still`  have  some  notion°bf 
business  ethics.  "62  For  all  these  reasons  China's  trade  pattern  and 
economic  development  programme  changed  significantly: 
a)  Its  previous  reliance  upon  the  Soviet  Union  as-  a  major  trading 
partner  sharply  decreased,  'and  its  trade  was  not  allowed  to  go  above  the 
limit  necessary  to  amortise  outstanding  debts; 
b)  From  the  begining  of  1961,  in  order  to  cope  with  repeated  crop 
failures,  it  bought  various  surplus  grains  from  the  major  Western 
producers,  especially  Canada  and  Australia; 
c)  China's  foreign  trade  began  to  be  determined  more  by  commercial 
motives  such  as  the  search  for  foreign  exchange  and  better  credit  terms, 
standards  of  quality,  and  effectiveness,  than  by  politics.  63 
Consequently,  in  1960,  the  turnover  of  Sino-Soviet  trade  decreased  by  19 
per  cent  from  the  1959  level.  Soviet  exports  fell  by  14  per  cent,  and 
imports  by  23  percent,  64  and  the  conclusion  of'a  long-term  trade  agreement 
was  put  off  for  an  indefinite  period.  In  1961  the  reduction  in  the 
economic  co-operation  between  the  two  countries  continued.  Under  the 
agreement  of  19  June  the  Soviet  Union  would  give  China  technical 
assistance  in  building  only  66  projects  for  the  period  1961-1965.  As  a 
result  in  1961  Soviet  deliveries  of  complete  plant  and  equipment  was 
reduced  to  one-fifth  of  the  1960  volume.  6a  Towards  the  end  of  1962, 
business  relations  reached  an  all-time  low  in  every  field.  The  volume  of 
economic  co-operation  was  roughly  equivalent  to  only  5  percent  of  the  1959 
volume.  Supplies  of  Soviet  equipment,  materials,  technical  facilities  and 
documents  were  reduced  to  41-42  million  rubles  as  against  428  million 119 
rubles  in  1960.  Supplies  of  complete  plant  amounted  to  7.8-8  million  rubles 
as  compared  with  336.5  million  rubles  in  1959.6 
The  turnover  of  trade  was  down  to  599  million  rubles  in  1963,  roughly 
equivalent  to  that  of  1950,  a  reduction  of  20  per  cent.  The  Soviet  Union'  s 
share  of  China's  foreign  trade  in  1963  fell  to  23  per  cent  as  against  29 
per  cent  in  1962  and  50  per  cent  in  1959.437  The  figures  set-out  below 
illustrate  how  economic  factors  reflected  political,  and  how  one  issue 
governing  Sino-Soviet  relations  affected  another. 
Soviet  exports  to  China  Soviet  imports  from  China  Turnover 
(in  million  U.  S.  dollars)68 
1960  817.00  848.00  1665.00 
1961  367.33  551.00  918.33 
1962  233.31  515.82  -749.13 
1963  187.20  412.75  599.95 
1964  135.20  314.20  449.40 r 
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V. 
Sine-Soviet  Relations  Before  the  Cultural  Revolution 
(1964-1965) 
The  new  leaders  of  the  CPSU  have  faithfully  taken  over  the  mantle 
of  Khrushchev...  they  remain  out-and-out  Khrushchev  revi- 
sionists,  pursuing  Khrushchev  revisionism,  but  without 
Khrushchev.  ' 
Renmin  Ribao 
1964-1965  was  a  short  but  very  important  period  in  the  development  of 
Sino-Soviet  relations.  Khrushchev's  fall  from  power  seemed  to  offer  an 
opportunity  for  reassessment  and  improvement.  And  there  were  other  moments 
when  a  change  seemed  possible.  But  Brezhnev  and  his  colleagues  could  not 
make  a  major  leap,  and  Mao  hardly  tried.  Outside  events  took  a  hand.  And 
eventually  everything  seemed  to  conspire  to  let  Mao  give  free  rein  to  his 
bitterness'  against  those  he  regarded  as  revisionists  in  the  Soviet  Union 
and  at  home. 
5.1  Soviet  Foreign  Policy  after  Khrushchev's  Fall 
On  14  October  1964  Khrushchev  was  removed  as  First  Secretary  of  the  CPSU 
and  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  by  the  Central  Committee  as  a 
result  of  a  conspiracy  carried  through  against  him  by  his  designated 126 
successors,  Brezhnev  and  Kosygin.  2  The  question  that  arose  in  Chinese  minds 
was  whether  the  new  Soviet  leaders  were  going  to  change  Khrushchev's  policy 
or  just  make  an  adjustment  to  it.  It  did  not  take  long  time  to  get  the 
answer.  The  Central  Committee  resolution  annoucing  Khrushchev's 
"resignation"  reaffirmed  the  validity  of  the  20th  and  22nd  CPSU 
Congresses,  thus  automatically  cutting  off  any  possibility  of  fundemental 
changes.  3 
The  strategy  of  the  new  leaders  can  be  summed  up  as  follows: 
1)  In  the  first  place,  they  would  be  preoccupied  with  the  serious 
domestic  industrial  and  agricultural  situation.  To  many  people,  the  primary 
causes  for  Khrushchev's  fall  were  internal  and  bureaucratic  in  character: 
issues  of  foreign  policy  did  not  play  a  major  role.  Because  of  Khrushchev's 
"sins"  -  "harebrained  scheming;  half-baked  conclusions  and  hasty  decisions 
and  actions,  divorced  from  reality;  bragging  and  bluster;  attraction  to 
rule  by  fiat;  unwillingness  to  take  into  account  what  science  and  practical 
experience  had  already  worked  out",  °  -  the  economic  situation  was  quite 
depressed.  According  to  official  figures,  the  economic  growth  rate  in 
1961-1965  was  6.5  per  cent  compared  with  9.2  percent  in  the  period  1956- 
1960.6  The  growth  rate  of  agriculture  dropped  from  5.9  to  2.4  per  cent  at 
the  same  time.  The  growth  rate  of  real  income  per  capita  decreased  from  5.7 
to  3.5  per  cent  as  well.  -  It  was  not  surprising  that  soon  after 
Khrushchev's  fall  his  drastic  reorganization  of  the  Party  and  government 
structure  into  parallel  industrial  and  agricultural  hierachies  was 
cancelled.  The  new  leaders  also  announced  the  removal  of  "unwarranted 
limitations"  on  the  size  of  private  plots  and  private  livestock  holdings. 
In  industry  the  way  was  opened  for  reforms  in  the  incentive  system 
designed  to  provide  increased  rewards  for  managerial  efficiency  in  the  use 127 
of  resources.? 
2)  The  Soviet  leaders,  as  Griffith  observed,  wished  to  continue 
detente  with  Western  countries,  mainly  with  the  United  States,  but 
restricting  it  rather  more  than  Khrushchev  had  done  in  order  to  counter  the 
Johnson  administration's  increased  military  activity  abroad. 
(a)  With  respect  to  Vietnam  they  wanted  to  adopt  a  more  forward  policy, 
involving  intensification  of  military  aid  to  North  Vietnam  and 
simultaneous  utilization  of  the  stepped-up  military  operations  in  the  South 
to  influence  the  North  to  choose  Moscow  over  Beijing  as  the  more  effective 
supplier  of  arms. 
(b)  With  respect  to  Europe  and  disarmament,  they  were  anxious  to  revive 
revival  of  disarmament  negotiations,  thus  (1)  putting  further  strain  on 
NATO  and  blocking  German  nuclear  armament,  multilateral  or  otherwise,  and 
(2)  stalling  if  not  preventing  another  leap  forward  in  the  arms  race.  ° 
3)  The  new  leaders  also  aimed  to  reconsolidate  the  menaced  Soviet 
positions  in  Eastern  Europe,  in  Southeast  Asia  and  in  Cuba. 
(a)  In  Eastern  Europe  this  meant  (1)  readjusting  Soviet-East  European 
relations  on  the  basis  of  a  differentiated  rather  than  a  monolithic 
alliance,  centring  on  geopolitical  and  military  rather  than  on  ideological 
factors,  that  is,  giving  priority  the  minimum  essential  security  interest 
in:  East  Germany,  Poland,  and  Czechoslovakia;  (2)  moving  toward 
rapprochement  with  Romania;  and  (3)  intensifying  the  rapprochement  with 
Yugoslavia. 
(b)  With  respect  to  Southeast  Asia  it  involved  countering  Chinese 
influence  by  (1)  the  policy  towards  Vietnam  just  described,  and  (2)  by 
similar  means,  improving  relations  with  North  Korea. 
(c)  As  for  Cuba,  Moscow's  policy  included  (1)  improving  relations 128 
through  more  development  aid,  and  (2)  providing  more  financial  and 
technical  assistance--probably  reluctantly--to  stepped-up  guerrilla 
operations  in  Latin  America.  9 
4)  With  the  Chinese  the  new  Soviet  leaders  would  continue  their 
polemics  on  issues  of  principle.  But  they  would  make  adjustments,  thus 
keeping  to  purely  ideological  features  and  avoiding  a  dispute  between 
individuals.  From  Ocotober  1964  to  June  1965  they  adopted  more  flexible 
tactics  allowing  for  national  autonomy  and  neutralism  among  socialist 
states  and  Communist  Parties. 
In  sum,  with  respect  to  Sino-Soviet  relations  the  new  regime  in  Moscow 
at  most  objected  to  some  of  Khrushchev's  tactics  against  Beijing  but  shared 
with  him  his  opposition  to  the  fundamental  capitulation  that  the  Chinese 
apparently  demanded.  It  was  not  altogether  inauspicious,  but  not  wholly 
unpromising  either. 
5.2  Post-Khrushchev  Chinese  Reaction 
The  fall  of  Khrushchev  greatly  strengthened  Mao  Zedong's  position  inside 
the  CCP.  It  was  an  obvious  personal  victory  for  Mao  himself.  It  was  also, 
he  probably  thought,  a  victory  for  his  policy.  And  on  that  same  day  China 
exploded  its  first  nuclear  device  in  spite  of  Moscow's  having  cut  off  all 
nuclear,  military  and  economic  aid.  1° 
Chinese  influence  had  been  steadily  rising  as  Soviet  influence  steadily 
declined  in  the  international  Communist  movement.  It  would  have  been 
surprising  if  Mao  had  changed  his  tactics  after  such  a  victory;  and,  as  it 
soon  became  clear,  he  did  not.  But  at  the  beginning  the  Chinese  wanted  to 
improve  relations  with  Parties  such  as  the  Romanian  that  were  opposed  to 
an  international  conference  and  wanted  a  decrease  in  Sino-Soviet 129 
hostility.  The  signs  of  disquiet  in  Eastern  Europe  over  Khrushchev's  fall 
made  this  consideration  even  more  attractive. 
Mao  Zedong,  Liu  Shaoqi,  Zhu  De  and  Zhou  Enlai  sent  warm  congratulations 
on  the  nomination  of  Brezhnev  as  Party  First  Secretary  and  of  Kosygin  as 
Premier,  hoping  that  "the  'unbreakable  friendship  between  the  Chinese  and 
Soviet  peoples  would  continue  to  develop".  ",  Moscow  then  invited  a  high- 
level  Chinese  delegation  to  attend  the  forty-seventh  anniversary 
celebrations  of  the  October  Revolution,  and  on  5  November  Beijing  sent 
Zhou  Enlai,  Ho  Long  (a  Politburo  member  and  Vice  premier)  -  and,  among 
others,  Kang  Sheng  and  Wu  Xiuzhuan,  both  participants  in  the  July  1963 
Sino-Soviet  bilateral  discussions.  However,  Moscow  also  invited  a  Yugoslav 
delegation  but  not  an  Albanian  representative.  This  was  a  clear  sign  that 
no  decisive  Soviet  concessions  were  in  the  offing. 
The  celebrations  demonstrated  that  substantive  Sino-Soviet  differences 
remained  as  great  as  ever.  In  his  public  speech  on  6  November,  and  in 
"frank  and  comradly  talks"12  with  Zhou  Enlai,  Brezhnev  indicated  clearly 
that  the  new  leadership  would  continue  Khrushchev's  policy.  He  reaffirmed 
the  validity  of  the  20th  CPSU  Congress.  He  emphasized  the  Soviet  line  of 
peaceful  coexistence  and  especially  endorsed  the  partial  Test  Ban  Treaty. 
He  appealed  to  the  Chinese  only  to  improve  inter-state  relations  and  to 
tolerate  differences  in  methods  of  socialist  construction,  with 
effectiveness  being  the  test  of  correctness.  Brezhnev's  most  hostile 
statement,  from  the  Chinese  point  of  view,  must  have  been  his  declaration 
that  the  time  was  "obviously  ripe"  for  an  international  Communist 
conference  to  serve  "cohesion"  and  "unity".  "- 
The  Chinese  response  was  substantially  as  negative  as  before 
Khrushchev's  fall.  Although  the  Chinese  press  reprinted  some  Pravda 130 
editorials  and  Brezhnev's  Moscow  speech,  Peng  Zhen's  October  Revolution 
speech  in  Beijing  and  the  7  November  Renmin  Ribao  editorial  repeated  firmly 
the  major  Chinese  themes:  revolutionary  violence,  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat,  modern  revisionism,  and  13  socialist  states  (that  is, 
excluding  Yugoslavia).  The  editorial  declared  bluntly  that  "Khrushchev 
revisionism"  had  been  and  would  be  "spurned  by  the  people...  in  the 
past-in  the  present-and  in  the  future"-  a  clear  warning  to  the  new 
Soviet  leaders.  '-' 
On  the  14th  Zhou  Enlai  went  back  to  Beijing,  and  again  Mao  was  at  the 
airport  to  welcome  him.  Zhou  later  said  that  he  had  unsuccessfully  tried  to 
get  the  Soviets  to  abandon  the  conference  proposal,  but  he  had  succeeded 
only  in  getting  it  postponed.  The  Chinese  declared  that  the  new  Soviet 
leadersip  then  "told  the  members  of  the  Chinese  Party  and  government 
delegation  to  their  faces  that  there  was  not  a  shade  of  difference  between 
themselves  and  Khrushchev  on  the  question  of  the  international  Communist 
movement  or  of  relations  with  China".  's 
On  20  November,  Hongsli  the  journal  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  CCP, 
published  an  article  entitled,  "Why  Khrushchev  Fell".  It  brushed  off 
suggestions  of  ill-heath.  methods  of  work  and  age;  Khrushchev  fell  because 
of  the  failure  of  his  "revisionist  line".  The  article  summed  up  the  12 
charges  against  him  along  the  following  lines: 
1)  He  had  attacked  Stalin  on  the  pretext  of  combatting  the  personality 
cult; 
2)  He  had  sought  all-round  co-operation  with  US  imperialism; 
3)  He  had  sold  out  the  interests  of  the  Soviet  people  and  prevented 
China  from  building  up  its  own  nuclear  strength  by  signing  the  nuclear  test 
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4)  He  had  obstructed  revolutionary  movements  by  advocating  a  peaceful 
transition  to  socialism; 
5)  He  had  opposed  and  sabotaged  national  liberation  movements  by 
advocating  peaceful  coexistence; 
6)  He  had  supported  the  "renegade  Tito  clique"; 
7)  He  had  injured  and  undermined  "socialist  Albania"; 
8)  He  had  tried  his  utmost  to  "subvert  socialist  China"; 
9)  He  had  opposed  "the  independent  development  of  the  economies  of  other 
socialist  countries  in  the  name  of  mutual  economic  assistance"; 
10)  He  had  resorted  to  all  sorts  of  schemes  to  carry  out  subversive  and 
disruptive  activities  against  other  Communist  Parties; 
11)  He  had  created  an  open  split  in  the  international  Communist  movement 
by  playing  the  "patriarchal  father  Party  role"; 
12)  He  had  pursued  "a  series  of  revisionist  policies  leading  the  Soviet 
Union  back  to  capitalism". 
The  article  concluded  with  a  barely  veiled  warning  to  the  new  Soviet 
leaders  in  the  hope  that  events  would  not  develop  along  the  lines 
prescribed  by  Khrushchev1  for  should  there  be  "Khrushchevism  without 
Khrushchev",  it  would  end  up  in  a  "blind  alley".  '6 
Simultaneously,  Renmin  Ribao  began  reprinting  comments  on  Khrushchev"s 
fall  by  foreign  Parties,  such  as  an  Albanian  editorial  entitled 
"Khrushchev's  fall  Did  Not  Entail  the  Disappearance  of  Khrushchevian 
Revisionism",  and  a  declaration  by  Aidit,  leader  of  the  Indonesian 
Communist  Party,  that  Khrushchev's  removal  was  not  "the  end  of  the  struggle 
to  smash  modern  revisionism"  and  that  Moscow  should  amend  the  20th,  21st, 
and  22nd  Congress  resolutions.  "  By  January  1965,  Renmin  Ribao  was 
reprinting  much  more  bitter  attacking  articles,  for  example,  a  Japanese 132 
Communist  onslaught  denouncing  the  new  Soviet  leaders  for  "disruptive 
activities"  within  the  Japanese  Party,  '®  and  an  Albanian  one  condemning 
them  for  wishing  to  "restore  all  the  links  with  the  imperialists".  13 
5.3  Disagreements  Over  Policy  towards.  Vietnam  I 
The  escalation  of  the  war  in  Vietnam  in  the  early  months  of  1965 
contributed  greatly  to  widening  the  gap  between  the  USSR  and  the  PRC.  For 
domestic  and  foreign  policy  reasons  the  Soviet  Union  made  great  efforts  to 
bring  about  a  negotiated  settlement,  but  China  doggedly  opposed  any 
suggestion  of  a  compromise. 
In  December  1964-January  1965  the  White  House  probed  the  Kremlin,  asking 
it  to  influence  Hanoi  to  stop  supporting  the  South  Vietnamese  National 
Liberation  Front  and  to  engage  in  "unconditional  discussions".  2°  Far  from 
rejecting  this  approach,  the  Soviet  governemnt  agreed  to  transmit  the 
proposals  to  Hanoi,  and  Kosygin  went  in  person  to  give  the  message  to  Ho 
Chi  Minh  in  February  1965.  But  Ho  Chi  Minh  and  the  National  Liberation 
Front  had  made  their  positions  clear  in  official  statements.  --'  TThe  1954 
Geneva  conference  had  recognized  Vietnam  as  an  independent,  sovereign, 
unified  nation.  So  the  U.  S.  must  now  withdraw  all  its  troops  and  weapons 
from  South  Vietnam.  On  7  February,  the  day  after  Kosygin  arrived  in  Hanoi, 
the  U.  S.  started  regular  bombing  raids  on  Vietnam,  as  if  ensuring  a 
negative  response. 
Kosygin  then  flew  to  Beijing  on  10  February  to  put  three  points  to  Mao 
Zedong  and  Zhou  Enlai: 
a)  That  there  was  a  danger  of  escalation  to  "total  war"  unless  the 
Americans  were  given  an  honorable  way  out  of  Vietnam.  This  was  tantamount 
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liberation  struggle.  Mao  asked  about  Vietnamese  honor. 
b)  That  the  international  conference  of  all  Communist  Parties  to  be  held 
in  March  was  only  a  consultative  meeting.  So  China  should  come,  as  a  mark 
of  unity. 
c)  That  there  should  be  "unity  of  action"  to  aid  Vietnam,  a  bridge  to 
convey  weapons  through  China. 
Mao's  response  was  that  an  international  conference  in  the  present 
circumstances  would  only  confirm  the  divergence  of  views.  As  to  the 
cessation  of  polemics,  he  was  willing  to  make'  it  nine  thousand  years 
instead  of  ten,  from  a  spirit  of  conciliation.  As  for  unity  of  action,  what 
particularly  did  the  USSR  have  in  mind?  Unity  to  bargain-  with  the 
U.  S.,  using  the  Vietnamese  as  a  pawn  in  a  dirty  game?  How  could  there  be 
unity  of  action  to  betray  a  revolutionary  cause?  As  to  "global  war",  Mao 
said  he  did  not  believe  it  would  happen  over  Vietnam,  a  view  he  had  made 
explicit  earlier  that  year  in  an  interview  with  the  American  writer,  Edgar 
Snow.  22  When  it  came  to  passage  through  China,  Mao  refused  to  allow  Soviet 
garrisons  and  a  bridge,  or  an  airlift.  The  whole  of  China's  rolling  stock 
was  at  the  disposal  of  the  USSR  for  sending  any  weapons  they  wanted.  It  was 
a  hard  line.  But  "Comrade  Kosygin  expressed  agreement  with  our  views  at  the 
time  and  stated  that  they  would  not  bargain  with  others  on  the  issue 
(Vietnam).  "23  But,  in  the  event,  when  he  returned  to  Moscow,  he  seems  to 
have  changed  his  mind. 
The  day  after  his  return,  on  16  February,  a  proposal  for  reconvening  the 
Geneva  conference  went  from  Moscow  to  China  and  North  Vietnam.  Without 
waiting  for  a  reply,  the  USSR  as  co-chairman  also  informed  France  and  Great 
Britain.  On  25  February  the  United  States  turned  it  down,  saying  it  had  not 
acquiesced  in  unconditional  negotiations.  The  Chinese  condemned  the 134 
proposal  as  another  shamful  betrayal. 
The  new  Soviet  leaders  did  deploy  to  some  effect  their  own  catchall 
phrase  "unity  of  action"  in  aid  to  Vietnam.  2,4  They  hoped  in  this  way  to 
introduce  differences  between  the  Vietnamese  and  the  Chinese,  and  between 
the  Chinese  and  other  Communist  Parties,  by  denouncing  "obstructiveness"  on 
the  part  of  China.  Obviously  they  were  more  able  than  the  Chinese  to 
offer  Hanoi  modern  surface-to-air  anti-aircraft  defenses  to  limit  the 
bombing.  In  April  the  Soviet  Union  also  made  two  specific  proposals,  one 
for  a  tripartite  meeting  of  itself,  North  Vietnam  and  China  on  the  Vietnam 
war,  and  the  other  for  sending  through  China  some  four  thousand  Soviet 
military  to  be  stationed  in  Vietnam,  the  use  and  occupation  of  airports  in 
China  to  be  manned  by  five  hundred  or  so  Soviet  experts,  and  the  opening  of 
an  air  corridor  and  free  traffic  for  Soviet  planes  through  China's 
airspace.  This  was  essentially  a  repetition  of  what  Kosygin  had  suggested 
in  Feburary.  It  was  again  rejected,  since  North  Vietnam  felt  under 
pressure  to  open  "unconditional  negotiations".  211  and  since  Mao  was  still 
not  convinced  there  would  be  a  global  war.  For  China  the  issue  in  Vietnam 
was  really  the  battle  against  modern  revisionism,  and  mao  was  determined  to 
carry  the  struggle  against  Khrushchev's  version  of  it  through  to  the 
end.  26  The  Soviet  approach  was  neither  disinterested  nor  consistent.  But 
the  Chinese  attitude  was  almost  obsesively  single-minded. 
5.4  From  Escalating  Polemics  to  Inter-Party  Rupture 
There  were  several  events  contributing  to  the  escalation  of  the  polemics 
between  the  CCP  and  the  CPSU  from  March  1965  onwards.  The  first  was  the 
Moscow  meeting  of  19  Communist  Parties  that  was  held  on  1-5  March.  This 
meeting  was  originally  announced  by  Pravda  as  the  "first  meeting  of  the 135 
drafting  commission"27  of  26  Communist  Parties  for  a  world  conference.  But 
in  late  Feburary,  the  Russians  termed  it  only  a  "consultative  meeting".  2° 
What  was  the  reason  for  this  change?  The  invitation  was  accepted  by  all 
the  parties  invited  except  those  of  China,  Albania,  Romania,  North  Korea, 
North  Vietnam,  and  Japan.  Several  of  the  Parties  which  accepted  the 
invitation,  notably  the  British,  Cuban,  Italian  and  Polish,  did  so  with 
reservations.  The  result  was  that  the  Soviet  Party  had  to  abandon  its 
original  intention.  The  final  communique  made  clear  that  the  participants 
had  only  "held  consultations"  and  "exchanged  opinions",  although  some 
delegations  were  reported  to  have  pressed  for  the  adoption  of  a  resolution 
fixing  the  date  for  a  world  conference  and  condemning  the  Chinese.  The 
meeting  only  suggested  a  preliminary  consultative  conference  of  the  81 
Parties  taking  part  in  the  1960  conference  to  discuss  the  question  of  a  new 
international  conference,  and  called  for  the  discontinuation  of  open 
polemics,  and  the  end  of  "the  interference  of  some  parties  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  others".  29  It  was  hardly  a  Soviet  success. 
On  4  March,  Renmin  Ribao  published  a  number  of  recent  extracts  from  the 
Soviet  press  supporting  "the  line  of  the  'three  peacefuls'  and  the  'two 
entires'  (i.  e,  peaceful  coexistence,  peaceful  competition,  peaceful 
transition  to  socialism;  the  state  of  the  entire  people,  and  the  Party  of 
the  entire  people),  which,  it  said,  formed  "the  main  content  of 
Khrushchevite  revisionism".  3°  It  was  not  exactly  a  friendly  Chinese  act. 
Then  on  22  March  Renmin  Ribao  published  "A  Comment  on  the  March  Moscow 
Meeting",  a  statement  that  marked  the  public  death  sentence  for  any  Sino- 
Soviet  reconciliation  and  signaled  the  opening  of  a  major  Chinese  campain 
aganist  the  new  Soviet  leadership.  It  denounced  the  Moscow  meeting  as 
"illegal  and  schismatic".  It  declared  that  "the  new  leaders  have  merely 136 
changed  the  signboard  and  employed  more  subtle  methods  in  order  better  to 
apply  Khrushchevism,  which  could  be  described  as  'three  shams  and  three 
realities--sham  anti-imperialism  but  real  capitulatism,  sham  revolution  but 
real  betrayal,  and  sham  unity  but  real  split'.  Playing  with  the  now 
familiar  arithmetic,  the  article  continued,  "if  the  Soviet  arguments  cannot 
be  refuted  in  9,000  years,  then  we  shall  take  10,000".  31 
While  the  Moscow  meeting  was  still  going  on,  about  2,000  Chinese, 
Vietnamese  and  other  students  demonstrated  outside  the  U.  S.  embassy  in 
Moscow.  Serious  fighting  broke  out  between  the  students  and  Soviet  police 
who  protected  the  embassy;  and  quite  a  few  students  and  policemen  were 
injured.  The  Chinese  government  protested  violently,  alleging  that  the 
police  had  tortured  the  students  and  that  hospitals  had  refused  to  treat 
them,  and  demanding  that  the  Soviet  government  "admit  its  errors", 
"apologize  to  the  students"  and  "severely  punish"  the  police  involved.  -22 
The  Soviet  government  rejected  the  protest,  insisted  that  any  similar 
riots  would  be  "resolutely  cut  short",  and  stated  that  any  international 
law  required  a  government  to  protect  foreign  embassies.  -I-:  3  On  16  March  the 
Chinese  sent  another  note,  again  demanding  that  Moscow  "admit  its 
mistakes"  and  apologize  to  the  students.  34  When  the  injured  Chinese 
students  returned  to  Beijing  they  were  received  with  all  honors.  36  It  was 
all  rather  puerile.  Sino-Soviet  relations  continued  to  worsen  from  that 
time  onwards.  The  dispute  between  the  PRC  and  the  USSR  around  the 
preparations  for  the  Second  Afro-Asian  Conference  (or  Second  Bandung)  was 
another  example.  The  core  of  the  struggle  was  whether  the  USSR  would  be 
allowed  to  attend.  Beijing  was  trying  its  best  to  set  up  and  develop  new 
Afro-Asian  organizations  from  which  Moscow  would  be  excluded.  3b  On  the  eve 
of  the  planned  Conference,  Moscow  reaffirmed  its  right  to  participate.  On 137 
12  June,  after  glorying  in  Moscow's  comprehensive  support  to  the 
developing  countries,  Pravda  maintained  that  "Statsemen  and  the  press  of 
many  Asian  and  African  countries  emphasize  that  the  participation  of  the 
USSR  would  greatly  enhance  the  authority  of  the  conference  and  would  serve 
the  common  cause  of  the  struggle  against  imperialism,  colonialism  and  neo- 
colonialism.  "37However,  the  Chinese  soon'rejected  the  Soviet  arguments  for 
participation,  saying  that  the  Soviet  Union  was  not  qualified  to 
participate,  though  only  because  "it  is  not  an  Afro-Asian  country".  36 
The  Chinese  Communist  Party  then  made  its  first  direct  attack  on  the  Soviet 
leaders  since  the  dismissal  of  Khrushchev  in  a  long  editorial  published  in 
Renmin  Ribao  on  13  June,  which  declared  that  they  "have  not  departed  from 
the  essence  of  Khrushchev's  policies--revisionism,  great-power  chauvinism, 
and  Soviet-American  co-operation  for  the  domination  of  the  world".  33 
On  2  September,  the  twentieth  anniversary  of  the  defeat  of  Japan,  two 
important  articles  by  Defence  Minister  Lin  Biao,  4°  and  Chief  of  the  Army 
General  Staff  Luo  Reiging,  47  and  a  Renmin  Ribao  editorial42  showed  just 
how  intense  and  extreme  the  Chinese  line  had  become.  The  lesson  of  the 
protracted  struggle  with  Japan  was  that  a  people's  guerrilla  war  could 
overcome  massive  conventional  military  might--that  the  U.  S.  could  be 
defeated  by  people's  wars  in  the  countries  of  Asia,  Africa  and  Latin 
America.  Describing  the  Khrushchev  line  of  "three  peacefuls"  as  "rubbish" 
Lin  maintained  that  "the  essence  of  the  general  line  of  the  Khrushchev 
revisionists  is  nothing  other  than  the  demand  that  all  the  oppressed 
peoples  and  nations  and  all  the  countries  that  have  won  independence  should 
lay  down  their  arms  and  place  themselves  at  the  mercy  of  the  U.  S. 
imperialists  and  their  lackeys...  614.3 
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was  another  factor  contributing  to  the  worsening  of  Sino-Soviet  relations. 
From  the  begining  of  the  crisis  Moscow  stressed  its  interest  in  the  area 
and  reiterated  appeals  for  a  cease-fire.  44  For  example,  according  to  a  TASS 
statement  on  7  September,  Moscow  wanted  to  increase  its  influence  in  India, 
to  maintain  at  least  normal  relations  with  Pakistan,  to  prevent  China  from 
profiting  from  the  conflict,  and  finally  to  avoid  Washington  -profiting 
as  well.  The  Soviet  Union  can  hardly  have  been  surprised  at  the  Chinese 
response.  Beijing  was  certainly  enraged  by  what  it  correctly  perceived  to 
be  Soviet-American  co-operation  towards  ending  the  war.  As  Renmin  Ribao  put 
it  on  18  September:  "Who  are  their  (the  Indian  reactionaries)  backers?  One 
is  U.  S.  imperialism,  the  other  the  revisionist  leadership  of  the  Soviet 
Union...  (which)  is  not  one  whit  inferior  to  the  U.  S.  in  its  imperialism.  "°° 
There  followed  a  further  slanging  match.  Pravda  published  a  full 
statement,  condemning  the  Chinese  that  they  "force  their  will  on  other 
peoples"  and  "do  irreparable  damage  to  the  cause  of  the  working  class".  The 
Chinese  counter-attacked  by  publishing  an  article  entitled  "Refutation  of 
the  New  Leaders  of  the  CPSU  on  United  Action"  in  Renmin  Ribao  and  Hongi  . 
This  asserted  that  the  new  Soviet  leaders  were  "still  pursuing  Khrushchev's 
line,  but  with  double-faced  tactics  more  cunning  and  hypocritical  than 
his",  and  were  "allied  with  U.  S.  imperialism".  On  16  November,  -  Pravda 
responded  by  describing  the  Chinese  article  as  "saturated  with 
impermissible,  utterly  groundless,  slanderous  and  provocative 
fabrications".  "b 
On  15  January  1966  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Mongolian  People's  Republic 
signed  a  new  twenty-year  Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Mutual  Assistance  to 
replace  the  expiring  1946  agreement.  Brezhnev  headed  the  Soviet 
delegation.  47  Perhaps  mindful  of  this,  the  CCP  Central  Committee  sent  a 139 
letter  to  the  CPSU  on  22  March,  refusing  an  invitation  to  its  23rd 
Congress.  The  Chinese  missive  alleged  that  the  Soviet  leaders  had  sent  a 
letter  to  other  Communist  Parties  "instigating  them  to  join  in  opposing 
China  as  it  was  allegedly  obstructing  Soviet  aid  to  North  Vietnam".  It  went 
on  to  state  that  "the  leadership  of  the  CPSU  has  become  the  centre  of 
modern  revisionism!  '.  48  By  this  action,  relations  between  the  two  Parties 
were  finally  broken.  Nobody  at  the  time  could  have  thought  that  this  break 
would  continue  for  the  next  23  years.  Over  eighty  foreign  Communist  Parties 
were  represented  at  the  Congress,  including  those  of  North  Vietnam  and 
North  Korea,  and  also  of  Yugoslavia  which  sent  a  delegation  for  the  first 
time  since  the  war.  In  order  to  maintain  solidarity  for  the  success  of  the 
Congress,  Soviet  speakers  were  restrained  in  their  comments  on  relations 
with  China.  In  his  report  on  29  March,  Brezhnev  merely  reiterated  Soviet 
hopes  for  a  meeting  with  the  CCP  at  which  "existing  differences"  could  be 
examined.  49  But  by  this  stage,  Sino-Soviet  differences  had  become  so  great 
that  no  tactical  adjustment  could  resolve  them. 
Meanwhile,  Mao  began  to  prepare  his  struggle  against  revisionism  at  home. 
This  time  he  was  in  a  much  better  position  than  he  had  been  in  the  early 
1960s.  His  principal  enemy  abroad,  Khrushchev,  had  fallen.  His  main  rival 
at  home,  Liu  Shaogi,  was  gradually  revealing  himself  as  a  "Chinese 
Khrushchev".  In  the  light  of  the  disastrous  conditions  confronting  the 
Chinese  government  in  the  early  1960s,  the  rapidity  of  its  recovery  and 
the  renewal  of  its  economic  growth  were  quite  remarkable  accomplishments.  80 
Yet,  while  the  policy  of  Liu  Shaoqi  brought  these  advantages,  the  social 
and  ideological  results,  from  Mao's  point  of  view,  were  less  salutary. 
There  was  a  price  to  be  paid  for  economic  progress  --  and  that  was  the 
emergence  of  new  forms  of  inequality.  '  As  Mao  saw  it  inequality  had 140 
provided  a  good  opportunity  for  "new  bourgeois  elements,  new  bourgeois 
intellectuals  and  other  exploiters"  to.  "be  ceaselessly  generated  in 
society,  in  Party  and  government  organs,  in  economic  organizations  and  in 
cultural  and  educational  departments.  These  new  bourgeois  elements  and 
other  exploiters  will  invariably  try  to  find  their  protectors  and  agents  in 
the  higher  leading  organizations.  The  old  and  new  bourgeois  elements  and 
other  exploiters  will  invariably  join  hands  in  opposing  socialism  and 
developing  capitalism.  "5:  2  By  1965  Mao  had  begun  to  charge  that  some  people 
within  the  CCP  wanted  to  restore  capitalism  and  were  revisionist.  At  the 
December  1964-January  1965  enlarged  Party  meeting  he  challenged  Liu  by 
saying,  "If  revisionism  appears  at  the  centre,  what  will  you  do  about  it? 
There  is  the  possibility,  and  it  is  a  real  danger.  "53 
One  year  later,  Mao's  biggest  move  against  revisionism,  the  Cultural 
Revolution  got  under  way  throughout  China.  In  its  course  Liu  Shaoqi  would 
be  named  China's  Khrushchev.  Simultaneouly  Sino-Soviet  relations  would 
become  the  worst  they  had  been  since  the  rift  first  appeared  in  the  late 
1950s. 141 
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VI. 
The  Cultural  Revolution,  the  Czecholsovakian  Invasion  and 
Sino-Soviet  Relations,  1966-1969. 
The  Soviet  Union  today  is  under  a  dictatorship  of  the  bourgeoisie, 
a  dictatorship  of  the  big  bourgeoisie,  a  dictatorship  of  the  German 
facist  type,  a  dictatorship  of  the  Hitler  type.  ' 
Mao  Zedong 
The  period  1966-69  saw  Sino_soviet  relations  deteriorate  to  the  point  of 
border  fighting.  More  particularly  it  saw  the  Cultural  Revolution  drive 
China  into  an  all-out  ideological  assault  on  the  Soviet  Union,  and  Soviet 
expansionism,  characterised  by  the  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia,  push  Moscow 
into  authorising  the  seizure  of  Chinese  territory.  But  at  the  point  at 
which  there  was  even  talk  of  war,  both  sides  drew  back  enough  in  substance 
if  not  in  polemics  to  allow  talks  to  begin  which  at  least  involved  the 
beginning  of  a  new  phase  in  the  troubled  relationship. 
6.1  The  Chinese  Campaign  against  Soviet  Revisionism 
The  11th  plenary  session  of  the  8th  Central  Committee  of  the  CCP,  which,,: 
was  held  from  1  to  12  August  1966,  officially  endorsed  the  policy  of  the 
"Great  Proletarian  Cultural  Revolution".  A  long  communique  issued  on  12 
August  reaffirmed  the  Party's  hostility  to  Soviet  "revisionism''  and  its 
refusal  to  co-operate  with  the  USSR  on  the  Vietnamese  question.  Its  main 
thrust  concerned  revisionism,  both  in  China  and  at  abroad.  It  approved  all 
of  Mao's  directives  concerning  the  class  struggle  as  well  as  the  long 
polemical  battle  against  the  Soviet  Union.  2  Why  did  Mao  Zedong  initiate 
the  "Great  Proletarian  Cultural  Revolution"  at  the  age  of  72?  There  are 
still  many  arguments  about  this.  But-there  is  no  doubt  that  the  struggle 145 
against  Soviet  revisionism  which  dominated  Mao's  mind  in  his  later  years 
was  one  of  the  main  motives. 
Internationally,  as  Mao  saw  it,  there  were  two  equal  enemies  at  the  time, 
the  imperialist  U.  S.  A.  and  the  revisionist  USSR.  Indeed,  when  the  Cultural 
Revolution  was  launched,  the  United  States  military  intervention  in  Vietnam 
was  massively  escalated,  bombs  were  being  dropped  very  near  the  Chinese 
border,  and  there  was  a  threat  of  extending  the  war  to  China  itself.  But 
the  Cultural  Revolution  was  undertaken  not  because  of  the  threat  posed  by 
the  American  intervention  in  Vietnam.  In  terms  of  the  world  revolution,  Mao 
believed  that  the  internal  class  struggle  in  China  was  far  more  important 
than  anything  else.  The  purpose  of  the  movement  was  the  overthrow  of  "those 
within  the  Party  who  are  in  authority  and  taking  the  capitalist  road".: 
Mao  Zedong  the  Soviet  leaders  of  having  "betrayed  Marxism-Leninism, 
betrayed  the  great  Lenin,  betrayed  the  road  of  the  great  October 
Revolution,  betrayed  proletarian  internationalism,  betrayed  the 
revolutionary  cause  of  the  international  proletariat  and  of  the  oppressed 
peoples  and  oppressed  nations,  and'  betrayed  the  interests  of  the  great 
Soviet  people  and  the  peoples  of  the  socialist  countries.  "4  The  Soviet 
Union  was  therefore  a  target  for  Chinese  attack  and  could  not  "be  included 
in  the  united  front"sagainst  American  imperialism.  And  those  Chinese  who 
held  Soviet  type  views  were  automatically  a  target  for  Mao's  attack. 
Domesticaly,  it  had  been  Liu  Shaoqi,  later  named  as  China's  Khrushchev, 
who  had  issued  the  strongest  warnings  that  China  was  prepared  to  come  to 
the  assistance  of  the  Vietnamese  people  in  their  struggle  against  American 
imperialism.  6  During  the  Cultural  Revolution,  Liu  was  accused  of  relying  on 
Russian  industrial  aid  especially  in  the  armaments  industry.  '  On  the 
crucial  issue  of  relations  with  the-Soviet  Union,  Liu  had  opposed  Mao's 146 
hard-line  policy  and  advocated  a  more  conciliatory  approach.  In  1965  he  had 
said  openly,  "You  will  find  it  difficult  to  draw  a  conclusion  on  what  kind 
a  country  the  Soviet  Union  is.  At  the  present  time,  it  is  also  difficult  to 
draw  a  conclusion  about  the  nature  of  the  Soviet  Communist  Party.  "8  In 
fact,  Mao  told  Edgar  Snow  in  1970  that  one  of  the  major  reasons  he  had 
been  determined  to  depose  Liu  was  because  he  had  proposed  reviving  the 
Sino-Soviet  alliance  to  ward  off  the  American  threat  in  Vietnam,  and 
thereby  delay  the  cultural  revolution.  9  During  the  early  months  of  the 
Revolution  among  those  most  violently  denounced  as  "revisionists"  was  Deng 
Xiaoping.  the  Party  Secretary-General  who  had  headed  the  delegation  at  the 
1960  Moscow  conference  and  the  1963  Moscow  talks,  and  Peng  Zhen  who  had 
been  a  member  of  the  same  delegations  and  had  also  represented  China  at 
the  Bucharest  conference.  10 
The  Revolution  gathered  pace  as  the  summer  wore  on.  Hong  Wei  Bing  were 
organized  by  thousands  of  students  on  18  August,  in  connection  with  a  mass 
meeting  in  Tiananmen  Square.  Thereafter,  Hong  Wei  Bing  repeatedly 
demonstrated  outside  the  Soviet  embassy,  carring  portraits  of  Mao  Zedong 
and  Stalin,  and  they  renamed  the  street  leading  to  it  the  "struggle  against 
revisionism  street".  Foreign  missions  were  informed  on  20  September  that 
all  foreign  students  should  leave  by  10  October.  On  7  October,  Moscow 
informed  Beijing  that  all  Chinese  students  should  depart  from  the  Soviet 
Union  by  31  October  .  This  caused  fresh  demonstrations  against  the  Soviet 
embassy  in  Beijing.  The  Cultural  Revolution  had  taken  on  a  particularly 
anti-Soviet  slant. 
There  then  occured  an  incident  in  Red  Square  on  25  January  1967.69 
Chinese  students  returning  from  France  and  Finland  via  Moscow  clashed 
with  the  police  when  they  went  to  Lenin's  mausoleum  to  lay  wreaths.  This 147 
caused  enormous  protests  from  both  sides.  New  demonstrations  -took  place 
outside  the  Soviet  embassy  in  Beijing.  As  a  result  on  9  February  the 
Soviet  government  unilaterally  cancelled  the  agreement  allowing  Chinese  and 
Soviet  citizens  to  visit  each  other's  country  without  a  visa.  Similar 
action  was  taken  by  the  Chinese  government  the,  following  day. 
Factors  influencing  Mao  in  this  would  appear  to  have  been  as  follows: 
a)  It  was  the  struggle  against  revisionism  at  home  and  abroad  that  made 
him  start  the-  Cultural  Revolution.  In  his  mind  Liu  Shaoqi  was  the 
representative  of  the  revisionist  line  inside  the  Party  who  must  be  dealt 
with.  Smashing  revisionists  at  home  was  a  heavy  blow  at  revisionists 
abroad.  Mao's  thoughts  at  the  time  were  conveyed  in  a  letter  he  wrote  to 
his  wife,  Jiang  Qing,  on  6  July  1966.  ''  He  showed  his  fundamental  worry 
about  a  change  in  the  colour  of  the  Party,  "There  are  more  than  a 
hundred  Communist  Parties  in  the  world.  The  great  majority  no  longer 
believe  in  Marxism-Leninism...  They  have  reduced  Marx  and  Lenin  to  dust.  If 
this  happens  to  them,  why  not  to  us?...  Our  task  at  present  is  to  overthrow 
the  right  partly  (not  totally,  for  this  is  impossible)  throughout  the 
Party  and  the  whole  country".  1 
In  Mao's  mind,  the  fate  of  the  world  revolution  was  inextricably-linked 
with  the  fate  of  the  Chinese  revolution.  What  the  Chinese  took  to  be 
"proletarian  internationalism"  received  its  fullest  expression  in  Lin 
Biao's  1965  article,  "Long  Live  the  Victory  of  the  People's  War",  that 
projected  the  Chinese  revolutionary  experience  into  a  global  vision  of  a 
worldwide  revolutionary  process  where  the  "revolutionary  countryside"  of 
the  economically  backward  lands  of  Asia,  Africa,  and  Latin  America  would 
surround  and  overwhelm  the  advanced  "cities"  of  Europe  and  North  America. 
This,  to  be  sure,  was  more  a  description  of  the  world  situation  than  a 148 
prescription  for  Chinese  action,  but  it  was  the  view  held  by  the  leaders 
of  the  Cultural  Revolution.  It  was  assumed  that  the  success  of  socialism  in 
China,  to  be  guaranteed  and  demonstrated,  by  the  Cultural  Revolution, 
would  serve  as  the  model  and  stimulus  for  successful  socialist  revolutions 
elsewhere.  A  socialist  China,  as  Mao  hoped,  would  thus  become  the 
"revolutionary  homeland",  replacing  a  morally  bankrupt  Soviet  Union  in 
which  revisionism  at  home  and  expansionism  abroad  were  leading  the  forces 
of  world  revolution  astray.  In  1967,  Mao  not  only  called  China  "the 
political  centre  for  world  revolution"  but  also  proposed  that  it  become 
"the  military  and  technical  centre.  "73 
b)  The  second  influential  factor  was  the  necessity  to  end  the  few 
remaining  contacts  between  the  Russians  and  their  last  Chinese  informants 
and  to  destroy  the  illusions  of  those  Chinese  who  still  placed  hope  in 
the  Soviet  Union. 
c)  Lastly  it  was  useless  for  China  to  preserve  even  the  appearance  of 
organic  unity  with  the  Soviet  Union,  since  the  possibility  of  having  an 
international  Communist  conference  in  the  near  future  could  not  be 
excluded. 
In  commemorating  the  50th  anniversary  of  the  Octber  Revolution,  a  joint 
editorial  appeared  in  the  leading  Chinese  newspapers,  asserting  that  the 
Soviet  Union  had  "changed  its  political  colour  as  a  result  of  the 
usurpation  of  Party  and  state  leadership  by  the  handful  of  top  persons  in 
authority  -(who  are)  taking  the  capitalist  road  within  the  CPSU".  -  The 
language  was  the  same  as  that  used  on  the  home  front  for  the  Cultural 
Revolution.  The  USSR  was  also  said  to  be  becoming  "the  centre  of  modern 
counter-revolutionary  revisionism.  "  The.  Soviet  rulers  were  called  "a  group 
of  despicable  scabs"  who  keep  the  Soviet  people  "under  oppression  and 149 
enslavement.  "  The  Cultural  Revolution  should  thus  be  viewed  as  a  "theory  of 
the  continuation  of  the  revolution  under  the  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat"  and  "not  merely  within  national  bounds";  ,  it  is  "likewise  a 
revolution  of  an  international  oeder.  "  Finally,  the  editorial  expressed 
the  hope  that  "the  genuine  Soviet  Communists  and  the  great  Soviet 
people...  will  not  tolerate  for  long  the  renegade  clique  of  Soviet 
revisionists.  "74 
This  interventionist  tone  was  developed  in  mid-October,  at  the 
conclusion  of  an  Albanian  Party  and  state  delegation  visit  to  China.  The 
two  governments  had  issued  a  joint  communique  expressing  their  confidence 
that  Soviet  Communists  and  the  Soviet  people  would  "launch  a  revolution  to 
overthrow  and  fully  wipe  out  the  renegade  Khrushchev  clique"  headed  by 
Brezhnev  and  Kosygin.  For  its  part  the  first  and  second  plenary  session  of 
the  9th  CCP  Central  Committee  in  their  resolutions  revealing  its  intention 
to  carry  the  struggle  against  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  CPSU  through  to  the 
end.  A  Chinese  pamphlet  on  the  Sino-Soviet  border  incidents  asserted  that 
it  was  impossible  to  have  any  peace  on  the  border  against  Soviet 
revisionism.  '- 
Yet  minimum  inter-state  relations  persisted.  The  commission  on 
navigation  on  the  border  rivers  continued  to  function.  A  civil  aviation 
agreement  was  signed  on  4  April  1966,  and  a  technical  and  scientific  co- 
operation  agreement  on  6  November.  Shipments  of  Soviet  aid  to  North 
Vietnam  through  China  involved  some  co-operation.  However,  the  trade 
turnover  decreased  greatly  during  the  Cultural  Revolution.  In  1967  it 
should  have  been  228,000,000  rubles,  but  in  practice  it  was  only 
96,000,000  rubles  a  decrease  of  2/3  from  .  The  Soviet  Union  dropped  to 
14th  partner  in  Chinese  foreign  trade.  In  1968,  the  turnover  was 150 
86,000,000  rubles,  a  10  per  cent  decrease  from  1967.  In  1969,  it  was  only 
51,000,000  rubles,  the  lowest  since  1949.16 
6.2  Soviet  Denunciation  of  Mao  and  the  Cultural  Revolution 
The  Soviet  reaction  to  the  Cultural  Revolution  was  very  cautious  in  the 
first  few  months.  One  reason  for  this  may  have  been  that  Moscow  was  still 
uncertain  whether  the  volubly  anti-Soviet  Peng  Zhen,  who  was  fighting  hard 
to  retain  his  position,  would  succeed  in  riding  out  the  purges.  When  he  was 
finally  removed  in  mid-May,  there  was  a  notable  change  in  the  tenor  of 
Soviet  propaganda,  which  began  to  call  attention  to  signs  of  serious 
disaffection  within  the  ranks  of  the  CCP.  In  June  the  Soviet  press  began 
publishing  descriptions  of  the  Cultural  Revolution,  "and  in  July,  after  the 
first  US  bombing  of  Hanoi,  the  Soviet  media  resumed  regular  attacks  on 
China  for  the  first  time  since  the  ouster  of  Khrushchev. 
The  summoning  of  the  Hong  Wei  Bing  on  18  August,  apparently  threw  Moscow 
off  stride,  because  eight  days  passed  before  the  press  began  to  report 
it.  '®  But  soon  thereafter,  perhaps  in  the  belief  that  the  chaos  in  China 
might  create  an  opportunity  for  Soviet  intervention,  Soviet  Izvestia 
published  an  extract  from  a  set  of  memoirs  stating  that  the  success  of  the 
CCP  after  the  Japanese  war  was  due  to  the  presence  of  Soviet  troops  in 
Manchuria  in  1945-46.  According  to  this  account,  the  Red  Army  had  protected 
Chinese  Communist  organs  that  were  in  the  process  of  rallying.  popular 
support  and  establishing  democratic  self-government.  The  Soviet  troops  had 
been  fulfilling  their  international  duty  to  the  people  of  China.  19  As 
things  turned  out,  however,  the  intercession  of  the  Hong  Wei  Bing  proved  to 
be  not  at  all  conducive  to  Soviet  intervention,  but  just  the  opposite. 151 
The  Soviet  Party  Central  Committee  declared  at  its  mid-December  plenary 
session  that  the  "anti-Soviet  policy  of  Mao  Zedong  has  entered  a  new, 
dangerous  stage...  The  course  promoted  by  the  present  leaders  of  the  CCP  in 
the  international  arena,  their  policy  with  respect  to  the  socialist 
countries,  their  hostile  campaign  against  our  Party  and  the  Soviet  people 
and  their  splitting  activities  in  the  international  Communist  movement-- 
all  this  has  nothing  in  common  with  Marxism-Leninism..  This  policy  and 
these  actions  damage  the  interests  of  socialism  and  the  international 
workers'  and  liberation  movements  and  the  socialist  gains  of  the  Chinese 
people  themselves  and  objectively  assist  imperialism.  "20  The  USSR  began  to 
take  a  much  tougher  line  on  China  from  that  time  onwards.  But  the  other 
way  round,  the  year  1967  saw  the  climax  of  the  Cultural  Revolution  as  far 
as  its  external  impact  was  concerned.  The  Soviet  embassy  in  Beijing  was 
beseiged  for  several  weeks  in  January,  and  again  in  May  and  August,  by 
great  mobs  of  Hong  Wei  Bing. 
In  January  1967  Leonid  Brezhnev  openly  deplored  the  Cultural  Revolution 
as  a  "great  tragedy  for  all  Communists  in  China".  2'  Thirteen  Soviet 
divisions  were  moved  to  China's  frontiers.  Moscow  began  to  condemn  "Mao  and 
his  group"  by  name  and  called  for  another  international  conference  to 
condemn  the  CCP.  From  February  onwards  the  Soviet  press  published  a  series 
of  fierce  attacks  on  Mao  Zedong  personally  and  his  policies.  The  most 
important  was  a  long  article  condemning  the  Cultural  Revolution  in  Pravda 
on  16  February.  "The  destruction  of  Party  organizations  and  the  persecution 
and  extermination  of  Party  militants  are  now  being  carried  on  under  the 
banner  of  the  'Cultural  Revolution'  by  Mao  Zedong's  shock  troops,  with  the 
support  of  the  army  and  the  security  organs...  One  of  the  principal  aims  of 
the  anti-Soviet  hysteria  they  are  stirring  up  is  to  cut  off  the  Chinese 152 
people  from  authentic  Marxism-Leninism  and  the  experience  of  world 
socialism...  Their  policy  shows  that  to  keep  power  they  are  ready  to 
sacrifice  everything-the  interests  of  socialism,  the  interests  of  their  own 
people,  and  the  interests  of  the  revolution...  "22 
Leopold  Labedz,  editor  of  the  London  monthly  on  Russian  and  East  European 
affairs,  Survey,  noted  that  Soviet  hostility  reached  such  a  pitch  that,  in 
attacking  Maoism,  writers  were  a  fortiori.  castigating  the  whole  Stalinist 
past.  --3  Moscow  Radio  increased  its  Chinese  broadcasts  to  84  hours  a 
week.  Another  station.  Radio  Peace  and  Progress,  which  had  previously 
broadcast  only  in  European  languages,  began  broadcasting  in  Chinese  on  1 
March  1967.  Both  stations  made  violent  attacks  on  Mao  and  his  closest 
supporters,  such  as  Lin  Biao  and  especially  Kang  Sheng  whose  hands  were 
said  to  be  dripping  with  the  blood  of  thousands  of  Communists  whom  he  had 
tortured  and  shot..  During  this  campaign,  correspondents  of 
Izvestia.  Komsomolskaya"Pravda.  and  the  press  agency  Novosti  were  expelled 
from  China.  And  on  6  May  1967  Pravda's  correspondent  in  Beijing  was 
ordered  to  leave  China  within  7  days  on  the  grounds  that  he  had  "slandered 
the  Cultural  Revolution,  the  Chinese  people,  and  Chairman  Mao.  "211  At  the 
same  time,  the  Chinese  Foreign  Ministry  protested  against  the  press 
photograph  ban  which  had  been  announced  by  the  Soviet  authorities  for 
Chinese  correspondents  in  Moscow.  The  journalists  claimed  that  they  had 
been  "savagely  beaten"  and  that  their  cameras  had  been  destroyed  while  they 
were  taking  pictures  of  some  of  the  incidents  in  the  Russian  capital. 
Eventually  the  behaviour  of  both  sides  was  equally  unseemly.  One  Soviet 
writer  compared  Chinese  excesses  to  Trotskyite,  nihilist  and  anarchist 
attitudes:  "In  carrying  out  their  anti-Leninist  line,  the  left-sectarian 
elements,  especially  the  Trotskyites,  -  try  at  various  times  to  utilize  the 153 
immature  stratum  of  young  people  as  a  tool  for  the  struggle  against  the 
Party.  "2S  According  to  another,  there  were  three  objects  of  persecution 
among  the  Chinese  Communists  in  the  Cultural  Revolution:  a)  past  opponents 
of  the  Great  Leap  and  the  People's  Communes;  b)  the  supporters  of  Soviet 
Party  decisions  on  de-Stalinization;  and  c)  the  advocates  of  a  united 
front  with  the'Soviet  Union  against  imperialism.  --6  At  a  joint  session  of 
the  Supreme  Soviets  of  the  USSR  held  on  3-4  November,  Brezhnev  criticized 
"the  ideological  and  political  degradation  of  some  of  the  leaders  of  the 
CCP",  and  declared  that  "the  attitude  of  Mao  Zedong's  group  hampers  co- 
ordinated  assistance  to  Vietnam  from  all  socialist  countries".  27  Conversly 
the  CCP,  describing  the  Kremlin  leaders  as  "renegades",  did  not  send  a 
delegation  to  the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  Bolshevik  revolution  in 
Moscow  in  November  1967.  And  at  a  mass  meeting  in  Beijing  on  6  November, 
Lin  Biao  denounced  the  Soviet  leaders  as  "accomplicies  of  U.  S.  imperialism" 
who  had  betrayed  the  revolution  and  restored  capitalism.  An  editorial  'the 
same  day  in  Renmin  Ribao  described  them  as  "renegades  to  the  October 
Revolution"  and  claimed  that  the  Cultural  Revolution  represented  "the  third 
great  milestone  in  the  history  of  the  development  of  Marxism".  In  this 
atmosphere  even  minor  agreements  and  small  areas  of  co-operation  went  out 
of  the  window.  Both  sides  were  shouting;  neither  was  thinking. 
6.3  The  Soviet  Invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  and  Heightened  Tension 
During  the  night  of  20  August  1968  Soviet  forces  together  with  Polish, 
Hungarian,  East  German  and  Bulgarian  units  invaded  Czechoslovakia  and  put 
an  end  to  the  liberal  regime  of  Alexander  Dubcek,  a  move  which  in  Chinese 
parlance  "unmasked  the  hideous  features  of  the  Soviet  revisionism".  In 
fact,  the  invasion  ruptured  the  socialist  camp,  -for  both  Romania  and 154 
Yugoslavia  (and  of  course  Albania)  protested.  For  his  parts  Zhou  Enlai 
described  the  invasion  as  "the  most  barefaced  and  typical  specimen  of 
fascist  power  politics  played  by  the  Soviet  revisionist  clique  against  its 
so-  called  allies",  and  declared  that  "the  Soviet  revisionist  clique  of 
renegades  has  long  since  degenerated  into  a  gang  of  social-imperialists  and 
social-facists".  29  Albania  automatically  supported  China.  On  13  September 
the  People's  Assembly  at  Tirana  'approved  the  formal  withdrawal  of  Albania 
from  the  Warsaw  Pact  (in  which  it  had  been  inactive  for  years).  Prime 
Minister  Shehu  had  already  indicated  that  Albania  counted  on  China  for  its 
protection.  On  17  September  Mao  Zedong,  Lin  Biao  and  Zhou  Enlai  returned 
the  favour.  "The  seven  hundred  million  Chinese  will  always  and  in  all 
circumstances  be  found  firmly  at  the  side  of  their  brother  people  in 
Albania".  2"'  On  the  same  day  the  Xinhua  news  agiency  announced  that  the 
Foreign  Ministry  had  delivered  a-note  to  the  Soviet  charge  d'affaires,  Yuri 
Razdukov,  protesting  against  Soviet  violations  of  Chinese  airspace  in 
Heilongjiang  province.  Cataloguing  119  violations  of  Chinese  airspace  by 
Soviet  military  aircraft  from  August  1967  to  August  1968,  and  29  during 
August  alone,  the  note  complained  that  these  intrusions  "have  been 
thoroughly  organized  and  planned  by  the  Soviet  government  in  order  to 
support  the  kind  of  atrocious  aggression  already  perpetrated  against 
Czechoslovakia".  34) 
The  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  nevertheless  had  a  major  impact  on  the 
relations  between  China  and  the  Soviet  Union.  From  the  Chinese  point  of 
view,  this  was  a  strong  gesture  that  Moscow  might  do  the  same  thing  to 
Beijing.  At  the  end  of  September,  Zhou  Enlai  calimed  that  Moscow  was 
actually  planning  military  aggression.  He  accused  the  USSR  of  deploying 
military  forces  to  menace  Albania  and'China,  of  acting  to  encircle  China  in L55 
particular  by  massing  troops  along  the  Sino-Soviet  and  Sino-Mongol 
frontiers.  He  warned  that  such  action  would  have  no  effect  on  the  Chinese 
and  Albanian  peoples,  "who  are  armed  with  Marxism-Leninism".  31 
In  order  to  justify  the  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia,  Brezhnev  laid  down 
the  doctrine  of  "limited  sovereignty"  while  addressing  the  Polish  United 
Workers'  Party  Congress  on  12  November.  He  declared  that  when  internal 
developments  in  a  Communist  country  endangered  "the  socialist  community  as 
a  whole",  other  Communist  countries  were  justified  in  intervening.  Such  a 
step,  he  added,  "may  be  taken  only  in  case  of  direct  actions  by  the 
enemies  of  socialism  within  a  country  and  outside  it,  actions  threatening 
the  common  interests  of  the  socialist  camp".  3 
This  so-called  Brezhnev  Doctrine  was  strongly  denounced  by  the  Chinese 
presumably  because  it  could  be  used  to  justify  Soviet  intervention  in 
China.  Lin  Biao  commented  on  1  April  1969  in  his  report  to  the  Ninth 
Congress  of  the  CCP:  "In  order  to  justify  its  aggression  and  plunder,  the 
Soviet  revisionist  renegade  clique  trumpets  the  so-called  theory  of 
'limited  sovereignty',  the  theory  of  'international  dictatorship'  and  the 
theory  of  'socialist  community'.  What  does  all  this  stuff  mean?  It  means 
that  your  sovereignty  is  'limited'.  while  his  is  unlimited.  You  won't  obey 
him?  He  will  exercise  'international  dictatorship'  over  you-dictatorship 
over  the  people  of  other  countries,  in  order  to  form  the  'socialist 
community'  ruled  by  the  new  tsars...  "33  Lin  Biao  also  pointed  out  that: 
"China  has  drawn  a  'clear  line  between  itself  on  the  one  hand  and 
U.  S.  imperialism  and  Soviet  revisionism  on  the  other.  "z"4  These  two  were  now 
equally  China's  enemies.  In  fact,  the  essence  of  this  principle  was  written 
into  the  new  Party  Constitution. 
The  World  Conference  of  Communist  and  Workers'  Parties,  held  in  Moscow 156 
from  5  to  17  Tune  1969,  three  months  after  the  armed  clashes  on  the  Ussuri 
River  and  six  weeks  afer  the  Ninth  Congress  of  the  CCP,  was  a  partial 
failure  for  the  Soviet  Union  in  terms  of  its  relations  with  China. 
Yugoslavia,  Albania,  Cuba,  North  Vietnam  and  North  Korea  did  not  attend 
Brezhnev  reproached  the  Chinese  for  their  armed  provocations,  their 
territorial  claims,  their  appeals  to  the  Soviet  people  to  rebel  against 
their  government,  their  rejection  of  "scientific  communism",  and  their 
pretension  to  impose  the  thought  of  Mao  Zedong  on  the  whole  world.  He  had 
the  backing  of  the  French  and  Polish  Communists,  but  the  Italians  and  the 
Romanians,  who  supported  equal  rights  for  all  Parties  with  no  central 
leadership,  opposed  him.  The  final  resolution  did  not  condemn  China.  Mao's 
remark  on  the  Soviet  effort  was  that  "the  Soviet  revisionist  clique  is  like 
a  notorious  prostitute  who  insists  on  having  a  monument  erected  to  her 
chastity".  3s 
Nevertheless,  Brezhnev  utilized  the  conference  to  suggest,  an  Asian 
collective  security  pact.  To  the  Chinese  its  meaning  was  plain.  The  USSR 
intended  to  step  into  Southeast  Asia,  into  every,  territory  or  base  which 
the  United  States  would  vacate  in  its  withdrawal.  "This  so-called 
collective  security  pact  is  only  an  anti-Chinese  military  alliance,  but  it 
will  not  disturb  a  hair  on  our  heads",  Mao  said  later;  but  in  talks  with 
Asian  heads  of  state  from  Thailand  and  the  Philippines,  Zhou  Enlai  and  Deng 
Xiaoping,  had  warned  them  to  be  careful,  "when  they  repelled  the  wolf 
from  the  front  gate,  not  to  let  the  tiger  in  the  back  door".  China's  policy 
of  opposing  any  hegemony  in  the  region  would  be  introduced. 157 
6.4  The  Frontier  Confrontation 
The  boundary  question  between  the  PRC  and  the  USSR  has  been  a  very 
complicated  problem  which  has  occupied  a  most  important  position  in  the 
Sino-Soviet  relationship. 
The  Sino-Soviet  frontier,  at  7,300  kilometers  one  of  the  longest 
frontiers  in  the  world,  falls  into  two  sections:  a)  the  Western,  which 
divides  the  Chinese  province  of  Xinjiang  from  the  Soviet  Central  Asian 
Republics  of  Tajikistan,  Kirghizia  and  Kazakhstan;  and  b)  the  Eastern, 
which  divides  the  North-Eastern  provinces  of  China  from  Siberia.  From  the 
18th  century  onwards  the  Russian  frontier  in  Central  Asia  was  pushed 
steadily  eastwards  from  Lake  Bulkhash,  and  large  areas  formerly  under 
Chinese  control  were  annexed  in  1864  and  1881.  In  the  Far  East  the  Treaty 
of  Aigun  (1858),  which  was  imposed  by  the  Tsarist  Government  at  a  time 
when  China  had  been  weakened  by  a  war  with  Britain  and  France,  gave  Russia 
sovereignty  over  230,000  square  miles  north  of  the  Amur  River 
(Heilongjiang)  and  placed  150,000  square  miles  east  of  the  Ussuri  River 
under  joint  Sino-Russian  control.  The  Treaty  of  Beijing  (1860)  incorporated 
the  territory  east  of  the  Ussuri  into  the  Russian  empire.  -  After  the 
October  Revolution,  the  Soviet  government  proclaimed  on  27  September  1920 
that  it  "declares  null  and  void  all  the  treaties  concluded  with  China  by 
the  former  governments  of  Russia,  renounces  all  seizure  of  Chinese 
territory  and  all  Russian  concessions  in  China,  and  restores  to  China, 
without  any  compensation  and  for  ever  all  that  had  been  predatorily  seized 
from  her  by  the  Tsar's  Government  and  the  Russian  bourgeoisie.  "a"  But  this 
promise  was  not  fulfilled  and  a  host  of  problems  was  stored  up  for  the 
future. 
From  the  founding  of  the  People's  Republic  until  1960  the  frontiers 158 
between  the  two  countries  were  quiet  and  peaceful.  The  problems  only  came 
to  the  fore  as  relations  between  the  two  countries  deteriorated.  Subsequent 
statements  from  both  Soviet  and  Chinese  sources  revealed  that  border 
incidents  began  in  July  1960,  after  the  withdrawal  of  Soviet  technicians 
from  China.  In  his  political  report  of  1  April  1969  to  the  Ninth  Congress 
of.  the  CCP,  Lin  Biao  stated  that  China  had  proposed  to  the  Soviet 
government  as  early  as  22  August  and  21  September  1960  that  negotiations 
should  be  held  to  settle  the  boundary  question.  A  Soviet  government 
statement  on  21  September  1963  merely  alleged  that  the  "Chinese 
servicemen  and  civilians  have  since  1960  been  systematically  violating  the 
Soviet  border.  In  the  single  year  1960  over  5,000  violations  of  the  Soviet 
border  from  the  Chinese  side  were  recorded.  " 
Boundary  negotiations  began  in  Beijing  on  25  February  1964,  but  were 
suspended  in  the  following  May  without  any  progress  having  been  achieved. 
The  Chinese  Foreign  Minister,  Marshal  Chen  Yi,  then  accused  the  USSR  on  20 
May  1966  of  provoking  over,  5,000  incidents  between  July  1960  and  the  end  of 
1965,  of  concentrating  troops  on  the  Chinese  frontiers  and  of  conducting 
military  manoeuvres  which  presupposed  that  China  was  the  enemy.  *®  Western 
sources  estimated  the  number  of  troops  on  the  Sino-Soviet-border  before 
1969  at  nearly  40  Soviet  divisions,  many  of  which  had  been  transferred 
from  Eastern  Europe-` 
More  serious  armed  clashes  between  Soviet  and  Chinese  frontier  troops, 
causing  considerable  loss  of  life,  occurred  on  2  and  15  March  1969  on  the 
Island  in  the  River  Ussuri  called  Zhen  Bao,  just  a  few  weeks  before  the 
Ninth  Congress  of  the  CCP.  '°  The  USSR  claimed  the  Island  as  part  of  its 
territory,  an  assertion  which  contradicted  both  international  law  and  the 
unequal  treaty  of  1860.  The  latter  named  the  River  Ussuri  as  the  border 159 
between  the  two  states;  and  according  to  regulations  for  safeguarding  the 
state  frontiers  of  the  USSR  on  navigable  boundary  rivers  the  border  should 
run  along  the  center  of  the  main  channel,  or  the  Thalweg  of  the  river 
according  to  international  usage.  Zhen  Bao  Island  hugs  the  Chinese  bank, 
separated  by  a  rivulet  in  the  dry'  part  of  the  year.  Moscow  insisted  that 
the  frontier  was  actually  on  the  Chinese  bank,  denying  free  use  of  the 
inside  of  the  river  to  the  Chinese.  41  Moscow  then  started  an  astonishing 
diplomatic  offensive.  Ambassadors  and  Ministers  of  the  USSR  approached 
their  counterparts  in  Washington,  Paris,  Bonn  and  London  to  discuss  the 
enormous  danger  to  the  world  of  China's  "chaotic  internal  situation"  and 
suggested  concerted  measures  against  it.  The  Yellow  Peril  myth  was  once 
again  resurrected. 
On  21  March,  Soviet  Premier  Kosygin  telephoned  Beijing,  urgently 
demanding  to  speak  to  Premier  Zhou.  42  He  was  told  that  there  were  normal 
diplomatic  channels  through  which  he  could  communicate.  This  strange  call 
the  Chinese  regarded  as  part  of  the  usual  ploy  of  trying  to'create  panic. 
They  concluded  that  it  had  a  purpose,  to  negotiate  something,  somewhere. 
And  indeed  on  29  March  Moscow  suggested  that  negotiations  on  the  frontier, 
interrupted  since  1964,  be  resumed.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  Kosygin  was 
more  moderate  than  Brezhnev,  several  possible  causes  for  the  Soviet  shift 
can  be  suggested.  As  observed  by  Harold  Hinton,  '0  one  possibility  was 
that  the  Ussuri  clashes  may  have  let  Beijing  obstruct  transhipments  of 
Soviet  military  equipment  bound  for  North  Vietnam,  prompting  Hanoi  to  urge 
Moscow  to  ease  its  pressure  on  China.  Another  consideration  may  have  been 
the  fact  that  many  in  the  international  Communist  movement  were  plainly 
dismayed  by  the  spectacle  of  the  two  major  socialist  states  engaging  in 
armed  conflict  and  were  calling  -on  both  sides  to  compose  their 160 
differences.  44  At  the  same  time,  the  crisis  with  China  was  not  having  the 
effect  Moscow  had  hoped  it  would  toward  inducing  the  Warsaw  Pact  powers  -- 
perticularly  Romania  --  to  tighten  their  security  ties  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  But  most  important  factor  of  all,  was  probably  Moscow's  concern 
about  the  possibility  that  excessive  Soviet  pressure  might  impel  the 
Chinese  to  seek  a  rapprochement  with  the  United  States.  No  doubt  the 
Kremlin  leaders  took  due  note,  in  this  connection,  of  an  important  speech 
delivered  by  US  Senator  Edward  M.  Kennedy  in  New  York  on  20  March. 
Advocating  better  Sino-American  relations,  Kennedy  stated;  "Even  now  the 
deterioration  of  Sino-Soviet  relations  in  the  wake  of  the  recent  border 
clashes  may  be  stimulating  at  least  some  of  the  leaders  in  Beijing  to  re- 
evaluate  their  posture  toward  the  United  States  and  provides  us  with  an 
extraordinary  opportunity  to  break  the  bonds  of  distrust.  ' 
From  Mao's  point  of  view,  the  USSR  leaders  were  trying  to  divert 
attention  from  their  real  target,  Europe,  so  that  they  could  push  forward 
the  European  security  conference,  a  primary  aim  since  1954.  There  were 
hard-liners  in  the  Red  Army  who  looked  with  suspicion  at  disarmament,  even 
just  as  a  word,  and  felt  Brezhnev's  policy  of  detente  was  a  danger  to 
the  Soviet  Union.  By  the  action  against  China,  Brezhnev  could  smother  the 
dissidents  and  proceed  with  detente.  "They  shout  towards  the  East  but  their 
target  is  the  West".  46  Mao  concluded.  He  was  also  convinced  that  the  USSR 
was  now  baring  its  paper  tiger  teeth  and  demonstrating  itself  a  young 
imperialism  on  the  offensive.  The  United  States  would  find  it  difficult  in 
the  future  to  defend  what  it  had;  for  the  USSR  would  now  compete 
everywhere,  including  in  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans.  The  USSR,  in  his 
eyes,  was  now  the  chief  enemy  of  the  peoples  of  the  world,  even  more 
cunning  than  the  U.  S.  His  views  forced  a  great  change  in  China's  foreign 161 
policy  in  the  1970s. 
"Prepare  for  war,  prepare  for  natural  calamities,  and  do  everything  for 
the  people".  47  "Dig  tunnels  deep,  store  grain  everywhere,  and  never  seek 
hegemony"  .  413  China  began  its  preparation  for  the  defence  of  the  country  by 
building  well-stocked  undergroud  cities  and  storing  'grain.  Negotiations 
regarding  the  contested  Sino-Soviet  border  were  still  frozen.  The  Chinese 
replied  affirmatively  to  the  March-April  letters  from  Moscow.  The  Soviet 
Foreign  Ministry  followed  up  its  note  of  29  March  with  another  two  weeks 
later  proposing  specifically  that  talks  be  re-opened  in  Moscow  on  15  April 
or  "at  another  time  in  the  near  future  convenient  to  the  Chinese  side.  149 
The  Chinese  reply  on  24  May  insisted  that  Beijing's  policy  sought  the 
avoidance  of  border  incidents  and  the  settlement  of  the  dispute  through 
diplomatic  negotiation.  It  charged  the  Soviet  Union  with  responsibility  for 
the  March  clashes  on  Zhen  Bao  Island,  as  well  as  for  other  border 
incidents;  reaffirmed  that  Zhen  Bao  was  Chinese  territory  even  under  the 
unequal  treaty  of  1860;  and  claimed  that  the  Soviet  Union  had  illegally 
occupied  territory  beyond  what  China  had  been  forced  to  cede  under  the 
19th-century  treaties,  not  only  in  the  Amur-Ussuri  region  but  also  in  the 
Pamirs,  on  the  western  frontier  of  Xinjiang  Province.  The  note  went  on  to 
propose  a  cease-fire  along  the  "line  of  actual  control"  on  the  Amur-Ussuri 
frontier,  and  demanded  the  annulment  in  principle  of  the  unequal  treaties 
as  a  preliminary  to  a  comprehensive  border  settlement,  but  agreed  that 
these  treaties  might  be  taken  as  the  basis  of  a  settlement  subject  to 
"necessary  adjustments  at  individual  places".  The  note  rejected  the  15 
April  date  already  past)  proposed  by  Moscow  and  suggested  that  another 
date  be  agreed  upon  through  diplomatic  channels.  5°  In  content  if  not  in 
tone  the  letter  was  surprisingly  concilatory,  especially  with  respect  to 162 
the  treaties. 
The  Soviet  answer  was  sent  to  Beijing  on  13  June.  It  insisted  on  the 
continued  validity  of  the  treaties,  reasserted  the  Soviet  right  to 
ownership  of  Zhen  Bao  Island  and  again  alleged  Chinese  responsibility  for 
all  the  border  incidents.  Nevertheless,  it  welcomed  Beijing's  agreement  in 
principle  to  the  holding  of  border  talks  and  proposed  that  they  should  be 
resumed  in  Moscow  within  two  to  three  months.  s'  This,  too,  was  a  basically 
conciliatory  reply.  But  with  the  three  months  deadline  set  by  Moscow  for 
the  start  of  border  talks  approaching  and  no  reply  yet  forthcoming  from 
Beijing,  -  Pravda  on  28  August  published  an  editorial  denouncing  in  unusually 
strong  language  China's  "adventurist  course"  both  on  the  Sino-Soviet  border 
and  in  world  affairs  generally.  After  noting  Beijing's  failure  to  reply  and 
reiterating  Moscow's  desire  for  peace  and  good  relations,  the  editorial 
went  on  to  warn  that  "if  war  were  to  break  out  under  present  conditions, 
with  the  armaments,  lethal  weapons,  and  modern  means  of  delivery  that  now 
exist,  not  a  single  continent  would  remain  unaffected.  "  Fairly  obviously, 
Moscow  wanted  to  cow  Beijing  into  thinking  that  the  countries  stood  on  the 
brink  not  just  of  war,  but  of  nuclear  war.  S2 
However  Moscow  too,  found  itself  under  certain  restraining  pressures. 
One  was  its  own  concern  --  stimulated  by  the  action  of  the  Nixon 
administration  in  improving  relations  with  China  --  that  excessive  Soviet 
pressure  might  drive  China  into  the  arms  of  the  United  States.  The 
situation  was  clarified  for  Kosygin  in  September.  On  his  return  trip  from 
Hanoi,  he  stopped  in  Beijing  on  11  September  for  a  two-hour  meeting  with 
Zhou  which  was  described  as  "frank".  Zhou  made  three  proposals  as  the 
basis  for  negotiations.  There  should  be  an  agreement  on  the  maintenance  of 
the  status  quo  on  the  border  and  the  prevention  of  conflicts;  this  would  be 163 
achieved  by  withdrawing  the  forces  on  both  sides  to  an  agreed  distance  from 
the  boundary  in  the  disputed  areas.  The  agreement  should  include 
provision  for  non-use  of  force  and  for  mutual  non-aggression,  with  no  radio 
and  press  attacks  while  negotiations  proceeded;  the  talks  would  be  taken 
up  at  deputy  ministerial  level.  The  Chinese  would  accept  the  unequal 
treaties  as  the  basis  for  setting  the  boundary  question. 
Despite  the  understanding  Kosygin  apparently  reached  with  Zhou  at 
Beijing  airport,  attacks  against  China  resumed  as  soon  as  he  got  back  to 
Moscow.  The  USSR  still  refused  to  agree  to  the  maintenance  of  the  status 
quo  on  the  border,  and  it  looked  as  if  no  progress  whatsoever  was  likely  to 
be  made.  However,  on  7  October,  China  officially  stated  that  differences 
on  questions  of  principle  "should  not  prevent  China  and  the  Soviet  Union 
from  maintaining  normal  state  relations  on  the  basis  of  the  five  principles 
of  peaceful  coexistence",  r,  2  and  that  "there  is  no  reason  whatsoever  for 
China  and  the  Soviet  Union  to  go  to  war  over  the  boundary  question".  64  The 
Soviet  warning  had  been  heeded.  But  up  to  a  point  the  conciliatory  Chinese 
approach  had  also  been  recognised. 
Talks  on  the  Sino-Soviet  border  question  opened  in  Beijing  on  20  October, 
at  the  level  of  deputy  minister.  This  marked  the  begining  of  a  new  phase  in 
the  history  of  relations  between  the  two  countries,  which  continued  until 
about  1982. 164 
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VII. 
Tension  and  Watershed  in  the  1970s 
Of  the  two  imperialist  superpowers.  the  Soviet  Union  is  the  more 
ferocious,  the  more  reckless,  the  more  treacherous,  and  the  most 
dangerous  source  of  world  war.  ' 
Renmin  ribao 
In  1970  when  Mao  Zedong  looked  at  the  state  of  the  world,  two 
main  possibilities  presented  themselves:  either  a  world  war  would 
eventually  occur,  and  in  its  wake  would  bring  revolution  to  many 
countries,  or  the  rising  tide  of  world  revolution  would  stop  world  war. 
"The  danger  of  a  new  world  war  still  exists,  and  the  people  of  all 
.  countries  must  get  prepared".  2  Why  did  Mao  come  to  such  a  conclusion? 
Would  the  border  clashes  lead  to  a  Sino-Soviet  war  and  a  wider  antagonism? 
It  was  not  easy  to  answer.  these  questions  at  the  time.  From  the  Western 
point  of  view,  the  Soviet  Union,  had  begun  its  detente  with  the  West  in  the 
late  1960s  and  early  1970s.  In  February  1969  the  Soviet  Union  and  West 
Germany  signed  an  agreement  'whereby  the  latter  was  to  supply  'a  wide-' 
diameter  pipeline  for  the  transmission  of  natural  gas  from  Siberia  to 
Central  Europe,  -and  on  12  August  1970  the'treaty  of  Moscow  was  concluded 
between  the  two  countries.  With  this  and  other  treaties  concluded  between 
West  Germany  and  East  European  countries,  the  Soviet  Union  had  built  close 
diplomatic  and  economic  ties  with  West  Germany  and  through  it  with  Western 
Europe.  :3 
Meanwhile  it  had  also  achieved  a  rough  parity  with  the  United  States  in 168 
nuclear  weapons  and  felt  able  to  negotiate  from  a  position  of  strength.  It 
became  ever  more  positive  in  its  efforts  to  establish  a  closer  relationship 
with  the  United  States.  The  first  round  of  the  Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
Talks  (SALT)  was  held  in  November-December  1969.4  A  treaty  on  the 
exploitation  of  minerals  in  the  sea-bed  was  'concluded  between  the  United 
States,  the  Soviet  Union  and  Britain  in  February  1971.6  The  second  round  of 
the  SALT  talks  in  November  1972  produced  an  agreement  sanctioning  a 
superiority  in  Soviet  ICBMs  and  not  affecting  weapons  in  which  the  United 
States  was  superior  --  notably  strategic  bombers,  U.  S.  carrier-based 
strike  aircraft  and  MIRVs.  6  Tension  between  the  two  super-powers  relaxed 
considerably. 
Fron  a  Western  point  of  view  that  was  all  very  satisfactory.  Viewed  from 
Beijing,  however,  the  situation  was  quite  different.  The  Sino-Soviet  cold 
war  continued.  Detente  in  the  West  made  war  in  the  East  all  the  more 
likely.  Or'  the  other  hand.  the  possibility  of  military  attack  by  the 
Soviet  Union  on  China  made  an  enormous  contribution  to  the  normalization 
of  Sino-American  relations,  to  the  likelihood  ultimately  of  detente  in  the 
East. 
7.1  The  Development  of  Soviet  Policy  Towards  China 
There  were  several  tendencies  dominating  Soviet  policy  towards  China  in 
the  1970s,  all  of  them  contained  within  the  Brezhnev  Doctrine.  There  were 
five  theoretical  strands:. 
1)  There  was  the  theory  of  "limited  sovereignty".  Safeguarding  the 
interests  of  socialism  meant  safeguarding  "supreme  sovereignty.  "  This  gave 
the  Soviet  Union  the  right  to  determine  the  destiny  of  other  socialist 
countries  "including  the  destiny  of  its  sovereignty.  "'D 169 
2)  The  theory  of  the  "international  dictatorship"  gave  the  Soviet  Union 
the  right  to  "render  military  aid  to  a  fraternal  country  to  do  away  with 
the  threat  to  the  socialist  system.  19  The  Soviet  view  was  that:  "Lenin  had 
foreseen"  that  historical  development  would  "transform  the  dictatorship  of 
the  preletariat  from  a  national  into  international  one,  capable  of 
decisively  influencing  the  entire  world  politics.  "'° 
3)  Under  the  theory  of  the  "socialist  community",  the  Soviet  Union 
insisted  that  "the  community  of  socialist  states  is  an  inseparable  whole"'' 
and  that  "united  action"'2  by  and  behalf  of  the  socialist  community  must 
be  strengthened. 
4)  The  theory  of  the  "international  division  of  labour"  was  already  well 
developed  in  Eastern  Europe.  But  it  was  now  to  be  extended  to  other 
countries  in  Asia,  Africa,  and  Latin  America  which  could  not  "secure  the 
establishment  of  an  independent  national  economy,  "13  unless  they  co- 
operated  with  the  Soviet  Union.  "This  co-operation  enables  the  Soviet  Union 
to  make  better  use  of  the  international  division  of  labour.  "',  ' 
5)  Finally,  there  was  the  more  blatant  theory  that  "our  interests  are 
involved"  which-meant  that  "the  Soviet  Union  which,  as  a  major  world  power, 
has  extensive  international  contacts,  cannot  regard  passively  events  that, 
though  they  might  be  territorially  remote.  nevertheless  have  a  bearing  on 
our  security  and  the  security  of  our  friends.  "'s  A  corollarly  of  this  was 
that  "Ships  of  the  Soviet  Navy"  will  "sail.  ..  wherever  it  is  required  by 
the  interests  of  our  country's  security.  "16 
In  practice,  the  transfer  of  the  Brezhnev  Doctrine  from  West  to  East  took 
the  form  of  promoting  an  "Asian  collective  security  system",  aimed  at 
isolating  China.  The  means  to  this  end  were  to  build  up  Soviet  armed 
forces  in  the  Far  East  in  exercising  pressure  on  China  and  Japan  and L70 
compete  with  the  United  States  in  the  Pacific;  to  use  the  "Cuba  of  Asia', 
Vietnam,  as  a  base  for  seizing  the  whole  of  Indochina  so  edging  the  United 
States  out  of  the  continent.  The  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  in  1979 
wasa  specific  late  example  of  the  policy,  not  only  of  imposing  Soviet 
control  in  one  country,  but  also  of  furthering  the  long-term  strategic 
objective  of  expanding  Soviet  power  in  South  Asia  and  the  Middle  East. 
A)  The  Struggle  for  an  Asian  Collective  Security  System 
As  early  as  June  1969,  the  Soviet  Union  proposed  an  Asian  Collective 
Security  System  at  an  international  conference  of  Communist  Parties  in 
Moscow.  Brezhnev  fiercely  attacked  the  Chinese  in  his  report  to  the 
conference:  "The  combination  of  the  Chinese  leaders'  political  adventurism 
with  the  atmosphere  of  war  hysteria  continually  incited  by  them..  .  -'is 
introducing  new  elements  into  the  international  situation  which  we  have  no 
right  to  ignore".  "  Subsequently  the  Soviet  Union  redoubled  its  efforts  to 
obtain  influence  over  Japan;  to  establish  control  in  the  Indian  Ocean;  to 
obtain  a  footing  in  the  Philippines,  Hong  Kong,  and  Singapore;  and  to 
encircle  China.  By  concluding  with  one  Asian  country  after  another  treaties 
of  "peace  and  friendship"  or  of  "good-neighbourliness  and  co-operation", 
hoped  to  build  up  a  network  and  eventually  bring  these  countries  together 
into  a  collective  security  system.  Already  in  May  of  that  year  Kosygin  had 
visited  India,  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan;  in  early  June,  Mikhail  Kapitsa, 
head  of  the  Southeast  Asia  department  of  the  Soviet  Foreign  Ministry  and  a 
specialist  on  Chinese  affairs,  made  a  tour  of  Burma,  Malaysia,  Singapore, 
Laos,  Kampuchea  and  Thailand;  and  in  July-August,  a  high-level  Soviet 
delegation  visited  Indonesia.  Altogether  in  1969  there  were  more  than 
twenty  Soviet  delegations  which  went  on  "conspiratorial  missions"  to 171 
various  Asian  countries.  1e 
In  1971  the  treaty  of  friendship  and  alliance  with  India  permitted  the 
latter  to  realize  its  ambition  of  smashing  Pakistan  by  leading  a  military 
expedition  against  it  under  the  pretext  of  liberating  Bangladesh.  79  Yet  the 
Asian  collective  security  system  itself  met  with  little  success  among  Asian 
countries  desirous  of  good  relations  with  China.  In  a  speech  delivered  in 
March  1972  Brezhnev  declared  that  "collective  security  in  Asia  must...  be 
based  on  such  principles  as  renunciation  of  the  use  of  force  in  relations 
between  states,  respect  for  the  sovereignty  and  the  inviolability  of 
borders,  non-interference  in  internal  affairs,  and  the  broad  development  of 
economic  and  other  forms  of  co-operation  on  the  basis  of  full  equality  and 
mutual  advantage".  20  This  made  the  Soviet  aim  sound  less  like  a  single 
multilateral  security  pact,  and  more  like  a  network  of  bilateral  treaties 
wiht  individual  Asian  countries  on  the  model  of,  the  Soviet-Indian 
treaty.  21''  It  would  seem  to  follow  from  this  that  the  Soviet  Union 
intended  to  try  to  win  converts  first  among  the  Southeast  Asian  countries 
on  the  strength  of  the  Indian  example.  and  only  later  extend  its  efforts 
to  East  and  Northeast  Asia.  ' 
Although  Moscow  had  stated  that  China  could  become  a  full  member  of,  its 
new  system,  what  this  really  appears  to  have  meant  was  that  once  the  rest 
of  the  system  was  in  being.  China  would  be  invited  to  join  on  terms  set  by 
the  Soviet  Union  and  its  partners.  Meantime  the  Soviet-Union  would  fill 
the  vacuum  left  by  the  gradual  reduction  of  American  and  British  military 
forces  in  the  area.  It  would  also  deal  with  the  possible  emergence  of  new 
alliances  or  groupings  of  Asian  nations  under  Japenese  leadership.  All 
this  can  be  deduced  -from  Soviet  behaviour,  and  was  certainly  assumed  by 
Mao.  But  it  remained  more  of  a  hope  than  a  reality. t72 
B)  The  Soviet  Military  Build-up  in  the  Far  East 
In  1973  the  Americans  at  last  extricated  themselves  from  the  disastrous 
war  in  Vietnam.  They  now  stood  weakened,  their  military  reputation 
tarnished,  and  with  a  new  mood  of  isolationism  overtaking  the  majority  of 
their  people.  From  then  on,  it  seemed  a  good  time  for  the  Soviet  Union 
to  build  up  its  global  strength,  especially  its  strategic  forces  deployed 
against  the  United  States,  and  those  confronting  China. 
By  the  end  of  the  1970s,  according  to  Chinese  sources,  22  (see  table  I) 
about  one-fourth  of  the  total  Soviet  ground  forces,  numbering  more  than  one 
million  men  in  53  divisions  with  14,000  tanks,  were  stationed  in  the  Far 
East.  The  Soviet  Pacific  fleet  had  become  the  largest  of  the  four  Soviet 
fleets,  with  about  90  major  surface  combatants,  135  submarines,  and  a  naval 
infantry  division  with  amphibious  craft.  And  one  fourth  of  the  Soviet-Air 
Force  was  also  in  the  Far  East  with  about  2,200  combat  aircraft.  Both  naval 
and  airforce  Backfire  bombers  had  been  deployed  to  the  region,  along  with 
other  modern  aircraft,  including  Tu-16  bombers  sited  at  Cam  Ranh  Bay  in 
Vietnam.  The  most  significant  development  in  the  late  1970s  was  a 
substantial  increase  in  Soviet  strategic  forces  in  the  Asian-Pacific" 
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region.  There  were  two  categories  of  such  weapons.  The  first  was  more  than  :" 
170  SS-20  intermediate-range  ballistic  -  missiles  (IRBMS)  mainly  deployed 
along  near  the  northern  Mogolian  border  and  capable  of  reaching  China,  " 
Japan  and  much  of  Southeast  Asia;  the  second  was  submarine  lauched 
ballistic  missiles  . (SLBMS),  some  30  per  cent  of  the  Soviet  total  being  in 
the  Pacific.  23 
The  naval  base  of  Cam  Ranh  Bay  permitted  the  Soviet  Union  to  extend  its 
naval  operations  some  2,000  nautical  miles  south  from  Vladivostok.  Soviet 
warship  operating  from  Cam  Ranh  Bay  could  easily  track  American,  Japanese, GROWING  SOVIET  MILITARY  PRESENCE  IN  THE  EAST 
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West  European  and  other  vessels'  using  the  Straits  of  Malacca  and  the 
South  China  sea.  It  is  significant,  too,  that  the  Soviet  High  Command 
overcame  to  a  large  extent,  its  traditional  logistic  difficulties  in 
Siberia  and  the  Far  East.  Siberia  was  built  up  into  an  important  strategic 
base.  In  1970  it  "  produced  only  31  million  tons  of  oil.  In  1974,  however, 
crude  oil  production  passed  the  116  million  mark.  And  by  1980  Siberian  oil 
made  up  fifty  per  cent  of  the  total  annual  production.  2  With  the 
construction  of  more  refineries,  Soviet  forces  in  the  Far-East  had  ample 
energy  supplies  within  easy  reach.  Industrialization  in  Soviet  Central 
Asia  also  vastly  increased  Soviet  war  capabilities  on  the  southeast 
frontier.  It  has  been  estimated  that  the  Eastern  part  of  the  USSR  came  to 
produce  thirty-two  per  cent  of  the  total  Soviet  output  of  tanks,  almost 
forty  per  cent  of  planes,  and  twenty  five  per  cent  of  warships,  -  and  a 
quantity  of  guided  missiles.  25 
The  result  was  that  in  the  course  of  the  1970s  the  Soviet  Union  developed 
an  absolute  capacity  to  menace  China  from  the  east  and  south  as  well  as 
from  the  north.  While  the  major  land  threat  remained  concentrated  in  the 
.` 
north,  naval  and  missile  assaults  could  be  launched  from  around  the  eastern" 
and  southern  peripheries.  Thus,  the  Soviet  Union'  became  China's  most 
dangerous  enemy. 
C)  Intervention  - 
The  aggression  against  Kampuchea  by  Vietnam,  instigated  and  supported  by 
the  Soviet  Union,  was  an  important  part  of  the  global  strategy  employed  by 
Moscow.  Indochina  is  midway  between  the  Indian  and  the  Pacific  Oceans.  With 
a  foothold  in  Indochina,  the  Soviet  Union  could  send  its  own  fleet  through 
the  Straits  of  Malacca  into  the  Indian  Ocean  and  on  to  the  Red  sea  and  the 
Horn  of  Africa.  It  could  thus  seize-  control  of  the  important  oil  routes 174 
to  Western  Europe,  the  United  States  and  Japan,  and  also  complete  the 
strategic  encirclement  of  China.  In  the  days  of  the  tsars  Russia  worked 
desperately  to  gain  access  to  the  Indian  Ocean.  The  Soviet  Union  was  both 
more  ambitious  than  the  old  tsars  and  more  successful. 
From  the  mid  1970s,  the  Soviet  Union  began  to  increase  its  support  for 
Vietnam.  In  1975  it  concluded  two  economic  agreements  --  one  for  aid  and 
trade  during  1976,  the  other  a  long-term  pact  to  coincide  with  Hanoi's 
five-year  plan  for  1976-1980.  Under  these  agreements,  further  co-operation 
was  to  include  co-ordination  of  economic  development  plans,  the  dispatch 
of  Soviet  experts  and  continued  training  of  specialists  in  economic, 
technical  and  cultural  affairs.  As  worked  out  in  January  1976,  Soviet 
economic  and  technical  assistance  was  to  involve  the  construction  of  some 
40  projects.  These  included  a  hydropower  engineering  project  on  the  Black 
River  with  a  hydroelectric  station  of  1.7  million  kilowatt  capacity,  a 
thermal  power  station  of  500.000-kilowatt  capacity,  a  coal  mine  with  an 
annual  production  of  2.4  million  tons,  and  expansion  of  the  Lao  Cai  mine  to 
an  annual  production  of  1.5  million  tons  of  anthracite.  There  was  also  to 
be  assistance  in  prospecting  for  oil.  gas,  and  minerals,  and  in 
developing  agriculture.  This  technical  aid  is  to  be  "on  a  compensation 
basis".  27  In  1978  Vietnam  became  the  10th  full  member  of  the  Council  for  ￿A  ;. 
"' 
Mutual  Economic.  Assistance.  On  3  November  1978  a  treaty  of  friendship',  and 
co-operation  was  signed  which  Brezhnev  termed  one  of  "special  significance" 
in  view  of  China's  alleged  military  pressure.  19  About  a  month  later, 
Vietnam  began  a  full-scale  invasion  of  Campuchea.  During  the  invasion, 
Moscow  gave  Hanoi  3  million  U.  S.  dollars  each  day  in  military  and  economic 
aid.  29  Where  the  military  and  the  money  went,  so  did  political  power. 
The  military  occupation  of  Afghanistan  was  a  new  move  taken  by  the L75 
Kremlin  partly  to  outflank  China  and  partly  as  a  move  in  its  so-called 
"dumb-bell  strategy"  --  its  attempt  to  build  a  power  base  with  the  Pacific 
at  one  end  and  the  Indian  Ocean  at  the  other  and  the  Straits  of  Malacca  as 
the  bar  joining  them. 
Afghanistan  figured  high  in  Moscow's  overall  strategy  because  it  adjoins 
Iran  and  Pakistan  and  is  only  some  400  kilometres  from  the  Indian  Ocean. 
From  Afghanistan,  Soviet  military  aircraft  were  within  striking  distance 
of  the  strategic  Hormuz  Strait  at  the  entrance  to  the  Persian  Gulf. 
Afghanistan  also  links  West  and  South  Asia  and  its  strategic  attraction  was 
considerably  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the  region  about  the  Persian  Gulf  is 
the  world's  chief  oil-producing  centre.  3° 
The  invasion  marked  a  major  escalation  in  the  USSR's  long  and  persistent 
interest.  Direct  involvement  had  increased  substantially  after  April  1978 
when  a  coalition  of  the  two  rival  factions  of  the  People's  Democratic  Party 
overthrew  the  Mohamad  Daoud  regime,  and  it  became  greater  still  as  the 
internal  situation  began  to  deteriorate  seriously.  Finally,  on  27  December 
1979,  Soviet  forces  entered  the  country  starting  the  first  direct 
invasion  of  a  Third  World  country  by  a  major  power  since  World  War  Two. 
Brezhnev's  justification  in  a  speech  in  February  1980  was  in  part  that 
"American  and  Chinese  interference  in  Afghanistan  was  a  threat  not  only  to 
that  country,  but  to  the  USSR  as  well",  the  kind  of  "united  action"  he 
could  not  accept.  -21  But  as  more  observers  than  the  Chinese  recognised,  the 
Soviet  Union  was  also  to  close  the  Asian  net  against  China. 
7.2  China's  Reaction 
One  of  Mao's  main  reflections  on  Soviet  policy  in  this  period  was  that 
"The  ghost  of  John  Foster  Dulles  has  now  taken  residence  in  the  Kremlin".  32 »ý..  _.  :.  T, 
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A  somewhat  more  elaborate  view  was  presented  in  an  editorial  in  Renmin 
Ribao  which  noted  that,  "U.  S  imperialism  is  finding  the  going  tougher  and 
tougher  from  year  to  year...  and  its  endeavours  abroad  have  failed  to  turn 
the  tide,  a  fact  which  shows  all  the  characteristics  of  a  decline...  By 
contrast,  the  Soviet  Union  seems  more  potent  and  active:  in  the  all-round 
striving  for  hegemony;  Soviet  revisionist  social  imperialism  shows  a 
greater  momentum  and  extends  its  reach  further  and  wider  than  the  U.  S.  "" 
It  was  reflections  such  as  these  that,  in  the  face  of  'Soviet 
aggressiveness,  helped  to  promote  a  reappraisal  of  Chinese  foreign  policy. 
Throughout  the  1970s,  therefore,  China  sought  an  external  policy  that 
would:  a)  reduce  or  eliminate  the  threat  of  a  two  front  war  against  more 
than  one  major  enemy;  b>  more  generally  deflect  political  and  military  it 
by  preventing  encirclement  by  its  enemies;  c)  form  the  broadest  possible 
international  united  front  against,  hegemonism;  and,  d)  gain  'stable, 
diversified-  foreign  trade  partners  and  sources  of  advanced  technology, 
thereby  enabling  it  to  modernize  its  economy. 
In  order  to  realize  these  objectives  it  was  felt  that  China  should:  a) 
first  of  all  clearly  identify  its  principal  enemy  at  any  particular  time 
and  then  focus  its  main  efforts  on  combating  that  enemy;  b)  in  confronting 
an  enemy,  it  should  be  flexible  and  exploit  all  possible  contradictions, 
and  it  should  try  to  form  a  united  front  that  would  include  all  who 
could  be  induced  to  oppose  the  main  enemy;  c)  in  doing  this,  however,  it 
should  maintain  a  strong  posture  of  self-reliance  and  not  compromise  its 
essential  "independence  and  initiative". 
In  all  the  circumstances  of  the  1970s  it  did  not  take  long  for  the 
Chinese  to  deduce  which  was  their  principal  enemy:  "of  the  two  imperialist 
superpowers,  the  Soviet  Union  is  the  more  ferocious,  the  more  reckless,  the 177 
more  treacherous,  and  the  most  dangerous  source  of  world  war.  "34  The 
editorial  department  of  Renmin  Ribao  explained  the  reasoning  behind  this 
in  a  long  article  entitled  "Chairman  Mao's  Theory  of  the  Differentiation 
of  the  Three  Worlds  is  a  Major  Contribution  to  Marxism-Leninsim".  The 
article  pointed  out: 
"First,  Soviet  social-imperialism  is  an  imperialist  force  following  on  the 
heels  of  the  United  States  and  is  therefore  more  aggressive  and 
adventurous...  'Without  a  compulsory  redivision  of  colonies  the  new 
imperialist  countries  cannot  obtain  the  privileges  enjoyed  by  the  old  (and 
weaker)  ones.  '  To  attain  world  supremacy.  Soviet  social-imperialism  has  to 
try  and  grab  areas  under  U.  S.  control...  This  is  a  historical  law 
independent  of  man's  will.  " 
"Second,  because  comparatively  speaking  Soviet  social-imperialism  is 
inferior  in  economic  strength,  it  must  rely  chiefly  on  its  military  power 
and  threats  of  war  in  order  to  expand.  " 
"Third,  the  Soviet  bureaucratic-monopoly  capitalist  group  has  transformed 
a  highly  centralized  socialist  state-owned  economy  into  a  state-monopoly 
capitalist  economy  without  its  equal  in  any  other  imperialist  country  and 
has  transformed  a  state  under  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  into  a 
state  under  fascist  dictatorship.  It  is  therefore  easier  for  Soviet  social- 
imperialism  to  put  the  entire  economy  on  a  military  footing  and  militarize 
the  whole  state  apparatus.  " 
"Fourth,  Soviet  social-imperialism  has  come  into  being  as  a  result  of  the 
degeneration  of  the  first  socialist  country  in  the  world.  Therefore  it  can 
exploit  Lenin's  prestige  and  flaunt  the  banner  of  'socialism'  to  bluff  and 
deceive  people  everywhere...  This  duplicity  peculiar  to  the  Soviet  Union, 
increases  the  special  danger  it  poses  as  an  imperialist  super-power.  "3b 178 
Given  reasoning  like  this,  Chinese  policy  was  bound  to  change  from  the 
early  1970s  onwards.  One  of  the  first  moves  was  on  China's  National  Dayýin 
1970  when  Edgar  Snow  and  his  wife  stood  next  to  Mao  Zedong  on  the  Tien  An 
Men  rostrum.  That  was  a  "signal"  to  the  United  States,  which  had  already 
taken  moderate  steps  to  relax  Sino-American  relations.  In  a  long  interview 
with  Snow  in  December,  Mao  expressed  his  willingmess  to  talk  with  Nixon, 
since  he  was  the  American  -people's  choice,  either  as  a  tourist  or  as 
President.  Nixon  was  welcome  to  visit  China.  Snow's  report  was  published 
in  Life  on  30  April  1971.  Also  in  April  a  young  American  ping-pong  team 
came  to  Beijing  --  the  first  break  in  the  wall  of  containment  so  long 
erected  around  China.  Then,  in  July,  Henry  Kissinger  visited  Zhou  Enlai  to 
prepare  Nixon's  visit  for  February  1972. 
Meanwhile,  the  Chinese  people  were  being  educated  about  the  diplomatic 
change  which  would  occur.  Mao's  On  Policy  and  On  the  Chungking  Negotiations 
from  1940  and  1945  were  reprinted.  31-  They  contained  the  essence  of  Mao's 
thinking  on  how  to  deal  with  various  enemy  contradictions  and  how  to  grasp 
the  opportunities  offered  by  any  struggle,  loopholes,  or  contradictions  in 
a  flexible  manner.  Nixon's  arrival  in  Beijing  on  21  February  was  the  most 
fully  televised,  commented  on,  and  watched  event  in  the  world  at  that  time. 
On  the  very  afternoon  of  his  arrival  he  met  Mao.  Mao  was  frank  about  the 
backwardness  of  China  and  the  difficulties  of  the  Cultural  Revolution.  He 
showed  that  he  knew  the  Americans  were  no  fools;  they  were  fully  aware  of 
China's  weaknesses  but  also  in  need  of  China. 
The  improvement  of  Sino-American  relations  had  already  brought 
considerable  benifits.  First,  was  the  admission  of  China  to  the  United 
Nations  in  October  1971,  then  the  relaxation  of  its  connections  with 
Japan  and  other  Asian  countries.  During  the  period  1970-1972  China 179 
established  diplomatic  relations  with  38  capitalist  countries  and  greatly 
strengthened  its  international  position.  And  following  Nixon's  visit  much 
greater  advantages  beckoned. 
In  Asia,  China  had  assailed  the  Soviet  proposal  for  a  collective 
security  system  as  a  scheme  to  make  Asians  fight  Asians  and  as  a  cover  for 
Soviet  "aggression  and  expansion"  against  Asian  countries. 
But  the  most  dramatic  official  statement  of  China's  changing  world  view 
was  contained  in  Deng  Xiaoping's  1974  UN  speech,  which  analyzed  global 
affairs  in  terms  of  three  worlds.  Deng  identified  the  two  superpowers  as 
the  First  World,  the  other  industrialized  nations  as  the  Second,  and  the 
developing  nations  in  Asia,  Africa,  and  Latin  America  as  the  Third.  The 
most  important  struggle  he  asserted,  was  that  between  the-Third  World  and 
the  First,  with  support  for  the  Third  to  be  expected  from  the  Second  on 
some  issues.  Deng  also  proclaimed  publicly  what  had  been  implicit  in 
China's  policy  for  some  time  --  namely,  that  in  the  Chinese  view  the 
socialist  camp  no  longer  existed  and  that  China  belonged  to  the  Third 
World.  3' 
Chairman  Mao's  death  in  September  1976  was  followed  by  a  period  of 
reaction  and  consolidation  in  which  foreign  policy  changes  had  to  hang 
fire.  The  Chinese  Government's  main  task  of  modernizing  the  Chinese  economy 
required  political  stability  and  Party  discipline.  But  after  the  so-called 
"Gang  of  Four",  Zhang  Chunqiao,  Jiang  Qing,  Tao  Wenyuan  and  Wang  Hongwen, 
were  arrested  on  charges  of  plotting  to  seize  power  attention  could  once 
more  be  devoted  to  external  relations.  One  of  Mao's  initiatives  was  the 
first  to  be  realigned.  On  1  January  1979  China  was  able  to  normalize  its 
relations  with  the  United  States  and  thereafter  it  made  significant 
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Otherwise  it  was  Mao's  conservatism  that  persisted.  Despite  the  old  man'  s 
death  his  hostile  approach  to  the  Soviet  Union  was  continued.  On  I 
November  1977,  'Renmin  Ribao  devoted  itself  exclusively  to  Mao's  "theory  of 
the  three  worlds".  The  authors'  Judgments  were  remarkably  unequivocal,  and 
marked  the  continuing  -  triumph  of  Mao's  ideas:  "The  Soviet  Union  has 
decided  to  employ  an  offensive  strategy  to  encroach  on  the  sovereignty  of 
all  other  countries  and  weaken  and  supplant  U.  S.  influence  in  all  parts  of 
the  world....  The  people  of  China  and  the  people  of  the  rest  of  the  world 
firmly  demand  peace  and  oppose  a  new  world  war.  Faced  with  the  gigantic 
task  of  speeding  up  our  socialist  construction...  we  in  China  urgently  need 
a  long  period  of  peace.  .. 
"3ý 
At  about  the  same  time,  Chinese  writers  began  to  define  the  dangers  seen 
in  Soviet  policy.  Soviet  pressure  against  vulnerable  locatons  in  Asia  and 
Africa  was  interpreted  as  "striving  to  create  a  situation  to  outflank 
Europe  from  the  north  and  the  south".  -'""  Equally  less  direct  but  more 
effective  means  of  subjugating  the  West  would  focus  on  the  supply  lines  to 
Europe,  control  of  which  would  "put  a  stranglehold  on  Western  Europe",.  So 
construed,  Soviet  involvement  in  Angola,  Zaire,  and  the  Horn  of  Africa 
-  .. 
is 
.. 
could  still  be  treated  as  "peripheral  wars"  in  the  larger  Soviet-American 
competition  "for  hegemony  over  Europe  and  the  world  as  a  whole".  "O  But  this 
was  in  addition  to  the  central  threat'  to  China.  With  the  dramatic 
escalation  of  Sino-Vietnamese  tension  in  the  spring  of  1978,  Renmin  Ribao 
'declared  on  17  June  that.  "It  is  now  very  clear  that  the  Soviet  leadership 
is  the  main  instigator  and  backer  of  the  anti-China  and  anti-Chinese 
campaign  in  Vietnam"  .  41 
And  so  the  anti-Soviet  rhetoric  continued.  But  Moscow  now  had 
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exponent  of  "regional  hegemony".  All  such  activity  was  simply  one  component 
of  Moscow's  "global  strategic  plan...  to  outflank  and  encircle  Europe  and 
isolate  the  United  States"  and  "to  encircle  China".  42  On  I  October 
Hong  i  offered  an  extended  analysis  of  the  Soviet  Union's  use  of  Cuban 
mercenaries  in  Africa  and  of  "new  agents  patterned  after  Cuba"  in  Asia: 
"For  the  sake  of  preparing  for  a  new  world  war,  the  Soviet  Union  is 
G 
presently  searching  around  for  peripheral  areas.  It  uses  every  means  to 
scramble  for  strategic  bases,  passages,  and  materials  in  the  areas  of  the 
Middle  East,  Africa,  and  even  in  Asia....  The  intensification  of  the  Soviet 
expansionist  offensive  has  accelerated  the  danger  of  a  new  world  war.  "  But 
the  article  added  a  new  twist:  "The  international  united  front  against 
hegemony...  is  consolidating  and  expanding.  The  one  who  is  plotting 
encirclement  is  now  being  encircled  by  the  people  of  the  world.  113  Thus, 
with  no  particular  fanfare,  the  need  to  combat  the  "hegemonism"  of  the 
"less  dangerous  superpower"  had  been  removed  from  the  tasks  of  the 
international  united  front.  Indeed,  the  United  States  had  almost  seemed 
recruited  into  the  front.  Another  article  in  Renmin  Ribao  noted  , 
the 
danger  of  Soviet  actions  to  the  American  positions  in  the  Pacific",  and 
even  to  the  unhappy  consequences  for  China  of  any  weakening  of  the'United 
States.  48  One  fundamental  element  in  the  gradual  non-alignment  of  China',  s 
foreign  policy  was  the  virtual  revolution  after  1978  in  its  domestic 
policy.  The  re-emergence  and  dominance  of  Deng  Xiaoping  led  to  the  drive 
for  all-round  modernizaton  of  the  country  by  the  year  2000.  Hence,  China 
began  to  move  in  the  direction  of  greater  openness  towards  the  outside 
world,  economically  and  culturally,  and  also  politically  in  the  sense  of 
international  contacts.  In  this  context,  Beijing  showed  an  inclination  not 
only  to  adopt  Western-style  rewards  and  incentives  for  its  workers  but  also 182 
to  seek  technology  from  the  capitalist  West  and  Japan  in  order  to  develop 
the  PRC's  vast  underlying  sources  of  economic  power.  It  even  went  as  far 
as  to  consider  accepting  long-term  loans,  once  anathema  in  Chinese 
thinking,  and  to  send  students  to  the  West  for  training.  This  fundamental 
policy  change  of  seeking  closer  ties  with  the  capitalist  West  and  Japan 
received  the  formal  endorsment  of  the  Central  Committee  at  its  Third 
Plenary  Session  in  December  1978.46 
In  late  January  and  early  February  1979,  Deng  Xiaoping  paid  a  visit  to 
the  United  States.  By  March,  an  exchange  of  ambassadors  had  taken  place 
between  the  PRC  and  the  USA.  On  the  eve  of  his  visit  Deng  had  told  an 
interviewer  from  Timethat  "after  setting  up  a  relationship  between  China, 
Japan  and  America,  we  must  further  develop  the  relationship  in  a  deepening 
way.  If  we  really  want  to  be  able  to  place  curbs  on  the  polar  bear  (the 
USSR),  the  only  realist  thing  for  us  is  to  unite.  If  we  only  depend  on  the 
strength 
öf4  the  U.  S..  it  is  not  enough.  If  we  only  depend  on  the  strength 
of  Europe,  it  is  not  enough.  We  are  an  insignificant,  poor  country,  but  if 
we  unite,  well,  we  will  then  carry  weight.  "  He  had  then  gone  on  to  say 
that  "it  is  not  only  of  interest  to  China  but  also  of  great  significance  to 
world  peace,  world  security,  and  world  stability  that  there  be  friendly 
relations  between  China,  America,  Europe  and  Japan.  147  During  his  actual 
tour  of  the  United  States,  he  reiterated  these  arguments  for  a  Sino- 
Japenese-American  alliance  against  the  Soviet  Union,  and  he  took  every 
opportunity  to  denounce  its  "hegemonic  aspirations.  "  On  his  way  back  to 
Beijing,  he  stopped  over  in  Tokyo  for  two  days  of  talks  with  Japenese 
leaders,  during  which  he  delivered  the  same  message. 
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if  it,  materialized  in  an  alliance  organized  by  Beijing,  Washington,  and 
Tokyo.  While  it  treated  the  establishment  of  diplomatic  ties  between  the 
United  States  and  China  as  the  culmination  of  a  long  process  which  it  could 
not  do  other  than  support,  it  was  against  an  entente  directed  against 
itself.  Thus,  the  opening  of  official  relations  between  Washington  and 
Beijing  strengthened  the  already  pronouced  Sino-Soviet  rivalry  in  Asia. 
The  result  was  most  apparent  in  Indochina.  III 
Immediately  after  Hanoi  and  Phnom  Penh  began  to  publicize  their  border 
conflict,  Moscow  threw  its  support  openly  behind  Vietnam.  China  tried 
briefly  to  mediate,  but  by  February  it  had  come  out  firmly  on  the  side  of 
Kampuchea.  On  many  occasions,  Chinese  officials  stressed  the  consistency  of 
Chinese  opposition  to  "regional  hegemony.  "  They  pointed  out,  for  example, 
that  China  had  supported  Pakistan  against  India,  which  had  aspired  to  a 
South  Asian  confederation  of  itself  and  its  smaller  neighbors  like 
Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka,  Burma,  Nepal,  and  later  Bangladash.  Moreover,  they 
contended  that  the  USSR  endorsed  regional  hegemony  in  the  context  of-its 
drive  for  global  hegemony  and  that  it  therefore  backed  Vietnam  against.  the 
"weaker  party".  This  interpretation  of  the  Indochina  conflict.  of  course, 
ran  directly  counter  to  that  offered  by  the  Soviet  Union 
, 
and  Vietnam. 
During  his  visit  to  the  United  States,  therefore,  Deng  signaled  Chinese 
intentions  to  move  against  Vietnam  by  hinting  that  China  might  have  to 
take  some  "punitive  measures"  against  the  Hanoi  government.  At  a  meeting 
with  US  Senators,  he  was  even  fairly  explicit  on  the  subject.  He  indicated 
that  "sometimes  we  may  be  forced  to  do  something  that  we  do  not  want  to 
do.  `,  a 
On  17  February  the  Chinese  government  announced  that  its  troops  had 184 
struck  along  much  of  the  600-mile  Sino-Vietnamese  border,  because  "the 
Vietnamese  authorities  have  of  late  continually  sent  armed  forces  to 
encroach  on  Chinese  territory"  and  thereby  threatened  "seriously  the  peace 
and  security  of  China".  49  However  much  truth  there  was  in  this  explanation, 
one  objective  was  certianly  to  contain  the  Soviet  Union.  Sino-Vietnamese 
hostilities  lasted  for  17  days.  On  5  March  the  Chinese  government  announced 
that  it  was  withdrawing  its  troops  from  Vietnam. 
There  are  disagreements  about  the  success  or  otherwise  of  this  venture. 
One  certainty  is  that  China  did  succeed  in  demonstrating  that  any  country 
which  signed  a  friendship  treaty  with  Moscow  was  not  necessarily  immune 
to  military  action  by  other  major  powers.  Despite  Moscow's  admonitions 
about  the  consequences  of  any  punitive  measures  against  Vietnam,  China 
succeeded  in  carrying  out  its  intervention  without  provoking  Soviet 
retaliation.  Indeed,  the  Soviet  Union  showed  itself  to  be  a  "paper  tiger". 
As  a  result,  Beijing  proved  to  any  doubters  in  Southeast  Asia  that  the  USSR 
did  not  have  unlimited  capacities  to  exercise  hegemony  in  the  area,  even  in 
co-operation  with  a  "proxy".  Nevertheless,  the  Chinese  did  not  succeed  in 
getting  the  Vietnamese  to  withdraw  from  Kampuchea.  The  Soviet  Union  was  one 
thing,  a  little  power  was  another. 
"7.3  Pervasiveness  and  Complications  of  the  Border  Issue 
For  a  decade  after  the  spring  and  summer  fighting  in  1969  the  broder 
issue  continued  to  plague  Sino-Soviet  relations.  Negotiations  were  on  and 
off.  The  one  certainty  was  that  there  was  no  settlement.  In  many  ways  the 
state  of  play  over  the  borders  was  a  kind  of  temperature  chart.  When 
feelings  ran  high  on  other  matters,  there  were  no  meetings  -  and  vice 
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The  border  negotiations  opened  in  Beijing  on  20  October  1969  as  a  result 
of  the  Kosygin-Zhou  airport  meeting  on  11  September.  The  two  premiers  had 
reached  a  measure  of  agreement,  $°  but  the  Chinese  were  then  inclined  to  be 
critical.  51  The  negotiations  continued  with  a  number  of  breaks  until  July 
1973.  At  one  session  on  15  January  1971  Moscow  offered  a  new  non- 
aggression  treaty  or  a  reaffirmation  of  the  old  1950  treaty,  and  it  also 
accepted  the  Thalweg  as  the  frontier  in  navigable  rivers  and  the  mid- 
channel  in  non-navigable  ones.  It  expressed  its  willingness  to  hand  over  to 
China  certain  islands  in  the  Ussuri  including  Zhenbao,  but  not  the  disputed 
Black  Bear  Island  close  to  Khabarovsk.  None  of  this  was  acceptable  to  the 
Chinese,  who  considered  that  all  that  was  required  was  an  intermediate 
agreement  to  maintain  the  status  quo  on  the  borders  and  Moscow's 
acceptance  of  their  concept  of  disputed  areas.  They  had  complained  before 
about  lack  of  restraint  on  Soviet  military  forces62  and  about  Soviet 
unwillingness  to  recognise  the  frontier  treaties  as  unequal.  6° 
On  20  March  1972  Ilychev,  a  Deputy  Foreign  Minister  who  replaced 
Kuznetsov  on  15  August  1970  as  leader  of  the  Soviet  delegation,  returned 
to  Beijing  to  re-open  the  talks  bearing  an  important  new  concession:  namely 
Moscow's  willingness  to  establish  relations  with  China  an  the  basis  of  the 
five  principles  of  peaceful  co-existence,  thus  accepting  the  ideological 
stance  enunciated  in  November  1970.  This  was  clearly  intended  to  achieve 
some  results  between  Nixon's  February  1972  visit  to  Beijing  and  his 
projected  May  visit  to  Moscow,  leaving  Brezhnev  better  situated  to  deal 
with  him.  Further  Soviet  offers  on  14  June  1973  (the  day  before  Brezhnev 
met  Nixon  in  Washington)  and  25  June  1974  (48  hours  before  Nixon's  final 
visit  to  Moscow)  were  also  meant  to  influence  relations  with  the  United 
States.  The  1973  package  included.  long-term  trade  agreements,  the 186 
resumption  of  deliveries  of  industrial  equipment,  scientific,  medical,  ad 
other  exchanges,  and  the  signature  of  a  non-aggression  pact.  China 
rejected  both  proposals  as  pointless  unless  the  Soviet  Union  carried  out 
the  agreement  of  11  September  1969,  to  withdraw  its  forces  from  disputed 
areas.  If  China  proved  very  stubborn,  the  Soviet  Union  was  a  little  so. 
Instead  of  pulling  back  its  forces  in  the  border  regions,  it  reinforced 
them  to  a  total  of  42  divisions  by  1972  and  even  to  53  by  1978  according 
to  some  estimates. 
In  a  message  of  greeting  on  1  October  1974,  on  the  25th  anniversary  of 
the  founding  of  the  PRC,  the  Soviet  government  renewed  its  offer  of  a  non- 
aggression  pact.  The  Chinese  government  replied  in  a  message  of  greetings 
on  the  anniversary  of  the  Russian  Revolution  on  7  November  1974,  repeating 
the  proposal  that  such  a  pact  should  be  accompanied  by  the  withdrawal  of 
all  armed  forces  from  disputed  border  areas.  Brezhnev  rejected  this  on  26 
November  in  a  speech  in  -Ulan  Bator.  the  capital  of  Mongolia:  "Beijing 
declares  outright  that  it  will  agree  to  talks  on  border  questions  only 
after  its  demand  concerning  the  so-called  disputed  areas  is  met.  It,  is 
quite  obvious  that  such  a  position  is  totally  unacceptable,  and  we  reject 
it.  "S`  In  December  the  Chinese  journal  Li  Shi  Yan  flu  reaffirmed  the 
Chinese  position,  asking  the  Soviet  government  among  other  things  to  admit 
that  Russia  had  seized  Chinese  territory  by  force  in  the  19th  and  early 
20th  centuries.  And  so  it  went  on. 
Mao  Zedong's  death  was  greeted  in  Moscow  with  an  almost  total  cessation 
of  polemics  against  China,  and  the  return  of  Ilychev  to  the  negotiating 
table  on  27  November  1976.  He  had  a  meeting  on  28  January  1977  with  Huang 
Hua,  the  Chinese  Foreign  Minister,  but  thereafter  the  talks  were  again 
suspended  sine  die. 
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They  were  resumed  in  1978,  and  despite  ups'ss  and  downs$6  a  session  was 
held  as  late  as  30  November  1979.  However,  following  the  entry  of  Soviet 
military  forces  into  Afganistan  at  the  end  of  December  1979  the  Soviet 
government  had  its  hands  full  and  the  Chinese  government  decided  that  it 
was  inappropriate  to  continue  the  negotiations;  no  further  talks  were 
held  until  October  1982. 
There  were  three  features  worth  noting  about  the  1969-79  negotiations: 
a)  Their  focus  was  whether  there  were  disputed  areas  on  the  Sino- 
Soviet  border.  The  Soviet  Union  flatly  refused  to  acknowledge  that  the 
treaties  relating  to  the  existing  boundary  were  of  an  unequal  nature.  On 
the  contrary,  they  contended  that  these  treaties  had  been  signed  "to 
promote  good-neighbourly  relations.  11657  Secondly,  according  to  Chinese 
sources  the  the  Soviet  government  "insisted  on  a  settlement  of  the  boundary 
question  on  the  basis  of  a  so  called  'historically  formed'  and  'actually 
defended'  line  unrelated  to  these  treaties.  115e  Thirdly,  the  Soviet  Union 
still  stuck  to  its  1964  position  that  there  was  no  territorial  problem 
existing  between  it  and  China,  denying  that  there  were  numerous  disputed 
areas.  Fourthly,  the  Soviet  side  rejected  the  Chinese  proposal  on  the 
disengagement  of  armed  forces  from  the  disputed  areas,  and  on  the 
conclusion  of  an  intermediate  agreement.  To  this  end,  it  denied  that  an 
understanding  had  been  reached  during  the  11  September  1969  summit  between 
the  Premiers  of  the  two  countries. 
For  its  part  the  Chinese  government  advocated  a  clear  distinction 
between  right  and  wrong  on  historical  issues  and  confirmation  that  the 
treaties  were  unequal,  having  been  imposed  on  China  by  tsarist  Russian 
imperialism  when  the  Chinese  and  Russian  people  were  powerless.  Secondly, 
China  maintained  that  "both  sides  should,  in  the  light  of  actual 188 
conditions,  and  taking  these  treaties  as  the  basis,  bring  about  an  all- 
round  settlement  of  the  Sino-Soviet  boundary  question  through  peaceful 
negotiations  and  determine  the  entire  course  of  the  boundary.  "  China  did 
not  want  to  take  back  the  territory  seized  by  tsarist  Russia.  Thirdly,  the 
Chinese  contended  that  either  side  invading  and  ocupying  the  territory  of 
the  other  in  violation  of  these  treaties  must,  in  principle,  return  the 
territory  unconditionally.  But  both  sides  could,  considering  the  interests 
of  the  local  inhabitants,  make  necessary  adjustments  along  the  border 
according  to  the  principles  of  consultation  on  an  equal  footing,  and  of 
mutual  understanding  and  accommodation.  Fourthly,  the  Chinese  government 
held  that  a  new  and  equal  Sino-Soviet  treaty  should  be  signed  to  replace 
the  previous  ones  and  that  the  boundary  line  should  be  surveyed  and 
demarcated  for  this  purpose.  Finally,  the  Chinese  made  it  clear  that  the 
understanding  reached  by  the  Premiers  of  the  two  countries  should  be 
implemented,  and  that  until  an  all-round  settlement  of  the  boundary 
question  was  reached  through  peaceful  negotiations,  the  status  quo  should 
be  maintained,  armed  conflicts  should  be  avoided,  both  armed  forces  should 
withdraw  from  the  frontier  or  refrain  from  crossing  it  and  an  agreement 
to  maintain  the  border  status  quo  shoud  be  signed. 
b)  The  second  feature  to  note  is  that  the  incidents  never  stopped  on 
both  the  Central  Asian  and  Far  Eastern  sectors  of  the  border.  Many  of  them 
were  not  made  public.  Between  1972  and  1977  the  Soviet  Union  absorbed  1,080 
square  miles  in  the  Ili  River  region  of  Western  Xinjiang,  expelling  Kirghiz 
and  Uzbek  herdsmen  and  blocking  access  with  barbed  wire  barriers.  About  20 
areas  along  the  Xinjiang  border  were  in  dispute,  varying  in  size  from  390 
to  11,600  square  miles,  as  the  Russians  moved  into  Chinese  territory 
like  a  silkworm  devouring  a  mulberry  tree  leaf  by  leaf. 189 
On  the  Far  Eastern  section,  a  number  of  clashes  were  reported  by  both 
sides  in  completely  opposed  versions.  There  were  three  major  incidents 
made  public:  the  helicopter  incident  of  1974  in  Xinjiang,  the  Wusuli 
clash  of  1978,  and  the  Tersadi  incident  of  1979. 
The  helicopter  incident  took  place  on  14  March  1974  when  a  Soviet 
military  helicopter  carrying  three  servicemen  flew  70  kilometres  deep  into 
China's  Xinjiang  Uigur  Autonomous  Region  and  made  several  landings  in 
Fiabahe  County.  Chinese  frontier  guards  and  militia  forces  eventually 
succeeded  in  capturing  it  and  its  crew.  "  The  event  was  not  made  public 
until  a  week  later,  when  TASS  bluntly  charged  Beijing  with  acting  contrary 
to  international  practice  by  holding  the  Soviet  crew  and  aircraft.  It 
asserted  that  the  crew  was  on  a  "first  aid"  mission,  sent  to  pick  up  a 
"seriously  ill  serviceman.  i6O  The  helicopter  "encountered  difficult 
meteorological  conditions,  lost  its  bearings  and,  having  used  up  its  fuel 
supply,  made  a  forced  landing  near  the  border  in  PRC  territory.  "6"  Moscow 
also  declared  that  the  crew  "reported  the  situation  by  radio  to  their 
airport,  "  and  that  the  USSR  informed  the  PRC  of  the  incident  as  early  as 
15  March  1974.  sß 
Beijing  of  course  did  not  accept  the  Soviet  explanation  and  reacted 
strongly.  On  23  March  the  Chinese  Vice-Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  -Yu 
Zhan,  summoned  V.  S.  Tolstikov,  the  Soviet  Ambassador,  and  personally 
delivered  a  note  of  protest.  According  to  the  this  the  helicopter  was  an 
MI-4  armed  reconnaissance  craft,  and  thorough  investigations  by  the  Chinese 
showed  that  it  carried  neither  medical  personnel  on  a  "first  aid"  mission. 
nor  any  medicine  or  medical  equipment;  instead,  it  carried  arms  and 
ammunition  and  reconnaissance  equipment.  The  Chinese  condemned  "Soviet 
authorities"  for  sending  it  "to  intrude  into  China  for  purposes  of 190 
espionage"" 
Moscow  denied  Beijing's  accusation  of  espionage  in  a  note  of  28  March 
1974contending  that  "the  Chinese  side,  deliberately  distorting  the  facts, 
seeks  to  use  the  forced  landing  of  the  Soviet  helicopter  to  aggravate  an 
atmosphere  of  hostility  towards  the  USSR  and  further  to  exacerbate 
Soviet-Chinese  relations.  111554  Because  the  crew  remained  in  Chinese  hands, 
the  Soviet  government  escalated  its  diplomatic  pressure  in  the  following 
months.  In  a  declaration  of  2  May  it  insisted  on  the  immediate  return  of 
the  crew  and  helicopter  and  stated  that  "if  the  Chinese  side  intends  to 
detain  the  helicopter  and  its  crew  even  further  and  make  a  mockery  of  the 
Soviet  people,  it  thereby  assumes  full  responsibility  for  the  inevitable 
consequences  of  such  a  provocative  action.  "yF 
The  incident  remained  unresolved  for  nearly  two  years  until  its 
unexpected  ending  on  27  December  1975  both  the  crew  and  the  craft  were 
returned.  Some  international  observers  considered  that  the  Chinese  decision 
to  end  the  incident  in  this  manner  was  a  tactical  manoeuvre  to  ease  the 
strained  Sino-Soviet  relations  against  the  background  of  a  coming 
succession  period  in  China  and  on  the  eve  of  the  25th  Soviet  Party 
Congress. 
The  Wusuli  incident  of  9  May  1978  involved  18  Soviet  armed  motorboats, 
another  military  helicopter  and  about  30  Soviet  troops  who  penetrated  as 
far  as  4  kilometres  into  China's  side  of  the  border  in  the  lower  part  of 
the  Wusuli  River.  They  chased  and  tried  to  round  up  Chinese  inhabitants, 
shooting  continually  and  wounding  a  number  of  them.,  "-  The  incident  became 
public  on  11  May,  when  the  Chinese  delivered  a  note  of  protest  to  the 
Soviet  government.  67 
The  border  clash  of  16  July  1979  took  place  in  the  Tersadi  areas,  Taching 191 
County,  Xinjiang  Uigur  Autonomous  Region,  involving  shooting,  wounding  and 
killing.  Immediately  after  the  incident,  the  Soviet  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs  informed  the  Chinese  Embassy  that:  "Four  armed  Chinese  servicemen 
violated  the  border  and  intruded  into  Soviet  territory  for  a  distance  of 
one  kilometre;  as  a  result  of  a  clash  with  a  Soviet  border  detail,  one  of 
the  Chinese  violators...  was  killed  and  a  second  was  wounded  and  is  now 
undergoing  treatment  in  the  USSR.  15e  It  was  not  until  seven  days  later  that 
the  Chinese  presented  their  description  of  the  incident  in  an  official 
note;  "...  Twenty-odd  fully  armed  Soviet  frontier  soldiers  lying  in 
ambush...  fired  at  Li  Baoqin  and  Burumbutug,  who  were  there  to  inspect 
pasture,  a  normal  production  activity.  They  killed  Li  Baoqin  and  wounded 
Burumbutug  on  the  spot  and  then  intruded  into  Chinese  territory  and  carried 
Li  Baiqin's  body  and  the  wounded  Buruubutug  into  Soviet  territory.  1'r-3  Like 
the  other  two  incidents  discussed,  this  was  apparently  initiated  by  the 
Soviet  side  while  all  the  casualties  were  Chinese. 
The  third  feature  of  the  border  was  its  "academic"  aspect.  Both  the  PRC 
and  the  USSR  made  great  efforts  to  explore  the  background  to  the 
establishment  of  their  boundaries  in  order  to  substantiate  their 
respective  positions  through  historical  evidence.  Handicapped  by  the  weight 
of  non-supportive  historical  evidence,  70  Moscow  sought  to  revise  earlier 
publications  which  were  in  contradiction  to  its  present  position.  For 
instance,  Ye.  M.  Zhukov,  Director  of  the  Institute  of  World  History  of  the 
USSR  Academy  of  Science,  stated  in  the  1956  edition  of  the  "History  of 
International  Relations  in  the  Far  East"  that  the  Sino-Russian  Treaty  of 
Nipchu  (Nerchinsk)  of  1689  was  concluded  through  negotiations  based  on 
equality.  In  1973,  however,  when  the  third  edition  of  the  book  appeared 
the  same  editor  and  author  presented.  a  totally  different  conclusion:  the 192 
Treaty  was  an  "unequal  one"  which  tsarist  Russia  signed  under  immense 
military  pressure.  7'  In  1973  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  the  Russian 
Federation  published  a  special  decree  changing  into  Russian  some  of  the  Han 
and  Manchu  names  of  towns  and  cities  in  the  Soviet  Far  East.  72  This  move, 
as  Tsien-hua  Tsui  observed,  "further  demonstrated  the  Kremlin's  strong 
intent  to  eliminate  any  traces  of  prior  Chinese  possession  of  the 
territory.  i73 
The  Chinese  reacted  strongly  to  this  "academic  war".  "A  Short  History  of 
Tsarist  Russia's  Aggression  and  Expansion"  (1975),  and  "Soviet  Fabrication 
and  the  Truth  of  History"  (1977)  were  two  major  books  written  by  Chinese 
scholars  in  the  mid-1970s.  74  The  publication  in  1978  of  a  series  of 
volumes,  "Sha  E  Qin  Hua  Shi"  (History  of  Tsarist  Russia's  Aggression 
Against  China),  indicated  that  the  Chinese  had  become  more  alert  to 
Moscow's  efforts  in  redrawing  the  "picture"  of  Sino-Russian  frontier 
relations. 
In  conclusion,  looking  at  the  decade  as  a  whole,  it  can  be  said  that  the 
Chinese  attitude  toward  the  border  issue  was  consistent.  The  Soviet 
position,  on  the  other  hand,  underwent  a  remarkable  shift.  When  the 
negotiations  first  started  in  1969Moscow  took  a  much  tougher  stance, 
attempting  to  coerce  the  Chinese  into  submission.  75  In  face  of  Beijing's 
unwillingness  to  yield,  Moscow  retreated  from  1970  onwards  to  a  position 
identical  with  its  stand  during  the  abortive  border  talks  of  1964, 
insisting  on  the  status  quo  as  the  basis  for  the  boundary  talks. 
7.4  Atypical  Sino-Soviet  Economic  Relations? 
Sino-Soviet  economic  relations  had  previously  reflected  political 
relations.  Trade  had  steadly  declined.  This  process  had  been  accelerated 193 
by  the  Cultural  Revolution  and  in  1970  the  volume  of  trade  had  fallen  to 
42,000,000  rubles,  the  lowest  in  history.  76 
Oddly  enough,  after  that  date,  however,  trade  expanded:  China's  import 
needs  --  of  capital  goods  in  particular  --  grew  with  the  rapid  expansion  of 
its  economy,  and  although  much  of  its  imports  of  industrial  equipment 
came  from  the  West  and  from  Japan,  commercial  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  were  especially  attractive  because  of  their  barter  basis  and  the 
ease  of  direct  deliveries  by  rail.  The  Soviet  Union  also  stood  in  need  of 
Chinese  consumer  goods  by  barter.  So  a  new  trade  and  payments  agreement 
was  concluded  on  22  November  1970  by  a  Soviet  delegation  headed  by  Ivan 
Grishin,  a  Deputy  Minister  for  Foreign  Trade.  Despite  the  political 
situation  two  further  agreements  were  signed  on  5  August  1971  and  13  June 
1972.  Under  these  agreements  the  value  of  trade  was  planned  to  increase  to 
140,000,000  rubles,  three  times  of  that  of  1970.77  In  fact,  1972,  it 
continued  to  increase  to  211,000,000  rubles.  70 
A  non-stop  air  service  between  Beijing  and  Moscow  was  introduced  on  30 
January  1974  under  an  agreement  signed  the  previous  month.  Before  the  Civil 
Aviation  Administration  of  China  had  served  only  the  Beijing-Irkutsk  line. 
It  was  agreed  that  the  Soviet  and  Chinese  companies  would  each  handle  one 
weekly  direct  flight,  both  using  Ilyushin  62s.  Annual  trade  and  payments 
agreements  were  signed  on  4  July  1974,24  July  1975  ,  and  21  May  1976,  the 
agreed  volume  of  trade  being  about  160,000,000  rubles  in  1974,110,000,000 
rubles  in  1975  and  170,000,000  in  1976,  a  lower  and  fluctuating  level.  The 
percentage  of  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  overall  Chinese  foreign 
trade  decreased  sharply.  It  was  4.2  per  cent  in  1972,2.8  per  cent  in  1973, 
and  2.1  per  cent  in  1974.73'  Further  trade  and  payments  agreements  were 
signed  on  17  April  1978  in  Beijing,  and  6  August  1979  in  Moscow.  The 194 
volume  of  trade  reached  338,000,000  rubles  in  1978,  the  highest  in  the 
1970s,  but  still  no  comparision  with  that  of  1959,  when  it  was 
1,848,000,000  rubles.  °°  The  volume  of  trade  in  1979  was  almost  same  as  that 
of  the  previous  year.  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  were  still  at  daggers 
drawn  over  other  issues;  and  neither  figured  high  in  the  other's  trading 
list.  But  in  their  general  economic  relations  they  both  showed  growing 
glimses  of  good  sense,  lacking  elsewhere. t95 
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VIII 
Steps  Towards  Normalization  (1980-1989) 
End  the  past  and  open  up  the  future.  ' 
Deng  Xiaoping 
Since  the  early  1950s  there  have  been  four  watersheds  in  Sino-Soviet 
relations.  For  most  of  the  1950s  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  People's  Republic 
of  China  were  allied  against  the  West,  especially  against  the  United 
States.  From  the  late  1950s  to  the  late  1960s,  there  was  a  historic  split 
between  them  which  transformed  international  politics.  From  the  late  1960s. 
there  was  to  1970s,  there  was  a  general  confrontation  between  them.  There 
was  also  the  process  of  Sino-American  rapprochement  that,  by  the  end  of 
the  decade.  completly  altered  the  strategic  landscape  and  led  almost  to  an 
incipient  Chinese-American  alliance  against  the  Soviet  Union.  The  fourth, 
stage  in  the  evolution  began  in  the  early  1980s  and  by  the  end  of  the 
+''  decade  Sino-Soviet  normalization  was  almost  realized.  The  process  was 
long,  difficult,  and  complex. 
8.1  Frozen  but  Disturbed  Sino-Soviet  Relations  in  the  Late  1970s  and  the 
Early  1980s 
The  first  round  of  talks  about  normalization  between  the  USSR  and  the  PRC 
took  place  in  Moscow  from  27  September  to  30  November  1979.  At  this 
meeting,  the  Soviet  side  talked  about  what  might  loosely  be  called  a  non- 20L 
aggression  pact.  It  was  a  draft  declaration  of  the  principles  of  mutual 
relations  between  the  USSR  and  the  PRC.  2  This  declaration  called  for  mutual 
recognition  of  the:.  'principles  governing  peaceful  coexistence  --  full 
equality,  mutual  respect  for  state  sovereignty,  respect  of  territorial 
integrity,  non-interference  in  each  other's  internal  affairs,  and  non-use 
of  force  or  the  threat  of  force.  The  Soviet  Union  also  proposed  a 
discontinuation  of  "unfriendly  propaganda"  and  an  expansion  of  trade,  as 
well  as  economic,  scientific,  technological.  cultural,  and  other  peaceful 
exchanges.  China  suggested  four  points  for  the  re-establishment  of  normal 
relations:  3: 
a)  a  unilateral  reduction  of  Soviet  armed  forces  in  the  area  bordering 
on  China; 
b)  a  withdrawal  of  Soviet  forces  from  the  Mongolian  People's  Republic; 
c)  the  discontinuation  of  all  Soviet  support  for  the  Socialist  Republic 
of  Vietnam; 
d)  a  settlement  of  the  long-standing  border  dispute,  talks  on  which  had 
been  going  on  without  result  since  1969. 
Following  the  conclusion  of  the  talks,  the  two  sides  agreed  to  hold  a 
second  round  of  meetings  in  Beijing  in  1980.  But  it-was  postponed  after  the 
Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan,  which  added  another  Chinese  "precondition" 
for  normalization,  namely  the  removal  of  Soviet  troops  from  Afghanistan.  4 
Sino-Soviet  relations  therefore  remained  frozen  but  disturbed.  Deep- 
seated  suspicious  and  fears  still  existed.  s  On  3  April  1979,  the  fifth 
Standing  Committee  of  the  Chinese  People's  Congress  had  passed  a  resolution 
not  to  extend  the  already  long-disregarded  Sino-Soviet  Treaty  of 
Friendship,  Alliance  and  Mutual  Assistance,  a  sign  that  China  was  ready  to 
set  up  a  different  relationship  on  a  more  acceptable  footing.  On  the 202 
following  day  the  Soviet  government  had  attacked  what  it  saw  as  a  hostile 
action,  intended  further  to  sabotage  Sino-Soviet  relations.  It  had  even 
threatened  that  "all  responsibilities...  rest  with  the  Chinese  side"  and 
that  "the  Soviet  Union,  of  course,  will  draw  the  appropriate  conclusion" 
from  China's  action.  6  So  things  had  got  off  to  a  bad  start. 
In  the  early  1980s  the  Soviet  Union  kept  close  tabs  on  Chinese  writings 
about  itself.  According  to  O.  B.  Rakhmanin  (writing  under  the  pseudonym, 
O.  B.  Borisov),  then  First  Deputy  Head  of  the  Central  Committee's  Department 
for  Relations  with  Socialist  and  Workers'  Parties  and  one  of  the  most 
powerful  of  the  China  specialist  in  the  USSR,  Renmin  Ribao  contained  more 
than  3,400  attacks  in  1980  on  the  internal  and  external  policies  of  the 
USSR  and  on  the  the  leaders  of  the  CPSU  and  the  Soviet  government,  while  in 
1981  about  2,500  anti-Soviet  items  were  published.  '  He  also  accused  the 
PRC  of  distributing  fabrications  by  anti-communist  centres  and  of  having 
Maoism  without  Mao.  °  Indications  of  the  -deep  suspicion  of  China  that 
existed  within  the  Soviet  Union  could  be  found  in  an  article  by  M. 
Ukraintsev  published  in  the  Soviet  journal  Far  Eastern  Affairs  after,,, 
Brezhnev's  Tashkent  speech  of  24 
, 
March  1982.  '51.,  It  included  the  following 
accusations: 
a)  The  Chinese  leaders  had  adopted  practices  and  doctrines  that  ran 
"counter  to  the  principles  of  socialism". 
b)  Beijing's  heretical  stance  had  implications  that  transcended  bi- 
lateral  Sino-Soviet  relations  and  threatened  the  ideological  orientation  of 
the  entire  international  revolutionary  movement. 
c)  The  struggle  against  "distortions  of  scientific  socialism"  was 
particularly  important  at  a  time  when  an  alliance  was  shaping  up  between 
anti-Communism  of  the  Reagan  brand,  Beijing's  social  chauvinism,  and 203 
various  brands  of  opportunism  and  right-wing  nationalism. 
d)  The  post-Mao  Chinese  leaders  continued  to  throw  mud  at  the  CPSU. 
e)  Beijing's  recent  "tactical  manoeuvres"  to  improve  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  were  designed  to  "blackmail  the  West  with  threats  of  improving 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union.  " 
f)  The  ideological  reorientation  now  under  way  in  China  was  simply 
designed  to  make  Maoism  more  flexible,  while  retaining  its  essence  of 
Sinified  Marxism  plus  a  hegemonistic  foreign  policy  and  anti-Sovietism. 
g)  The  changes  in  China's  domestic  policy  were  not  significant  and  they 
were  aimed  at  providing  a  more  dependable  basis  for  Beijing's  anti 
Sovietism. 
h)  Under  the  PRC's  Constitution  and  the  rules  of  the  CCP,  struggle 
against  the  Soviet  Union  was  a  constitutional  and  statutory  duty  of  each 
citizen  and  each  Party  member,  reflecting  repeated  Chinese  statements  that 
struggle  against  the  Soviet  Union  would  be  a  long-term  struggle. 
I)  It  was  up  to  China  to  take  initiatives  to  improve  relations;  the 
Soviet  Union  had  done  all  it  could.  This  analysis  was  hardly  friendly  an 
,,. 
promising,  yet  it  came  ,  right  on  the  heels  of  Brezhnev's  supposedly 
conciliatory  Tashkent  speech. 
At  the  same  time,  scepticism  about  the  Soviet  Union  on  the  Chinese  side 
was  equally  deep-rooted.  Indications  of  the  suspicions  and  grievances 
that  the  Chinese  nursed  could  be  found  in  many  contemporary.  Liu  Keming, 
then  Director,  of  the  Institute  of  Soviet  and  East  European  Studies  of  the 
Chinese  Academy  of  Social  Sciences,  summed  up  ten  complaints  about  the 
Soviet  hegemonism  in  an  article  written  in  late  1979:  10 
a)  Soviet  politicians  had  consistently  tried  to  control  China.  In  1958, 
for  example,  they  had  proposed  the  establishment  of  a  joint  fleet  actually 204 
intended  to  control  the  Chinese  coastline.  Thereafter,  they  had  tried  to 
prevent  China  from  acquiring  its  own  nuclear  weapons.  They  had  wanted  to 
turn  China  into  a  "nuclear  protectorate". 
b)  In  recent  years  the  Soviet  Union  had  repeatedly  carried  out 
separatist  activities  in  China's  border  regions.  In  particular,  it  had  had 
an  eye  on  incorporating  Inner  Mongolia. 
c)  It  had  repeatedly  carried  out  subversive  activities  within  against 
China  with  the  aim  of  establishing  a  pro-Soviet  state. 
d)  It  had  obstructed  the  solution  of  the  border  problem  by  refusing  to 
acknowledge  the  existence  of  disputed  areas. 
e)  It  had  greatly  increased  the  number  of  its  troops  along  the  border 
to  strengthen  its  strategic  position  in  Asia  and  to  intimidate  China. 
f)  It  had  lent  its  support  to  Vietnam  to  invade  Kampuchea  and  make 
territorial  claims  against  China. 
g)  To  obstruct  China's  four  mordernizations,  it  had  tried  to  interfere 
in  China's  trade  with  the  West. 
h)  It  had  sought  to  isolate  China  from  Japan,  the  United  States, 
India. 
D  It  had  spread  lies,  and  distortions  about  Chinese  policies,  seeking 
to  slander  China  as  an  aggressive  power,  out  to  provoke  a  world  war.  "".  '. 
In  sum,  Liu's  article  had  concluded  that  the  Soviet  Union  wanted  to  turn 
China  into  a  client  state.  It  had  inherited  the  traditions  of  Russian 
imperialism;  and  it  could  not  now  allow  a  strong  and  powerful  China  at  its 
side  any  more  than  it  could  allow  the  emergence  of  a  powerful  Europe  in 
the  West.  The  conclusion  was  that  China  must  deal  with  the  Soviet  Union 
from  a  position  of  strength. 
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and  its  military  buildup  at  the  time.  According,  to  Western  sources 
Moscow  had  increased  the  number  of  its  modernized  regular  troops  by  the 
end  of  1979  to  46  divisions  along  the  border,  including  6  tank  divisions.  "  "'- 
Japan's  White  Paper  on  Defence  in  1980  estimated  that  the  USSR  had  placed 
one  fourth  of  its  ground  forces  along  the  Sino-Soviet  frontier,  of  which 
about  34  divisions  or  350,000  regulars  were  located  in  the  area  from  Lake 
Baikal  to  Vladivostok.  12  Chinese  sources  indicate  that,  in  adition  to 
Soviet  regular  divisions.  the  Soviet  Union  had  also  built  up  numerous 
missile  units  and  air-force  bases.  Therefore,  the  total  accountable  number 
of  Soviet  forces  in  the  region  may  have  been  well  over  one  million  men.  ' 
The  Soviet  Union  had  undoubtedly  carried  out  a  policy  of  increasing  its 
offensive  capability  in  Asia.  The  Soviet  strategic  military  presence  was 
far  in  excess  of  the  level  needed  for  defence  purposes  (see  table  1).  The 
normalization  process  of  the-  two  countries  was  bound  to  be 
protracted,  difficult  and  complex. 
8.2  Gradual  Appreciation  of  the  Need  for  Change 
In  the  early  1980s,  there  was  also  another  side  to  Sino-Soviet  relations. 
A  heated  discussion  got  under  way  both  in  China  and  in  the  Soviet  Union, 
involving  many  leaders  and  scholars,  about  whether  the  other  country  was 
socialist  or  not.  One  question  that  Arises  is  whether  Soviet  spokesmen 
entertained  different  interpretations  of  Chinese  political  and  economic 
policies  while  attacking  them.  Professor  G.  Rosman  has  explored  this 
possibility  in  his  book  entitled  A  Mirror  for  Socialism.  14  He  has  drawn 
attention  to  differences  of  opinion  between  orthodox  and  reform  groups  in 
the  Soviet  Union  on  a  wide  range  of  issues  pertaining  to  the  social  system 
and  social  classes  in  the  PRC.  He  has.  also  suggested  in  one  of  his  articles 206 
Table  I.  Sino-Soviet  Strategic  Balance.  January  1980'" 
Soviet  Union  China 
------------------------ 
International  1,398  First  true  ICBM  tested  in 
Ballistic  1980;  two  limited  capa- 
Missiles(ICBMs) 
--  --  --  --  -  --  --  --  -  ---  - 
bility  ICBMs  deployed. 
Submarine  Laun- 
---  ---  - 
950 
--  --------------  -  ------- 
None 
ched  Ballistic 
Missiles(SLBMs) 
--  -  ------  -  --------------  --  ---  --- 
Intercontinental-  156 
------  -  --  ---  -  ------- 
None 
Range  Strategic 
Bombers 
-----  -  --  --  -  ----  --------  -  --  -  ----------  - 
Total  Warhesds 
--- 
6,000 
-  ---  -  ------  -  ----------- 
Chinese  missiles  are  "ear 
generational"  and  carry 
only  one  warhead  each. 
Throw-Weight  (ibs.  ) 
--------------- 
11.8  million 
------------------- 
Not  Known 
Intermediate-and 
-------- 
About  40  new  SS20  (each 
-------------------------- 
About  100  ("early 
Medium-Range  with  three  independently  generaional") 
Ballistic  Missiles  targetable  warheads) 
--- 
deployed  against  China 
--  -  ---------- 
Medium-Range 
-- 
About  40  Backfire  super- 
--  ------  -  --  ------ 
Somewhat  over  100  (old 
Bombers  sonic  bombers(half  TU16  and  TU4  planes) 
assigned  to  naval  avi- 
ation)  plus  about  100 
bombers  of'earlier  vintage 
7  7:  7 
Ballistic  Missle  Soviet  antiballistic  No  capability 
Defence  missiles  deployed  around 
Moscow  and  available  at 
central  Asian  test  site 
effective  against 
projected  Chinese  ICBM 
------------------- 
designs. 
-------------------------  -------------------------- 
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that  the  orthodox  and  reform  groups  had  different  outlooks  on  the 
possibility  of  improving  Sino-Soviet  relations  as  well  as  in  their 
assessments  of  the  post-Mao  reforms.  " 
Among  the  Chinese,  there  were  two  opposing  viewpoints  about  the  nature 
of  the  Soviet  system.  The  discussion  began  in  secret  in  late  1979.16 
Quite  a  few  people  raised  the  possibility  that  the  Soviet  Union  was,  not  a 
social-imperialist  country,  but  still  a  socialist  country.  The  discussion 
was  soon  stopped  on  the  orders  of  the  top  leadership.  But  concepts  of 
the  USSR  began  to  change. 
Simultaneously  China  once  again  started  to  adjust  its  foreign  policy  to 
correspond  to  the  changes  in  the  international  situation  and  to  meet  the 
needs  of  the  country's  internal  modernization. 
From  the  early  1970s  to  the  early  1980s,.  China  pursued  a  "united  front" 
policy  so  as  to  find  allies  opposed  to  Soviet  expansionism.  This  policy 
was  based  on  the  following  assumptions: 
a)  Because  the  Soviet  Union  had  tried  consistently  to  impose  its 
control  on  China,  China  had  to  unite  all  possible  forces  against  the  Soviet 
Union 
. 
for  the  sake  of  its  independence  and  future  development. 
b)  Because  a  new  world  war  would  break  out  sooner  or  later  with  the 
Soviet  Union  as  the  aggressor,  China  must  combine  all  possible  forces 
to  resist  Soviet  aggression. 
c)  Although  the  United  States  was  one  of  the  superpowers  contending  for 
world  hegemony,  its  military  strength  could  be  used  to  balance  that  of  the 
Soviet  Union  which  was  more  aggressive. 
Following  through  this  policy,  China  had  made  some  gains  as  well  as  some 
losses.  But  there  were  fallacies  in  the  argumentation  supporting  it: 
a)  It  was  not  objective  to  regard-  the  Soviet  Union  as  the  main  source 208 
of  turmoil  in  the  world.  The  United  States  was  responsible  for  some  of  the 
crises  that  arose,  for  instance,  in  the  Middle  East  and  Latin  America. 
b)  Countries  opposing  the  Soviet  Union  included  some  of  the  most 
notorious  right-wing  regimes  in  the  world.  China  had  harmed  its 
reputation  by  maintaining  good  relations  with  these  regimes.  " 
c)  China  had  weakened  its  ties  with  some  Third  World  countries  which 
kept  good  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union.  This  policy  was  resented  by  many 
Third  World  countries.  la 
d)  It  had  not  dealt  with  some  pro-Soviet  Third  World  countries 
objectively,  but  had  taken  them  as  lackeys  of  the  Soviet  Union  instead 
of  analysing  their  positions  more  deeply.  19 
e)  Because  of  China's  one-sided  approach  and  its  need  for  high 
technology  from  the  West,  the  United  States  and  some  other  Western 
countries  were  trying  to  force  it  to  obey  their  demands,  for  example  in 
connection'  'with  the  problem  of  Taiwan  and  the  affair  of  textbooks  in 
Japan.  2° 
Because  of  these  mistakes,  China  had  been  unable  to  play  its  full  part 
in  international  affairs.  Becoming  aware  of  this,  the  new  Chinese  leaders 
began  to  adjust  their  foreign  policy  from  1982  onwards.  The  first  changes 
could  be  observed  in  the  political  report  to  the  12th  National.  Congress  of 
the  CCP  made  by  the  late  General  Secretary,  Hu  Yaobang.,  But  an  article 
entitled  "Adhere  to  an  Independent  Foreign  Policy",  written  by  Huan 
Xiang,  Chinese  expert  on  world  affairs  who  died  in  1989,  and  published  in 
Renmin  Ribao  at  the  end  of  October  1982,  gave  the  best  exposition  of 
China's  adjusted  foreign  policy: 
. 
a)  China  re-affirms  that  contention  for  world  hegemony  by  the  two 
super-powers  is  still  the  main  source  of  international  instability.  It  has 209 
therefore  stopped  saying  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  the  most  dangerous  source 
of  war. 
b)  It  has  also  abandoned  the  notion  that  a  new  world  war  is  inevitable. 
Hu  Yaobang  pointed  out  in  his  report  that  a  new  world  war  could  be 
prevented  if  people  all'  over  the  world  strengthened  their  unity  and 
launched  a  resolute  struggle  against  hegemonism.  Huan  Xiang  explained  this 
further:  "The  strength  of  the  superpowers  has  been  contained  and  worn  down 
in  the  course  of  their  confrontation  and  rivalry,  by  conflicts  inside 
their  own  blocs,  and  by  regional  wars.  .  As  a  result,  an  odd  phenomenon  has 
occurred  in  international  relations  that  the  military  capabilities  of  the 
superpowers  have  been  augmented  to  an  extent  never  seen  before,  while  their 
freedom  to  use  such  capabilities  to  manipilate  world  affairs  and  control 
their  own  spheres  of  influence  has  been  unprecedentedly  restricted.  "21 
Therefore  there  are  two  possibilities  --  world  war  will  either  break  out 
or  it  will  be  prevented. 
c)  In  pursuing  an  independent  foreign  policy,  China  will  never  attach 
itself  to  any  major  power  or  group  of  powers,  will  never  yield  to  pressure 
from  any  major  power,  and  will  constantly  safeguard-the  nation's  security 
and  interests.  As  Deng  Xiaoping  said  in  his  opening  speech  at  the  12th 
Party  Congress.  "No  foreign  country  can  expect  China  to  be  its  vassal  or 
expect  it  to  swallow  any  bitter  fruit  detrimental  to  its  interests.  "22 
d)  The  U.  S.  government  had  violated  China's  interests  by  passing  the 
Taiwan  Relations  Act  and  continuing  to  sell  arms  to  Taiwan  as  an 
independent  political  entity.  Sino-US  relations  could  continue  to  develop 
soundly  only  on  the  basis  of  mutual  respect  for  sovereignty,  territorial 
integrity  and  non-interference  in  each  other's  internal  affairs. 
e)  The  Sino-Soviet  conflict  had  been  caused  by  Soviet  hegemonist 210 
policy.  China  has  stopped  talking  talking  about  ideological  differences  in 
the  sincere  hope  that  all  barriers  harmful  to  the  normalization  of  Sino- 
Soviet  relations  will  be  eliminated. 
f)  China's  socialist  economic  construction  is  based  on  "self-reliance" 
and  at  the  same  time  on  "opening  up  to  the  outside  world.  "  Some  people 
wrongly  believed  that  China  needs  certain  countries'  help  and  will 
therefore  put  up  with  outside  threats  and  interference.  This  will  not  be 
the  case. 
g)  China  still  belongs  to  the  Third  World.  Its  supreme  international 
duty  is  to  oppose  imperialism  and  hegemonism  along  with  other  Third  World 
countries. 
h)  Each  Communist  Party  should  be  independent.  The  Chinese  Communist 
Party  hopes  to  develop  its  relations  with  other  Communist  Parties  on  the 
principles  of  independence,  equality,  mutual  respect  and  non-interference 
in  in  one  another's  internal  affairs. 
D  China  hopes  to  develop  relations  with  Western  countries  as  well  as 
East  European  countries. 
By  1982  China's  internal  modernisation  programme  was  well  under,  way.  and￿  , 
extending  from  agriculture  to  industry.  In  many  was  pragmatism  had  replaced 
ideology  in  domestic  affairs,  and  it  made  increasing  sense  to  'adopt  'a 
similar  approach  in  foreign  policy.  This  made  it  possible  to  understand 
that  mistakes  had  been  made  in  the  past,  particularly  with  regard  to  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  that  they  should  be  rectified.  What  Huan  Xiang  outlined 
was  a  generally  fairly  flexible  and  independent  foreign  policy  within  which 
China  would  on  one  hand,  firmly  oppose  Soviet  hegemonism,  but  on  the  other 
hand,  try  hard  to  keep  normal  relations  between  the  two  countries.  This 
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Union: 
a)  A  sincere  wish  to  resume  talks  with  the  aim  of  relaxing  Sino-Soviet 
tension. 
b)  A  firm  decision  to  reduce  ideological  criticism  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
c)  A  clear  objective  to  resume  or  strengthen  relations  with  some  pro- 
Soviet  countries,  such  as  Libya  and  Angola. 
a, 
About  the  same  time,  the  Soviet  Union  seems  to  have  begun 
reconsidering  its  policy  towards  China.  On  7  March  1981  Moscow  proposed 
implementing  "confidence-building  measures"  along  the  border,  including 
advance  notification  of  military  exercises  and  the  exchange  of  observers 
at  those  exercises,  and  then  on  25  September  it  finally  had  called  for  a 
resumption  of  negotiations.  23  On  24  March  1982,  Brezhnev  made  his 
important  speech  in  Tashkent  expressing  the  Soviet  wish  to  improve 
relations.  The  main  thrust  of  his  speech  was  to  recognize  China  as  a 
socialist  country  and  to  show  willingness  to  improve  relations  with  China 
over  a  range  of  issues.  The  Chinese  made  a  positive  if  cautious  response.  24 
In  September,  this  time  in  Baku,  Brezhnev  again  stressed  the  importance  he 
attached  to  improving  relations  and,  about  the  same  time,  the  Soviet  media 
began  to  halt  anti-Chinese  propaganda.  In  early  October  198Z  ''political 
consultation  began  at  the  level  of  Deputy  Foreign  Minister  when  Leonid 
Ilychev  quietly  arrived  in  Beijing  for  the  first  round  of  post-Afganistan 
talks  with  Qian  Qichen. 
This  adjustment  in  Soviet  policy  towards  China  was  part  of  a  general 
realignmemnt  of  its  foreign  policy.  At  a  time  when  relations  with  the 
United  States  were  at  a  low  ebb,  the  Soviet  Union  had  a  strong  incentive 
to  try  to  play  its  "China  card"  in  the  hope  of  pressing  the  Reagan 
Administration  to  be  more  flexible  in  the  strategic  arms  negotiations. 212 
Improving  relations  with  China  might  also  help  remove  the  ever  present 
risk  of  a  threat  or  even  a  war  on  two  fronts,  west  and  East.  Like  China, 
the  Soviet  Union  was  also  going  through  the  process  of  reassessing  its 
past  foreign  policy  and  of  discovering  a  new  understanding  of  the 
contemporary  world.  There  were  two  obvious  mistakes  it  had  made  in  the 
past  regarding  relations  with  socialist  countries.  One  was  that  it  had 
not  allowed  for  the  existence  of  different'  models  in  building  socialism; 
and  the  other  was  that  it  had  refused  to  qr  gVAn 
contradictory  ipterests  among  and  between  various  socialist  countries.  The 
final  factor  in  the  general  rethinking  of  foreign  policy  was  awareness  of 
the  wretched  state  of  the  Soviet  economy.  The  relevance  to  relations  with 
China  was  the  possibility  of  increasing  the  import  of  badly-needed 
consumer  goods.  Brezhnev's  speeches  clearly  indicated  that  even  he  had 
come  to  realise  the  connection  between  easing  the  Soviet  Union's  economic 
burden,  on  one  hand,  and  reducing  tension  with  China,  on  the  other. 
8.3  The  Slow  Process  of  Normalization  and  the  Triumph  of  Pragmatism 
'No-one  expected  the  process  of  normalization  to  be  as  long  as  it  Was.  'Zt 
might  have  been  slow  to  get  started;  but  the  very  fact  of  making  a  start 
seemed  to  remove  a  major  obstacle.  The  first  round  of  consultation  at  the 
Deputy  Foreign  Minister  level  took  place  on  3  December  1982.  By  the  end  of 
1988,  there  had  been  twelve  rounds  altogether.  These  consultations  played 
a  very  active  role  in  relaxing  tension  in  mutual  understanding  as  well  as 
in  practical  trading  and  economic  matters.  But  political  relations  still 
remained  at  a  stalemate  and  so  the  talks  were  slow.  The  main  reason  for 
this  was  that  the  Soviet  Union  for  a  long  time  refused  to  remove  what 
China  stated  at  the  first  meeting  as  the  'three  main  obstacles',  that  is, 213 
the  need  for  the  Soviet  Union  to  reduce  the  number  of  its  troops  stationed 
along  the  Sino-Soviet  border  and  to  withdraw  its  troops  from  Mongolia,  the 
need  for  it  to  evacuate  Afganistan  and  the  need  for  it  to  end  its  support 
to  Vietnamese  aggression  against  Kampuchea.  From  the  Soviet  point  of  view 
these  were  enormous  hurdels,  amounting  to  a  reversal  of  much  of  its  Eastern 
policy  to  date.  So  under  the  pretext  of  "not  harming  the  interests  of  a 
third  country,  "  the  Soviet  side  refused  to  discuss  the  three  obstacles. 
From  the  Chinese  point  of  view,  of  course,  all  three  issues  were  not  only 
an  acid  test  of  Soviet  intentions;  they  were  all  crucial  to  China's 
security  and  future. 
On  14  November  1982,  Huang  Hua,  then  Chinese  Foreign  Minister,  was  sent 
to  Moscow  to  attend  Brezhnev's  funeral  and,  following  a  lengthy  meeting 
with  Andrei  Gromyko,  Soviet  Foreign  Minister,  Huang  announced  that  he  was 
"quite  optismistic"  about  the  prospect  for  improving  Sino-Soviet  relations. 
This  was  the  first  meeting  between  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  two  countries 
in  about  twenty  years.  It  attracted  world-wide  publicity.  But  Huang  Hua 
was  dismissed  as  Foreign  Minister  soon  after  his  return  to  Beijing  because 
of  his  excessive  optimism.  The  fact  was  that  there  were  different  opinions, 
among  the  Chinese  leaders  about  how  fast  to  proceed  with  the  Russians. 
In  February  1983  Hu  Yaobang  voiced  considerable  scepticism  about  the 
outcome  of  the  dialogue  with  Moscow.  "A  complete  normalization  of  relations 
is  only  possible,  "  he  said  in  an  interview  with  Japanese  journalists,  "if 
the  obstacles  are  removed.  "21-  This  had  determined  that  the  talks  would  be 
a  marathon.  The  second  and  third  rounds  of  consultation  were  held  in 
Moscow  and  Beijing  respectively  in  1983.  ='  On  13  February  1984,  a  Chinese 
delegation  headed  by  Vice-Premier  Wan  Li  went  to  Moscow  to  attend 
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received  him  in  the  Kremlin.  This  was  the  first  senior  contact  between 
government  leaders  since  1969.20  From  12  to  26  March  1984,  the  fourth 
round  of  consultation  took  place  in  Moscow.  At  this  meeting,  the  two  sides 
were  at  laest  able  to  point  out  that,  since  the  political  discussions  had 
begun,  exchanges  in  the  field  of  economy,  trade,  science,  culture  and 
sports  had  been  markedly  increased.  29 
The  see-saw  continued.  On  27  April  Zhao  Ziyang,  then  Chinese  Premier, 
informed  President  Reagan  that  consultations  between  China  and  the  Soviet 
Union  had  not  made  substantial  progress.  3°  Yet  on  21  September,  Chinese 
Foreign  Minister  Wu  Xueqian  had  a  talk  with  his  Soviet  partner  Gromyko  at 
the.  U.  N.  headquarters  in  New  York.  This  was  the  first  formal  meeting 
between  Foreign  Ministers  for  more  than  twenty  years.  31  On  11  October 
1984  Deng  Xiaoping  took  a  middle-of-the-road  position.  He  told  some 
Tapanese  guests  that  Sino-Soviet  relations  could  not 
. 
be  improved 
substantially  before  the  three  obstacles  were  removed;  but  before 
normalization,  the  two  countries  could  strengthen  exchanges  in  the  fields 
of.  economy  and  culture.:  37  At  the  the  fifth  round  of  consultation  later  in 
the,  year  both  sides  expressed  willingness  to  increase  exchanges  to  their 
mutual  benifit.  33 
The  year  1985  at  least  saw  a  rise  in  the  level  of  contact.  On  12  March 
Vice-Premier  Li  Peng  headed  a  delegation  to  attend  Chernenko's  funeral. 
In  a  meeting  with  Mikhail  Gorbachev,  the  new  General  Secretary  of  the 
CPSU,  Li  expressed  his  wish  for  the  Soviet  Union  to  make  great  progress  in 
its  socialist  construction.  This  was  the  first  time  that  a  Chinese  leader 
had  recognized  the  Soviet  Union  as  a  socialist  country  since  the  middle 
1960s.  34  On  17  April  Deng  Xiaoping  pointed  out  in  an  interview  with  a 
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one  by  one  if  it  was  too  difficult  to  remove  them  at  the  same  time.  33  Wu 
Xueqian  talked  with  the  new  Soviet  Foreign  Minister, 
. 
Edvard 
Shevardnadze,  at  the  U.  N..,  They  exchanged  views  on  how  to  improve  Sino- 
Soviet  relations  and  extended  invitations  for  a  visit  to  each  other's 
country.  The  sixth  and  seventh  rounds  came  and  went.  And  on  9  October  1985 
Deng  Xiaoping  asked  the  Romanian  President,  Nicolae  Ceausescu,  who  was 
visiting  China,  to  pass  a  proposal  to  Gorbachev  that  there  should  be  a 
Sino-Soviet  summit,  but  on  the  precondition  that  the  Soviet  Union 
stopped  its  support  for  the  Vietnamese  in  Kampuchea.  36 
Reporting  to  the  27th  Party  Congress  in  January  1986,  Gorbachev 
indicated  that  Sino-Soviet  relations  had  improved  and  that  there  was  great 
potential  for  Sino-Soviet  co-operation.  At  the  same  time-,  however,  on  the 
29  January  Hu  Yaobang  told  Japanese  guests  that  an  exchange  of  visits 
between  Foreign  Ministers  was  dependent  on  the  development  of  the 
a  ,. 
situation  and  could  not  be  decided  at  that  time.  37  The  eigth  round  of 
consultation  was  held  in  April  in  Moscow-31  Then  on  28  July  Gorbachev 
made  an  important  speech  in  Vladivostok,  in  which  he  made  three  points 
concerning  China:  first,  he  expressed  understanding  and  respect  for 
China's  domestic  reform  and  modernization  drive;  second,  he  proposed  the 
main  navigation  channel  as  the  demarcation  line  in  the  rivers  between  the 
two  countries;  and  third,  referring  to  the  three  obstacles  he  indicated 
willingness  to  withdraw  some  Soviet  troops  from  Mongolia  and  Afghanistan 
and  to  discuss  mutual  reduction  of  the  number  of  troops  stationed  in  the 
border  areas.  39  The  process  beginning  with  Brezhnev's  recognition  of  China 
as  a  socialist  country  to  Gorbachev's  positive  assesment  of  China's  reform 
shows  that  the  Soviet  Union  was  gradually  discarding  subjective 
ideological  elements  in  its  attitude  China's  internal  and  external 216 
policies  and  interests.  Gorbachev's  Vladivostok  speech  was  a  signpost 
indicating  that  Sino-Soviet  relations  had  developed  to  the  stage  at  which 
a  solution  of  the  objectively  existing  difficulties  would  be  achievable.  ' 
One  and  half  months  later,  China  gave  a  cautious  welcome  to  the  speech, 
but  meanwhile  kicked  the  ball  back  to  Gorbachev.  On  2  September  Deng 
Xiaoping  called  on  him  to  "take  a  solid  step  towards  the  removal  of  the 
, 
three  major  obstacles  in  Sino-Soviet  relations.  1140  Deng  said  that,  of  the 
three  major  obstacles,  the  main  one  was  Vietnamese  aggression  against 
Kampuchea.  It  had  put  Sino-Soviet  relations  into  a  "hot-spot"  situation 
and  produced  a  state  of  confrontation  that  took  the  form  of  pitting. 
Vietnamese  against  Chinese  forces.  He  even  proposed  a  summit  if  the  Soviet 
Union  could  contribute  to  the  withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  troops  from 
Kampuchea:  "Once  this  problem  is  resolved,  I  will  be  ready  to  meet 
Gorbachev.  Now  I  am  over  82,  already  advanced  in  years,  and  have  long 
accomplished  my  historical  task  of  making  overseas  visits:  If  this  obstacle 
in  Sino-Soviet  relatons  is  removed,  I  will  be  ready  to  break  the  rule  and 
go  to  any  place  in  the  Soviet  Union  to  meet  Gorbachev.  "  Deng  added  further 
that  "a  meeting  -  like  this  would  be  --of  great  significance  `for 
the....  normalization  of  Sino-Soviet  relations.  "  He  nevertheless. 
criticized  Gorbachev  for  not  having  taken  a  big  step  since  soon  "Soon 
after  Gorbachev  made  his  speech,  "an  official  from  the  Soviet  Foreign 
Ministry  also  made  a  speech  that  was  different  in  tone.  This  shows  that  the 
Soviet  authorities  have  yet  to  decide  among  themselves  what  China  policies 
to  pursue,  and  so  we  still  have  to  wait  and  see.  N°-  The  year  petered  out 
after  the  ninth  round  of  consultation  when  Soviet  Deputy  Foreign  Minister 
Rogachev  replaced  Ilychev  as  the  Soviet  representative.  43 
On  15  January  1987  a  spokesman  for  the  Soviet  Foreign  Ministry  declared 217 
that  the  Soviet  Union  would  withdraw  numbers  of  troops  from  Mongolia 
between  April  and  Sune,  a  move  that  was  welcomed  by,  the  Chinese  side.  -44 
In  February  the  first  round  of  actual  border  talks  took  place.  45  Before 
the  tenth  round  of  consultation  was  held  in  Moscow  in  April,  the  Chinese 
representative  announced  that  the  Soviet  Union  now  expressed  its 
willingness  to  discuss  the  three  obstacles  which  it  had  refused  to  do  for 
a  long  time.  He  hoped  that  this  would  be  a  good  sign.  46  The  second  round  of 
border  talks  in  August47  and  the  eleventh  round  of  consultation  in 
October"  both  produced  modest  progress.  Deng  Xiaoping  in  November  49 
then  GorbachevS°.  then  again  Deng  Xiaoping  in  December-',  and  finally 
GorbacheV52.  always  through  third  parties,  exchanged  ideas  on  the 
possibility  of  a  summit  meeting,  dependent  on  the  Cambodian  issue. 
Progress  was  still  desultory.  But  a  significant  change  came  in  April  1988 
when  a  peace  agreement  was  signed  at  talks  in  Geneva  which  set  a  time- 
table  for  the  Soviet  Union  to  withdraw  its  troops  from  Afghanistan 
between  mid-May  1988  and  mid-February  1989.  This  was  welcomed  by  the 
Chinese  who  continued,  however,  to  ask  Moscow  to  exert  its  influence  to  get 
the  Vietnamese  out  of  Kampuchea.  This  and  the  twelfth  round  of  consultation 
in  June53  led  to  the  establishment  of  a  special  working  group  on  the. 
Kampuchean  problem. 
On  16  September  1988  Gorbachev  made  another  speech'on  Soviet  foreign 
policy,  this  time  in  Krasnoyarsk  in  South  east  Siberia.  Referring  to  the 
Kampuchean  talks  between  Deputy  Foreign  Ministers  Rogachov  and  Tian,  he 
said  that  they  had  "expanded  in  a  certain  way  the  zone  of  mutual 
understanding  on  this  issue  and  contributed  to  improving  Soviet-Chinese 
relations.  "'-'  A  Chinese  Foreign  Ministry  spokesman  agreed.  55  He  also  noted 218 
the  Soviet  willingness,  expressed  by  Gorbachev,  to  promote  a  more  rapid 
settlement  of  the  Kampuchean  problem:  "We  hope  that  the  Soviet  Union  will 
make  practical  efforts  to  this  end.  "56  Mutual  willingness  to  do  so  was  then 
expressed  on  28  September  by  Qian  Qichen  and  Shevardnadze  at  the  U.  N..  57 
Looking  back  it  is  possible  to  say  that  there  were  many  positive  changes 
in  Sino-Soviet  relations  that  led  to  a  breakthrough  in  eliminating  the 
three  obstacles.  It  was  after  this  breakthrough  that  Chinese  Foreign 
Minister  Qian  Qichen  actually  visited  Moscow  in  early  December,  quickening 
the  process  of  normalization.  During  his  visit,  both  side  strengthened 
their  mutual  understanding,  increasing  their  common  ground  and  narrowed 
their  differences  on  the  major  topic  --  the  Kampuchean  issue.  Above  all, 
they  reached  agreement  in  principle  on  a  Sino-Soviet  summit  in  the  first 
half  of  '1989.  At  the  same  time,  there  was  also  something  of  a 
breakthrough  in  the  border  talks.  From  20  to  31  October  their  third  round 
was  held  in  Moscow.  The  two  sides  made  agreements  on  the  Eastern  and 
also  discussed  the  question  of  the  Western  sector,  eventually  setting  up  a 
working  group  to  solve  the  problem.  S°  Finally,  on  7  December,  Gorbachev 
was  able  to  say  to  the  e  U.  N.  General  Assembly  that"the  Soviet  Union  would 
greatly  reduce  the  number  of  its  troops  stationed  in  its  Asian  territory 
and  would  withdraw  most  of  them  from  Mongolia.  This  was  welcomed  by  the 
Chinese.  89 
A  quantum  leap  was  made  in  Feburary  1989  when  Shevardnadze  paid  a  return 
visit  to  China.  The  two  sides  were  able  to  issue  a  nine-point  statement  on 
a  Kampuchean  solution: 
1)  The  Soviet  Union  and  the  People's  Republic  stand  for  a  fair  and 
reasonable  political  settlement  of  the  Kampuchean  question  at  the  earliest 219 
possible  date  and  express  their  readiness  to  make  every  effort  to  help 
attain  this  objective. 
2)  They  hold  the  view  that  a  Vietnamese  troop  withdrawal  from  Kampuchea 
is  an  important  component  of  any  political  settlement  of  the  Kampuchean 
question. 
3)  After  the  complete  withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  troops  from  Kampuchea, 
all  countries  concerned  should  gradually  reduce  and  eventually  totally  stop 
their  military  aid  to  any  of  the  parties  in  Kampuchea. 
4)  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  take  the  view  that  the  internal  problems 
of  Kampuchea  should  be  settled  through  negotiations  by  the  parties  in 
Kampuchea  on  the  basis  of  national  reconciliation  and  free  from  any  outside 
interference.  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  will  respect  the  results  of  future 
free  elections  in  Kampuchea. 
5)  It  is  the  view  and  concern  of  both  sides  that  after  the  withdrawal  of 
foreign  troops-from  Kampuchea,  no  dangerous  situation  should  emerge  and  no 
civil  war  should  break  out  in  the  country. 
6)  The  two  sides  are  of  the  view  that  the  United  Nations  mechanism  may 
play  its-appropriate  role  in  the  process  of  a  political  settlement..  of  the 
Kampuchean  question  as  conditions  gradually  present  themselves.  '  The  two 
sides  are  in  favour  of  convening  an  international  conference  on  the 
Kampuchean  question  when  conditions  are  ripe. 
7)  The  two  sides  hold  that  following  the  withdrawal  of  foreign  troops 
from  Kampuchea,  an  international  guarantee  should  be  instituted  for  the 
status  of  Kampuchea  as  an  independent,  peaceful,  neutral  and  non-aligned 
state.  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  express  their  willingness  to  join  in  this 
international  guarantee. 
8)  The  two  sides  agree  to  continue  to  discuss  their  remaining 220 
differences  of  views  on  settling  certain  aspects  of  the  Kampuchean 
question. 
9)  The  Chinese  and  Soviet  sides  hold  that  the  settlement  of  the 
Kampuchean  question  will  contribute  to  the  removal  of  a  source  of  tension 
in  Southeast  Asia,  to  a  healthy  development  of  the  political  situation  and 
also  to  the  promotion  of  peace  and  stability  in  the  region.  ß° 
On  that  occasion,  too,  Deng  Xiaoping  and  Premier  Li  Peng  met 
Shevardnadze.  There  was  agreement  on  the  date  of  Mikhail  Gorbachev's  visit 
to  China  at  the  invitation  of  the  Chinese  President,  Yang  Shangkun,  ''  and 
on  the  topics  for  discussion.  A  new  relationship  should  be  set  up  on  the 
basis  of  the  Five  Principles  of  Peaceful  Coexistence.  The  mutual  visits 
of  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  paved  the  way  for 
the  Sino-Soviet  summit,  the  highlight  of  which  would  be  Deng  Xiaoping's 
talk  with  Gorbachev  and  the  importance  of  which  would  be  the  beginning  of 
normalized  Sino-Soviet  relations. 
Why  did  it  take  so  long  to  improve  political  relations  between  the  two 
countries?  Why  was  it  so  difficult  for  the  USSR  to  remove  the  three 
obstacles?  Of  course,  Gorbachev's  policy  was  much  more  flexible  than,  that 
of  his  predecessors,  but  his  efforts  produced  very  little  effect  at'.  the 
beginning.  The  policy  ran  into  trouble  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
First,  Soviet  policy  towards  China  was  inevitably  subordinate  to  its 
global  strategy.  It  had  to  put  Soviet-American  relations  in  first  place 
because  the  major  threat  to  its  security  came  from  the  United  States  across 
Europe  and  world-wide,  and  the  main  reason  for  its  inordinate  militray 
expenditure  was  its  Cold  War  relationship  with  America.  While  talking 
peace,  too,  the  Soviet  Union  had  increased  its  military  strength  in  the  Far 
East  in  the  mid-1980s.  It  had  reorganized  the  command  system  of  its  three 221 
armed  services  in  the  Far  East;  developed  its  Pacific  Fleet  into  the 
country's  largest;  built  a  powerful  radar  station  near  Nakhodka;  deployed 
nuclear  weapons  on  Sakhalin  and  ground-to-ground,  and  ground-to-ship 
offensive  cruise  missiles  on  the  Kurile  islands;  and  expanded  its  naval 
base  in  Cam  Ranh  Bay  in  Vietnam.  In  short,  it  had  an  immense  military 
presence  in  the  East  which  it  could  not  quickly  take  down. 
Secondly,  for  a  long  time  the  Soviet  leaders  still  maintained  their  old 
policy  on  the  two  Asian  hotspots  --  Afghanistan  and  Kampuchea  -  partly  to 
pressurise  the  United  States,  partly  to  guard  against  an  uncertain  Chinese 
policy,  and  partly  because  it  was  difficult  to  contemplate  the  internal  and 
external  loss  of  face  involved  in  admitting  what  would  amount  to  defeat. 
Local  conditions  made  the  Vietnamese  problem  particularly  intractable. 
Moscow  continued  to  support  the  Vietnamese  invasion  of,  Kampuchea, 
increasing  its  economic  and  military  aid.  Economic  aid  to  Vietnam  in  the 
1986-1990  Five-Year-Plan  was  twice  the  amount  of  the  previous  plan.  In 
December  1986,  Yegor  Ligachev,  a  hard-line  member  of  the  Secretariat  of  the 
Central  Committee  of  the  CPSU.  attended  the  Sixth  National  Congress  of  the 
Vietnamese  Communist  Party  at  which  Vietnam's  leaders  were  replaced.  This 
aim.  was  probably  to  co-ordinate  policies  with  the  new  leaders  and 
encourage  them  in  their  invasion  of  Kampuchea  so  as  to  strengthen  the 
Soviet  Union's  position  in  Southeast  Asia,  as  he  saw  it. 
This  was  perhaps  a  third  reason.  It  probably  took  Gorbachev  some  time  to 
conclude  not  only  that  it  was  safe  to  come  to  terms  with  China,  but  that 
it  was  wise.  His  foreign  policy,  like  his  domestic  policy,  was  evolutionary 
-  one  satge  at  a  time.  Shevardnadze  who  toured  Southeast  Asiain  1987 
possibly  encouraged  withdrawal  from  the  Vietnamese  conflict;  but  Ligachev 
restrained  him.  In  his  book  Perestroika  Gorbachev  quite  openly  put  Western 222 
concerns  ahead  of  Eastern.  It  was  a  combination  of  history  and  geopolitics. 
But  when  in  his  pragmatic  way  he  did  get  round  to  looking  at  China  he 
discovered  a  power  that  was  far  less  ideological  than  in  Mao's  time  and 
that  in  its  pragmatic  way  was  proving  remarkably  successful  at  home  and 
abroad.  So  he  reciprocated. 
8.4  Normalization  and  Its  Possible  Consequences 
At  the  invitation  of  President  Yang  Shangkun  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
China,  Mikhail  Gorbachev,  President  of  the  Presidum  of  the  Supreme  Soviet 
of  the  USSR  and  General  Secretary  Of  the  CPSU,  paid  his  offical  visit  to 
China  from  15  to  18  May  1989.  This  may  prove  to  have  been  the  most  special 
offical  visit  of  a  generation.  All  the  elements  were  -there  for  an  epic 
drama.  The  leader  of  one  great  nation  travelled  to  another  great  nation 
which  had  not  received  such  a  visit  for  30  years.  The  moment  Deng 
Xiaoping  shook  hands  with  Gorbachev  on  16  may  marked  the  normalization  of 
relations  between  the  two  largest  socialist  countries  and  the  two  biggest 
Communist  Parties.  It  was  an  occasion  that  was  applauded  by  the  people  of 
both  countries. 
Deng  reaped  the  diplomatic  harvest  that  he  had  sown  three  years  before 
when  he  asked  Ceausescu  to  transmit  his  suggestion  that  the  three 
obstacles  should  be  removed  as  soon'as  possible  but  could  be  removed  one  by 
one.  Gorbachev  said  he  remembered  the  message:  "They  needed  three  years  to 
be  removed,  each  one  took  a  year,  Or"  Deng  summed  up  the  summit  in  eight 
words  --  "End  the  past  and  open  up  the  future.  "  While  the  two  leaders 
mended  the  30-year-old  rift,  their  handshake  seems  to  have  had  more 
profound  meaning  for  Deng.  He  had  been  one  of  the  main  fighters  against  the 
Soviet  leadership  during  the  1960s.  Gorbachev,  to  some  extent,  had  been 223 
just  a  witness  to  a  quarrel  between  former  friends.  Yet  later,  in 
Shanghai,  he  commented  that  the  summit  was  so  satisfying  that  the 
unpleasantness  of  the  previous  30  years  seemed  to  disappear.  Gorbachev 
concluded  that  the  Soviet  Union  had  made-mistakes.  At  the  same  time  he 
made  it  clear  that,  although  Deng's  comments  on  the  unhappy  relations  in 
the  past  were  not  groundless,  he  could  not  agree  completely.  62 
However,  the  two  leaders  agreed  to  let  bygones  be  bygones.  What  really 
mattered  was  for  both  to  look  forward  and  to  take  practical  steps  to 
expand  bilateral  relations.  During  a  press  conference  on  May  17,  Gorbachev 
said  that  his  meetings  with  Deng  Xiaobing,  Zhao  Ziyang,  Li  Peng  and  Yang 
Shangkun  were  historically  important  and  fruitful.  He  also  said  that  he 
was  happy  to  see  that  Soviet-Chinese  friendship  was  deeply  rooted  in  the 
hearts  of  the  Chinese  people,  especially  in  the  young.  He  said  the 
friendship  would  further  develop,  he  was  confident  of  that. 
,  On  18  May  the  two  countries  issued  an  18-point  joint  communique.  Its 
main  ideas  were  as  follows: 
1)  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  agreed  that  their  third  ,  high  level 
.  -meeting  symbolized  the  normalization  of  relations  between  them.  The 
normalization  of  their  relations  was  not  directed  at  any  third  country, 
nor  did  it  harm  its  interests. 
2)  The  People's  Republic  of  China  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics  would  develop  their  relations  on  the  basis  of  the  universal 
principles  guiding  state-to-state  relations,  namely,  mutual  respect  for 
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity,  mutual  non-agression,  non- 
interference  in  each  other's  internal  affairs,  equality  and  mutual  benefit, 
and  peaceful  coexistence. 
3)  Both  sides  expressed  their  readiness  to  resolve  all  their  disputes 0 
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by  peaceful  negotiation,  and  neither  side  would  use  or  threaten  to  use  arms 
against  the  other  by  any  means,  including  the  use  of  the  land,  water  or 
air  space  of  a  third  country  bordering  on  the  other.  They  confirmed  the 
statement  on  Kampuchea  issued  by  their  Foreign  Ministers  in  February  1989 
and,  in  view  of  later  developments,  they  had  had  an  overall  and  in-depth 
exchange  of  views  on  the  settlement  of  the  Kampuchean  question.  They 
reaffirmed  their  continued  efforts  to  promote  its  early  political 
settlement  in  a  fair  and  reasonable  way. 
4)  Both  powers  agreed  to  reduce  their  military  forces  along  their 
border  to  a  minimum  level  commensurate  with  normal,  good-neighbourly 
relations  between  them"  and  to  work  for  increased  trust  and  continuous 
tranqility  in  the  border  areas.  The  Chinese  side  welcomed  the  decision  of 
the  Soviet  Union  to  withdraw  75  percent  of  its  forces  from  the  People's 
Republic  of  Mongolia  and  hoped  to  see  the  complete  pull-out  'of  its 
remaining  forces  from  that  country  within  a  specified  short  period  of  time. 
5)  The  two  sides  favoured  a  fair  and  reasonable  settlement  of  the  Sino- 
Soviet  boundary  question  left  over  from  the  past,  on  the  basis  of  the 
treaties  concerning  the  existing  Sino-Soviet  boundary  and  of  the  generally; 
recognized  principles  of  international  law,  and  in  a  spirit  of 
consultation  on  an  equal  footing  and  with  mutual  understanding  and  mutual 
accommodation. 
6)  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  agreed  to  work  for  the  development  of 
economic,  trade,  scientific,  technological,  cultural  and  other  relations  in 
a  planned  way  on  the  basis  of  the  principles  of  equality  and  mutual  benefit 
and  to  deepen  mutual  understanding  and  promote  exchanges  between  the  two 
peoples. 
7)  The  two  sides  considered  it  beneficial  for  them  to  share  information 225 
and  experience  regarding  their  socialist  development  and  reforms  and  to 
exchange  views  on  bilateral  relations  and  international  issues  of  common 
concern. 
8)  The  two  sides  agreed  that  the  Communist  Party  of  China  and  the 
Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union  would  develop  their  contacts  and 
exchanges  in  accordence  with  the  principles  of  independence,  complete 
equality,  mutual  respect  and  non-interference  in  each  other's  internal 
affairs. 
9)  The  two  sides  stated  that  neither  would  seek  hegemony  of  any  form  in 
the  Asian-Pacific  region  or  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  Both  deemed  it 
essential  to  denounce  the  attempt  or  action  of  any  country  to  impose  its 
will  on  others  or  to  seek  hegemony  of  any  form  anywhere  in  the  world.  '3 
Obviously,  the  Sino-Soviet  summit  was  particularly  significant  for  Sino- 
Soviet  relations  but  also  had  an  impact  on  international  affairs.  "But  the 
momentous  occasion  was  over-shadowed  by  mounting  turmoil  in  Beijing,  "  in 
the  words  of  a  typical  Western  newspaper,  "as  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
students  and  workers  filled  the  huge  arena  of  Tiananmen  Square,  which  is 
the  symbol  of  the  revolution,  to  demand  democracy  in  China.  "B'.,.  The  so- 
called  "Gorbachev  whirlwind"  was  scattered  by  the  demonstrators.  ".  At.  least 
four  scheduled  events,  including  the  welcoming  ceremony,  laying  wreaths  at 
the  Monument  to  the  People's  Heroes,  visiting  the  Forbidden  City  and 
attending  a  press  conference,  were  either  changed  or  cancelled  because  of 
the  demonstrations  during  Gorbachev's  brief  three-day  stay  in  Beijing. 
There  may  be  lessons  in  this  for  the  future  of  Sino-Soviet  relations;  but 
that  is  work  for  another  dissertation.  However,  assuming  continued 
improvement  in  Sino-Soviet  relations,  the  world  may  benefit  in  the 
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1)  There  may  in  due  course  be  further  relaxation  and  stability  in 
international  relations  as  the  trend  develops  towards  turning  confrontation 
into  dialoque. 
2)  A  new  international  political  order  may  be  promoted  based  on 
increasing  observance  of  the  Five  Principles  of  Peaceful  Coexistence, 
rather  than  on  the  restoration  of  the  old  alliances. 
3)  The  Sino-Soviet  rapproachement  should  strengthen  international 
economic  co-operation. 
4)  It  should  equally  facilitate  the  exchange  of  experience  of  reform 
among  socialist  or  ex-socialist  countries. 
Despite  these  positive  factors,  the  improvement  and  normalization  of 
Sino-Soviet  relations  has  aroused  suspicion  and  concern  among  some  people 
in  the  world.  They  are  mostly  worried  about  a  resumption  of  the  old  Sino- 
Soviet  alliance,  fearing  that  this  might  upset  the  overall  balance  of 
strategic  forces  or  harm  the  interests  and  security  of  third  parties. 
Such  feelings  are  understandable,  but  unnecessary.  First,  the  present 
international  and  domestic  situations  of  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  are 
fundamentally  different  from  the  1950s  so.  that  there  is  no  subjective  or 
objective  need  for  them  to  form  an  alliance.  And  second,  the  normalization 
of  Sino-Soviet  relations  is  unlikely  to  endanger  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  and  the  West,  but,  on  the  contrary,  more  likely  to  assist 
good  relations  between  China,  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  powers  in  the  long 
run. 
At  the  same  time  it  must  be  stressed  that  normalization  of  Sino-Soviet 
relations  does  not  mean  that  there  will  be  no  more  contradictions  or 
differences  between  the  two  countries.  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
their  respective  national  interests  and  their  foreign  policies  have 227 
different  concerns.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  in  practice  the  Soviet 
Union  can  thoroughly  correct  its  big-nation  chauvinism  under  the  impact 
of  internal  change. 
8.5  Sino-Soviet  Relations  in  the  1980s 
Despite  political  differences  between  the  two  countries  they  actively 
developed  their  bilateral  relations,  especially  their  economic  and  trade 
relations  following  the  resumption  in  1983.  (see  table  1)  From  21  to  29 
December  1984,  Ivan  Arkhipov,  Soviet  First  Deputy  Prime  Minister,  visited 
China  to  negotiate  two  agreements.  One  concerned  Sino-Soviet  economic  and 
technological  cooperation,  the  other  the  establishment  of-a  Sino-Soviet 
Committee  for  economic,  trade,  scientific  and  technical  cooperation. 
The  Committee  now  meets  annually  in  Beijing  and  Moscow  in  turn.  The  first 
meeting  was  held  in  March  1986  in  Beijing  when  the  two  sides  signed  an 
agreement  on  the  conditions  for  exchanging  technical  personnel. 
In  July  1985  it  was  the  turn  of  Chinese  Vice-Premier  Yao  Yilin  to  visit 
Moscow  where  two  documents  were  signed:  one  a  five-year  trade  agreement 
aimed  at  boosting  trade  from  the  US  $1.3  billion  it  had  been  in  1984  to 
$10  billion  by  1990;  the  other  an  agreement  on  economic  and  technical 
cooperation  in  renewing  and  building  industrial  projects  in  China.  6S  In 
September  1986,  Nikolai  Talyzin,  Soviet  First  Deputy  Prime  Minister  and 
Chairman  of  Gosplan,  signed  an  agreement  in  Beijing  on  inter-Gosplan 
cooperation.  By  1988  the  total  turnover  of  trade  had  reached  2.8  billion 
US  dollars,  30  per  cent  more  than  the  figure  for  1987  and  a  nine-fold 
increase  compared  with  the  early  1980s.  In  the  first  half  of  1989  it 
amounted  to  1.7  billion  US  dollars.  56 
Border  trade  has  been  booming  since  Gorbachev's  Vladivostok  speech, 228 
particularly  between  Heilongjiang  Province,  the  Xingjiang  Uigur  Autonomous 
Region  and  neighbouring  areas  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Trade  between 
Heilongjiang  and  Siberia  has  been  recorded  for  over  300  years,  focussing 
initially  on  the  export  to  Russia  of  tea,  silk,  soya  and  alcohol,  and  on 
the  import,  of  furs  and  iron  and  steel  products.  It  was  not  until  1986, 
however,  that  trade  links  began  to  be  rebuilt  at  a  fast  rate,  supported 
by  the  specialists  at  the  Academy  of  Social  Sciences  in  Harbin.  Two  of  them 
published  a  paper,  emphasising  the  complimentarit-y  of  the  two  regimes 
economies  and  proposing  the  border  town  of  Heihe.  (which  is  still  not  open 
to  Western  visitors),  as  Heilongjiang's  equivalent  to  Shenzhen. 
Guangdong's  special  economic  zone  neighbouring  on  Hong  Kong.  In  May  1987 
four  border  cities  were  paired  for  economic  cooperation.  Also  in  March 
1988,  the  Chinese  government  agreed  to  open  the  border  areas  of 
Heilongjiang  Province  to  Soviet  economic  activity;  and  in  response,  the 
Soviet  government  in  vested  its  Far  Eastern  Region  more  decision-making 
powers.  Barter  trade  is  widespread  with  Swiss  francs  as  the  measure  and 
repayment  in  kind. 
The  conduct  of  'trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  by  more  than  .  100  Chinese 
companies  rather  than  by  the  one  and  only  provincial  foreign  trade  company 
has  resulted  in  the  rapid  growth  of  both  imports  and  exports  in 
Heilongjiang,  as  seen  from  the  following  table: 
Year  Imports  &  Exports  (million  Swiss  francs) 
1983  17.45 
1984  -  31.66 
1985  30.00 
1986  29.85 
1987  34.22 
1988  196.00 229 
Thus  in  1988  the  Province's  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  was  5.7  times 
that  of  1987,  or  the  total  of  the  previous  two  periods  (1957-66  and  1983- 
87)  put  together.  67  In  addition,  it  has  established  links  with  other 
Soviet  regions  as  far  away  as  Leningrad,  the  Ukraine,  Moscow  and  other 
western  areas. 
In  general  bilateral  economic  relations  have  expanded  from  simple  barter 
trade  to  include  extensive  economic  and  technical  cooperation.  By  the 
beginning  of  1989,  the  two  sides  had  signed  157  contracts  and  agreements  on 
economic  and  technical  cooperation  in  the  fields  of  vegetable  cultivation, 
project  contracting,  lumbering,  railway  freight  loading  and  unloading,  and 
ship  repair  and  maintenance.  In  1988,  Heilongjiang  1,300  workers  to  the 
Soviet  Union  on  labour  contracts.  The  figure  in  1989  was  expected  to 
exceed  5.000.  -- 
More  varieties  of  commodity  are  being  exported  to  the  Soviet  Union.  In 
1987,  the  Province  sold  some  50  different  commodities,  notably 
unprocessed  farm  produce  and  local  specialities.  This  figure  has  increased 
to  more  than  3,000  with  the  addition  of  light  industrial  products, 
machinery,  electrical  equipment.  precision  instruments  and  meters,  and 
building  materials.  Unlike  other  provinces  that  have  counter-trade  links 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  these  are  negotiated  locally  and  profits  stay  in 
the  Province.  Beijing  sets  the  framework  for  the  trade  and  also  keeps 
control  of  trade  with  other  countries  in  Eastern  Europe. 
Border  trade  between  the  Xingjiang  Uigur  Autonomous  Region  and  the  Soviet 
Union  rose  to  17  million  Swiss  Francs  in  1986.  The  total  turnover  in  the 
first  half  of  1987  increased  by  75  percent  over  the  same  period  in  1986. 
In  1988  it  reached  SF  180  million,  six  times  of  that  of  1987.  In  1989  it 
was  SF  200  million.  In  1988  the  two  sides  established  54  joint-ventures 230 
including  in  textiles,  electronics,  food  processing,  and  construction 
materials.  -In  1989,  Xingjiang  concluded  a  six-year  agreement  on  economic. 
technical,  and  trade  co-operation  with  the  Khazakstan  Republic.  It  covered 
87  projects,  among  which  were  25  large  and  53  medium  and  small  projects. 
The  total  investment  amounted  to  one  billion  U.  S.  dollars.  According  to 
contracts  between  the  two  sides,  Xingjiang  will  continue  to  export  shirts, 
children's  fur  coats,  woollen  sweaters,  towels  and  enamelware  to  the  Soviet 
Union  and  import  steel  products,  chemicals  and  refrigerators.  69  In 
addition,  border  trade  has  been  expanded  to  Inner  Mongolia.  In  Tuly  1988  a 
delegation  from  Inner  Mongolia  signed  a  protocol  with  a  Chita  Region 
delegation  to  develop  direct  trade,  and  economic  and  technical  co- 
operation.  Since  then,  the  trade  turnover  has  been  increased  rapidly. 
Between  September  1988  -  and  July  1989  Inner  Mongolia  concluded  27 
contracts  with  a  total  investment  value  of  SF  130  million.  70 
There  are  still  problems.  -  There  have  been  complaints  from  Chinese 
commodity  inspectors  about  materials  and  finish.  A  Chinese  trade  official 
suggested  that  Soviet  business  methods  were  not  flexible  'enough. 
Negotiations  can  continue  for  more  than  'a  year  and  then  come  to  nothing. 
Yevgeni  Bavrin,  a  Soviet  Embassy  commercial  attache,  admitted  that  such 
problems  had  existed  in  the  past,  but  that  they  were  now  few.  He  pledged 
further  improvements  of  timber  Supplies.  "  On  the  Chinese  side,  most 
problems  have  stemmed  from  insufficient  funds  and  bureaucracy.  In 
Heilongjiang  Province  alone,  the  authorities  invested  as  many  as  180 
companies  in  a  short  time  with  the  authority  to  conduct  direct  trade.  This 
created  some  confusion.  Railways  serving  the  Sino-Soviet  border,  already 
running  to  capacity,  also  stand  in  the  way  of  the  rapid  expansion  of  barter 
trade  between  the  two  countries. 231 
Exchanges  in  the  fields  of  culture,  sports  and  specialist  personnel  have 
also  been  expanded  rapidly  .  In  May  1987  an  important  delegation  from  the 
Soviet  Academy  of  Sciences,  headed  by  the  Deputy  President  P.  H.  Fedoseev. 
visited  China.  It  included  eight  directors  of  various  institutes  and  four 
of  Gorbachev's  advisers,  notably  the  famous  economist  A.  G.  Agenbegian.  It 
toured  Beijing,,  Shanghai,  Guangzhou,  Wuhan  and  the  special  economic  zone 
at  Shekou  adjoining  Shenzen,  and  engaged  in  many  talks.  It  is  said  that 
positive  reports  were  made  to  the  Central  Committee  of  the  CPSU.  In 
1988,  there  was  an  exchange  of  almost  five  hundred  delegations.  In  the  same 
year,  China  sent  450  students  to  study  in  the  USSR,  compared  with  as  few 
as  10  in  1983.  when  the  two  countries  decided  to  resume  educational 
exchanges.  72  On  15  July  of  that  year  it  was  agreed  that  Chinese  and  Soviet 
citizens  holding  valid  travel  certificates  would  no  longer  need  visas  to 
visit  each  other's  country.  on  business.  The  regulation  has  come  into  force 
on  13  August  1988.73  This  represented  a  major  departure  from  the  past  and 
a  promising  start  for  future  in  the  relations. 232 
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IX 
,ý 
Conclusion  ý  .. 
-...  the  normalization  between  the  Soviet  Union  -' 
and  China...  meets  the  interests  and  aspirations  of  the 
peoples  of,  the  two  countries  and  promotes  the  maintenance 
of  peace  and  stability  all  over  the  world.  The  normaliza- 
tion  of  Soviet-Chinese  relations  is  not  directed  against 
third  countries  and  does  not  infringe  upon  the  interests 
of  third  countries.  ' 
Sino-Soviet  Communique 
The  preceding  discussion  provides  a  'foundation  for  assessing  the 
respective  policies  pursued,  and  positions  taken  by  the  PRC  and  the  USSR  in 
the  past  thirty-six  years,  and  for  exploring  possible  directions  for  the 
development  of  Sino-Soviet  relations  in  the  near  future.  In  view  of  the 
evidence  presented  and  the  analysis  made  above,  several  points  can  be,  made 
in  conclusion: 
1)  From  1953  to  1957  solidarity  and  co-operation  were  the  main  features 
of  Sino-Soviet  relations.  Of  course  there  were  differences  that  appeared  at 
the  time  between  the  two  parties,  such  as  divergent  opinions  on  how  and  to 
what  extent  to  criticize  Stalin.  But  still  these  differences  were  regarded 
as  among  comrades.  The  way  of  dealing  with  them  was  unity-criticism-unity. 
2)  The  Years  1958-1959  were  critical  in  the  history  of  Sino-Soviet 
relations.  The  events  in  these  two  years,  to  a  large  extent,  determined  the 
whole  future  of  the  dispute.  'The  cracks  began  to  become  open.  But  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  the  solidarity  of  the  socialist  camp  in  face'of  the 237 
West,  both  sides  still  held  to  the  formula  unity-struggle-unity  for 
handling  disputes  since  they  thought  that  the  disputes  were  caused  only  by 
mistakes  committed  by  certain  individuals  in  the  two  Parties. 
3)  The  year  1960  was  the  turning-point  in  the  development  of  Sino- 
Soviet-  relations.  From  this  year  on  disputes  were  extended  to  the  field  of 
state  relations.  Khrushchev  began  to  taker  economic  sanctions  to  put 
pressure  on  China.  At  the  same  time,  Mao  raised  the  question  of  struggle 
against  "modern  revisionism".  The  formula  was  also  -changed  to  struggle- 
struggle-unity.  From  the  Soviet  -point.,  of  view,  inYorder,  -to  maintain  the 
solidarity  of  the  two  parties  as  well  as  of  the  two  countries,  Mao  had  to 
step  down.  As  for  the  Chinese,  they  had  no  doubt  that  Khrushchev  should  be 
ousted. 
4)  From  1966  to  the  late  1970s,  as  the  Cultural  Revolution  attacked 
revisionism  inside  and  outside  China  qualitative  changes  occurred  in  Sino- 
Soviet  relations  which  resulted  in  an-overall  confrontation  between  the 
two  countries.  The  formula  was  struggle-struggle-struggle. 
5)  The  1980s  saw  the  slow  process  of  normalization  in  Sino-Soviet 
relations.  The  formula  was-struggle-detente-normalization.  The  reasons  were 
many.  Internally,  both  countries  carried  out  economic  reforms  which,  to  a 
large  extent,  eliminated  their  ideological  disputes.  Externally,  the  rapid 
developemnt  of  science  and  technology  and  the  emergence  of  environmental 
problems  in  particular  strengthened  co-operation-  among  -various  countries 
with  different  social  systems.  Confrontation  in  international  relations 
generally  was  gradually  replaced  by  dialogue.  The  formula  came  nearer  to 
criticism-dialogue-cooperation. 
Personality  also  played  an  important  role  in  the  Sino-Soviet  dispute. 
As  the  top  Soviet  leader  for  more  than  ten  years,  from  1954  to  1964, 238 
Khrushchev  bears  great  resposibility  for  the  conflict.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  he  stood  in  the  vanguard  of  reform  after  Stalin's  death.  But 
essentially  speaking,  he  still  belonged  to  the  old  generation  with  a 
traditional  attitude.  He  was  fully  aware  of  the  short-comings  of  the  old 
system;  at  same  time  his  ideas  and-behaviour  were  greatly  influenced  by 
it.  He  was  the-contradictionary  product  of  the  transitional  period  from  the 
old  system  to  the  new.  He  went  all  out  to  fight  Stalin's  personality  cult, 
while  creating  one  for  himself;  he  fought  hard  against  bureaucracy  and 
subjectivism,  but  a  new  bureaucracy  and  subjectivism  reappeared  repeatedly; 
he  criticized  Stalin's  policy  of  chauvinism  in  dealing  with  fraternal 
countries,  but  at  the  same  time  he  treated  countries  with  -different  ideas 
ruthlessly,  using  extreme  political  and  economic  pressure.  In  a  word, 
Khrushchev,  as  Brugger  observed,  "strode  brashly,  across  the  face  of  Soviet 
history  engendering  an  odd  mixture  of  hope,  exasperation  and  ridicule.  "2 
Mao  Zedong,  as  an  experienced  revolutionary,  had  been 
_.  aware  of 
shortcomings  in  the  Soviet  system.  With  keen.  political,  insight  he 
successfully  resisted  high-pressure  Soviet  chauvinism.  But  involvement 
in  Sino-Soviet  polemics,  among  other  things,  put  him  under  extreme 
pressure  and  caused  him  to  bring  a  disastrous  interpretation  of  the 
class  struggle  upon  the  whole  nation.  This  was  real  historical  tragedy 
that  also  impacted  on  Sino-Soviet  relations.  - 
In  the  "Eighteenth  Brumaire  of  Louis  Bonaparte",  Marx  commented  on  the 
fetters-  imposed  by  history:  "Men  make  their  own  history,  but  they  do  not 
make  it  just  as  they  please;  they  do  not  make  it  under  circumstances  chosen 
by  themselves,  but  under  circumstances  directly  encountered,  given  and 
transmitted  from  the  past.  The  tradition  of  all  the  dead  generations  weighs 
like  a  nightmare  on  the  brain  of  the  living.  And  just  when  they  seem 239 
engaged  in  revolutionising  themselves  and  things,  in  creating  something 
that  has  never  existed,  precisely  in  such  period  of  revolutionary  crisis 
they  anxiously  conjure  up  the  spirit  of  the  past  to  their  service  and 
borrow  from  them  names,  battle  cries  and  costumes  in  order  to  present  the 
new  scene  in  world  history  in  this  time  honoured  disguise  and  borrowed 
language.  "'  Commenting  on  the  English  bourgeois  revolution,  Marx  noted  that 
it  took  quite  a  long  time  before  Locke  supplanted  Habbakuk  and 
revolutionaies  extricated  themselves  from  the  Old  Treatment.  `  A  similar 
situation  arose  in  the  Sino-Soviet  -dispute.  In  using  the  word 
"revisionist",  Mao  evoked  the  image  of  Bernstein  and  Kautsky  with  whom 
Khrushchev  bore  little  resemblance.  Khrushchev,  for  his  part,  painted  Mao 
as  another  Trotsky,  which  was  even  more  ridiculous.  's 
The  development  of  Sino-Soviet  relations,  one  of  the  most  dramatic  events 
since  World  War  Two,  has  not  only  greatly  affected  the  relations  among  the 
socialist  countries  and  the  Communist  Parties,  but  has  also  enormously 
influenced  the  evolution  of  the  whole  international  situation.  Great 
changes  have  taken  place  and  are  still  taking  place  inside  both  countries. 
What  problems  will  arise  in  Sino-Soviet  relations  in  facing 
. 
these  changes? 
Will  there  be  new  ideological  polemics  between  the  two  countries,  or  will 
there  be  a  new  alliance?  What  is  the  prospect  for  Sino-Soviet  relations  in 
the  1990s?  What  will  the  impact  of  all  this  be  upon  the  West?  It  is  very 
difficult  to  answer  these  questions  now.  But  one  thing  is  sure:  the 
relations  between  the  PRC  and  the  USSR  will  be  as  normal  as  between  any 
other  two  countries.  After  Gorbachev's  visit  to  Beijing  in  May  1989,  the 
developing  relationship  between  them  has  shown  that  both  sides  have  come 
down  to  earth  in  dealing  with  each  other: 
1)  Economic  relations  have  taken  priority  and  have  developed  rapidly.  In 240 
1989,  Sino-Soviet  trade  turnover  totalled  2.4  billion  rubles  (USS3.8 
billion),  a  20  per  cent  increase  over  the  year  before,  and  in  1990  it  was 
expected  to  increase  36  per  cent.  r,  During  Premier  Li'  s  Moscow  trip  in  May 
1990,  the  two  sides  signed  six  documents: 
---A  Long-term  Economic,  Scientific  and  Technological  Co-operation  and 
Development  Programme; 
---A  Co-operation  Agreement  on  the  Peaceful  Use  and  Study  of  Space; 
---An  Agreement  on  the  Mutual  Reduction  of  Military  Forces  in  the 
Sino-Soviet  Border  Areas  and  on  the  Guiding  Principles-for  Enhancing  Trust 
in  the  Military  Fields; 
---A  Protocol  on  Consultations  between  Foreign  Ministries; 
An  Agreement  on  Governmental  Credit  for  Daily-use  Commodities 
Provided  by  China  to  the  Soviet  Union; 
---A  Memorandum  on  the  Construction  of  a  Nuclear  Power  Plant  in  China 
and  a  Soviet  Government  Loan  to  China. 
Two  thirds  of  these  agreements  were  related  to  economic,  scientific  and 
technological  co-operation,  greatly  widening  the  scope  of  co-operation.. 
2)  Both  countries  have  taken  positive  attitudes  to  reducing  military 
confrontation.  The  Soviet  Union  said  it  would  cut  200,000  troops  in  Asia 
and  withdraw  three-quarters  of  its  troops  from  Mongolia  during  1989  and 
1990.  Because  the  border  issue  is  closely  linked  with  the  full 
normalization  of  relations  and  genuine  political  trust,  teams  of  diplomatic 
and  military  experts  from  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  have  been-  discussing 
the  situation. 
3)  There  should  be  no  ideological  obstacles  to  the  development  of  state 
relations.  The  Sino-Soviet  rift  was  largely  caused  by  ideological 
differences.  Learning  from  bitter-  experience,  the  two  sides  have  now 241 
managed  to  avoid  interfering  in  each  other's  internal  affairs  and  no  longer 
use  harsh  language  that  would  hurt  bilateral  relations.  When  answering 
questions  from  Soviet  journalists  this  year,  Premier  Li  Peng  said:  "The 
socialist  road  needs  to  be  continuously  explored.  The  Soviet  Union  has  its 
pattern  and  China  has  one  too.  This  poses  no  obstacles  to  developing  normal 
state-to-state  and  Party-to-Party  relations.  "' 
The  potential  of  Sino-Soviet  ties  can  be  summed  as  follows: 
1)  The  volume  of  Sino-Soviet  trade,  though  considerably  greater  than 
one  or  two  decades  ago,  is  only  3.5  per  cent  of  China's  total  foreign  trade 
volume  and  about  1.5  percent  of  the  Soviet  Union's.  It  is  far  from 
reaching  the  level  of  the  two  countries'  economic  capacity.  In  1989  Soviet- 
Chinese  trade  (US$3.8  billion)  was  less  than  Soviet-Japanese  (US$6.9 
billion)  and  Soviet-US  (US$5  billion).  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
many  favourable  conditions  for  developing  economic  relations;  particularly 
their  complementary  economic  structures  --  one  possesses  what  the  other 
lacks.  Linked  by  land  and  rivers,  they  enjoy  convenient  transport.  Having 
only  a  small  gap  in  their  economic  performance  ,  they  co-operate  easily.  -In 
practice,  their  economic  relations  are  growing  fast..  In  trade,  for 
example,  the  Commodities  Fair  held  in  Tune  1990  in  Harbin  led  within  10 
days  to  the  signing  of  contracts  worth  SF1.8  billion  "(US$1.2  billion) 
between  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  and  East  European  countries.  "  Begining 
in  1991,  spot  exchange  trade  will  replace  barter  trade  as  the  chief  form  of 
bilateral  trade.  At  the  same  time,  barter  trade  will  continue  to  be  used 
for  border  and  inter-enterprise  trade.  The  Beijiang  (northen  border) 
Railway,  completed  in  August  1990,  will  serve  as  another  European-Asian 
continental  artery  much  like  the  Far  East  Railway.  Compared  with  the 
latter,  however,  the  new  rail  line  will  save  time  and  thus  reduce  freight 242 
costs.  After  it  opens  to  traffic,  it  will  create  more  favourable 
conditions  for  trade.  Moreover,  the  Soviet  Union  has  made  ambitious  plans 
to  develop  Siberia  and  the  Far  East.  It  is  preparing  to  open  cities  in  the 
region  and  invite  neighbouring  countries  to  join  in  the  building'of  special 
economic  zones.  China's  relevant  provinces  are  also  planning  to  "revitalize 
frontier  provinces  by  trade"  and  have  mapped  an  economic  developemnt 
strategy.  These  plans  are  conductive  to  the  expansion  of  economic 
relations. 
2)  An  agreement  to  reduce  military  levels  on  the  border  is  still 
possible.  The  two  governments  have  already  reached  a  preliminary  agreement 
and  teams  of  experts  are  negotiating  the  details.  Exchanges  have  become 
normal  practice  and  are  ocurring  more  frequently.  For  example,  Chinese  and 
Soviet  Foreign  Ministers  held  working  talks  on  1  September  1990  in  the 
Chinese  city  of  Harbin.  According  to  the  comprehensive  news  release  issued 
on  2  September,  "The  two  ministers'  talks  were  part  of  an  in-depth 
dialogue  between  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  concerning  the  most  important 
current  international  issues.  The  two  sides  analysed  the  situation  in  the 
Gulf  region,  exchanged  views  on  the  Asian-Pacific  region.  the  Cambodian 
question,  the  Afghanistan  issue,  the  situation  in  the  Korean  Peninsula  and 
in  Europe,  as  well  as  the  issue  of  German  unification,  and  discussed  Sino- 
Soviet  relations-119  The  article  went  on  to  point  out  that  "The  two  foreign 
ministers  expressed  satisfaction  with  the  speedy  development  of  Sino-Soviet 
relations  in  various  areas.  The  two  sides  pledged  to  continue  efforts  for 
the  implementation  of  the  agreements  reached  at  the  Sina-Soviet  summit 
meeting  last  year,  and  to  enhance  the  friendly  neighbourly  relations 
between  them  on  the  basis  of  the  Sino-Soviet  Joint  Communique  of  18  May 
1989.  The  two  ministers  agreed  that  the  border  negotiations  have  made 243 
progress  and  that  the  process  should  be  accelerated  in  order  to  solve  the 
problem  as  soon  as  possible.  Both  sides  agreed  that  a  regular  meeting  of 
the  working  groups  should  be  convened  later  this  October  in  Beijing.  A 
decision  was  also  made  that  existing  talks  on  the  reduction  of  armed  forces 
and  the  strengthening  of  mutual  trust  in  the  military  field  should  be  held 
in  Moscow  on  10  September...  Agreements  were  also  reached  on  establishing  a 
Chinese  general  consulate  in  Chabarovsk  and  a  Soviet  one  in  Shenyang  as 
soon  as  possible.  "'° 
3)  The  continuing  improvement  in  Sino-Soviet  ties  is  part  and  parcel  of 
the  international  trend  towards  detente.  Normal  Sino-Soviet-relations  have 
faciliated  somewhat  better  relations  between  China  and  India,  India  and 
Pakistan,  China  and  Vietnam,  and  between  Indo-China  and  the  Association  of 
Southeast  Asian  Nations.  All  this  should  carry  forward  the  trend  towards 
peace  and  co-operation  in  the'Asian-Pacific  region. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  influenced  by  the  many  factors  discussed 
above,  ''  Sino-Soviet  relations  are  still  complicated.  There  will  still  be 
contradictions  and  divergences.  China  and  the  Soviet  Union  have  their 
respective  national  interests,  and  their  foreign  policies  vary  on  several 
issues.  What  is  more,  they  now  hold  some  fundamental  differences  on-how  to 
reform  socialism.  After  the  radical  change  in  Eastern  Europe  over  the 
winter  of  1989-90,  especially  after  the  Romanian  dictator  Ceaucescu  was 
executed  in  December,  the  Chinese  Party  and  government  were  very 
critical,  at  least  from  January  to  March  1990,  towards  Gorbachev  and  his 
"new  thinking".  The  Central  Committe  of  the  CCP  sent  a  telegram  to  all 
Party  members  in  late  January,  which  was  an  unusual  measure,  blaming 
Gorbachev  for  the  collapse  of  the  Communist  governments  in  Eastern  Europe, 
saying  that  he  was  a  traitor  to  socialism,  and  that  his  "new  thinking"  was 244 
a  reflection  of  the  Second  International.  Simultaneously,  the  Central 
Committe  of  the  CCP  organized  a  group  from  different  government 
institutions  as  well  as  from  academic  institutions  to  prepare  a  new  type 
of  polemics  between  the  two  countries.  This  affirmed  that  the  Chinese 
viewpoint  of  the  mid-1960s'  was  basically  correct  and  held  that  the 
spirit  of  the  "nine  comments"  was  still  suitable  for  the  present  time. 
Those  who  held  that  the  Soviet  reforms  were  still  under  the  control  of  the 
CPSU  and  in-  accord  with  socialism  found  themselves  under  great  pressure. 
Only  in  late  March  when  Deng  Xiaoping  said  that  the  Chinese  Communists 
should  first  strengthen  their  position  in  their  own  country  did  the  tune 
of  the  CCP  begin  to  change.  Jiang  Zemin,  the  new  Party  chief,  sent  three 
people  (one  from  the  International  Department  of  the  CCP,  one  from  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  third  from  the  Institute  of  Soviet 
and  East  Eropean  Studies  of  Chinese  Academy  of  Social  Sciences)  to  make  a 
two-month  survey  of  the  Soviet  Union.  They  gave  a  positive  report  about 
Soviet  reforms.  As  a  result  Li  Peng  could  go  to  Moscow  in  May.  This 
development  has  indicated  at  least  two  things.  First,  the  internal  and 
external  situations  of  the  two  countries  are  very  different  from  that  of 
the  past.  It  is  difficult  for  them  to  restart  their  polemics.  They  will 
try  to  solve  their  differences  by  means  of  peaceful  negotiation.  They  have 
learned  from  their  mistakes.  Yet,  secondly,  the  potential  for  a  new 
ideological  battle  still  exists.  It  cannot  be  totally  excluded  that  a  new 
type  of  conflict  may  emerge  should  their  internal  situations  in  particular, 
but  also  their  external  position,  change  radically  from  those  obtaining  at 
present. 245 
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APPENDIX 
China's  Foreign  Trade  with  USSR 
(1950-1989)  (in  million  Rubles) 
Year  Import 
-  --  -  ----------- 
Export 
--------------------- 
Turnover 
--------  -- 
1950  349.7  172.3 
-  ------------ 
522.0 
1951  431.0  298.4  729.4 
1952  499.3  372.7  872.0 
1953  628.4  427.7  1056.1 
1954  684.0  521.1  1205.1 
1955  673.5  579.2  1252.7 
1956  660.4  688.5  1348.9 
1957  490.2  665.0  1155.2 
1958  570.6  793.1  1363.7 
1959  859.1  990.3  1849.4 
1960  735.4  763.3  1498.7 
1961  330.6  496.3  826.9 
1962  210.1  464.7  674.8 
1963  168.5  371.7  540.2 
1964  121.8  282.8  404.6 
1965  172.5  203.0  375.5 
1966  157.8  128.8  286.6 
1967  45.2  51.1  96.3 
1968  53.4  33.0  86.4 
1969  25.0  26.1  51.1 
1970  22.4  19.5  41.9 
1971  70.1  68.6  138.7 
1972  100.2  110.4  210.6 
1973  100.5  100.8  201.3 
1974  108.4  105.5  213.9 
1975  93.1  107.8  200.9 
1976  179.8  134.6  314.4 
1977  118.4  130.1  248.5 
1978  163.8  174.9  338.7 
1979  175.2  157.3  332.5 
1980  169.6  147.0  316.6 247 
Year  Import  Export  Turnover 
1981  82.6  94.2  176.8 
1982  120.1  103.4  223.5 
1983  255.6  232.6  488.2 
1984  467.9  509.9  977.8 
1985  780.4  834.5  1614.9 
1986  910.3  911.7  1822.0 
1987  724.3  750.6  1474.9 
1988  1005.2  844.9  1850.1 
1989  1328.5  1083.5  2412.0 
Sources:  Vneshnia  Torgovlia,  CCCP,  Statisticheskii  Sbornik,  1956-1989, 
Moskva. 
H.  Sladkovsky,  "The  Development  of  Trade  Between  the  Soviet  Union 
and  the  People's  Republic  of  China",  Vneshnia  Torgovlia,  No.  10, 
1959,  p.  6. 
14.  L.  Titarenko,  40  Let  KNP,  1989,  Moskva,  p.  366. 
N.  H.  Yctuhova,  Ekonomika  i  Vneshne-Ekonomicheskie  Svyazi  CCCP, 
1983,  Moskva,  pp.  196-198. 248 
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